


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18 MAY 1993



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JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

ISRAEL

Near East & South Asia

ISRAEL

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Internal Affairs

Transfer Option in Face of Islamic Threats

93AA0032A Tel Aviv HAYARDEN in Hebrew
30 Mar 93 p 6

[Article by Moshe Ben-Shahar: "Islam Will Never Accept Israel's Existence in the Near East; words within slantlines published in English]

[Text] When we hear these days, against the background of the Arabs' detestable murders, Shalom Ahshav's (Peace Now) calls to "absorb our losses," it is impossible not to recall the events of years past, and to understand that the Arabs have not changed. They wanted then, and still want, to drive us out of here, or exterminate us, depending on what the circumstances and conditions allow.

When the Zionist Congress met in 1921, in a world completely changed by the results of the 1st World War, and the Zionist movement was facing a serious of problems totally different from what had been discussed at the previous congress in 1913, a small group within the Zionist leadership of that time, led by Professor Martin Buber, tried to present future objectives in "realistic" terms and place the problem of Arab-Jewish coexistence in the center of the debate. Because of Buber's inflexible pressure, a clause emphasizing the Jewish people's desire "to live with the Arab people in a relationship of compatibility and mutual respect, and, together with them, to turn the region we share into a thriving community, whose development will ensure each people uninhibited national development," was finally included in the resolutions of the congress.

The congress was able to agree to this formulation because many [delegates] believed that, for tactical reasons, it was desirable to say something of this kind. Buber himself was not satisfied; for the committees of the congress had cut passages and tones from his text, which would have been vital for making it clear that this was the basis for a new ideological beginning. But, as the 50 years since that congress have proven, nothing has changed in the attitude of the Arabs toward us.

But the founders of "Brit Shalom," as they called then, and the members of "Shalom 'Akshav," as their spiritual successors are called today, continue to preach the need for extreme concessions to the Arabs.

We must emphasize again that Islam will never agree to our existence in this region, and we should say this openly, publicly, and forcefully.

A thorough study of the Koran and shari'ah will show that Islam not only believes that it is the only true path, but also that it is a requirement to fulfill it through force at every opportunity.

In practice, Islam has never been squeamish about using any method to propagate its faith among the peoples,

whether by force, or by coercion and guile of all kinds. But it became clear very early that neither through holy war (Jihad) and conquest, nor through the "missionary persuasion" that came into use in later periods, would Islam be able to secure her rule over the whole world. Accordingly, the religious theorists determined that until the end of days, the world would be divided into two distinct parts: the part Islam already rules—"Dar al-Islam"—and the part where there must always be war ("Dar al-Harb") until Islam rules over it as well. The moment any rival seems weak, the moment its borders can be successfully breached, peace with that rival would end.

Beyond the everyday throwing of stones or Molotov cocktails by the Arabs, every Jewish citizen of Israel has the responsibility to know who we are dealing with here. About 40 percent of the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza support Hamas, and today, already, it is the second largest movement, after the PLO. The Hamas organization was founded in December, 1987, five days after the intifadah broke out. The Islamic Union decided to found it, for fear that the opportunities the intifadah was creating would be wasted, and the Islamic Union would lose power and end up a marginal factor in the field. Sheikh Ahmad Ya'sin (who is now in an Israeli prison), took the leadership of this movement upon himself. At first, the organization was small and permeated by religious fervor, its activities characterized by great readiness for self-sacrifice. In those days, the members of Hamas were among the few who practiced murder. As its activities broadened, the movement began to put up proclamations that declared "Days of Remembrance" and gave instructions to the public.

With the weakening of the mass dimension of the intifadah, this organization began to put the emphasis on peaceful methods of encouraging people to return to the principles of the faith, to increase the number of recruits to its ranks.

Hamas gathered great strength and many supporters for a year and a half, until it was outlawed near the end of 1988. Sheikh Ya'sin and a long list of activists were arrested, though only some were sentenced. Since then, Hamas has been challenging the PLO in general and preaching extremist ideas, with the destruction of the State of Israel central to them.

As to the PLO, which the leaders of the present coalition are courting: it is the movement that adopted the "Palestinian Manifesto," which requires them ideologically to annihilate Israel and expel the majority of her inhabitants.

"The Palestinian National Manifesto" is certainly the most important document, at least at this stage, of the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially for the Arab side. It constitutes an authoritative summary [of intentions], no less than Hitler's *Mein Kampf* did in its time.

The previous version of the manifesto was set at the first Palestinian Congress, which met in Jerusalem in May of

1964—just three years before the Six Day War. At that gathering, the "Palestine Liberation Organization" was founded. In the first manifesto's official translation into English, it is called a "covenant," that is, a "Brit (covenant)," to emphasize its holiness, and the words of the introduction to the manifesto end with an oath to carry it out. That congress determined that the Palestinian National Council, which is the highest institution of the Palestinian organizations, would meet periodically, and that amendment of the manifesto would be possible only through a majority of two-thirds of the congress's members. Because of the changes that had occurred in the Palestine Liberation Organization after the Six Day War, the Palestinian Congress met in Cairo for a fourth meeting, in May of 1968, and there revised the manifesto, which has remained in effect to this day! The principles set by the manifesto are: the Jews are not a people, and therefore not worthy of self determination or of having a state. Only the Palestinians have the right to self-determination, and they are masters of the entire land. In the Palestinian state, only Jews who were in the Palestine before 1917 will be recognized as citizens. The battle against Israel is legal, but if Israel defends herself, that is illegal, and any agreement with Israel is a matter of tactics, not strategy.

These passages in this "manifesto" are impossible to ignore.

In the present battle going on, with the knifings and the rest of the methods the Arabs are using to murder every Jew they can, another factor must be mentioned: the Islamic Jihad, which raises the banner of destruction of Israel immediately, through continuous, uncompromising armed struggle. There are also members of this movement among the Israeli Arabs, who are considered citizens of the State. The Hamas movement simultaneously raises the banner of bringing the Palestinians closer to Islam, to create public resolve, which will help when the time comes to carry out their goals. We should not ignore the fact that since the Six Day War the Islamic awakening among Israeli Arabs has been on the rise. The close tie to the Islamic institutions on the West Bank and Gaza is constantly strengthening. Over the last few years, many mosques have been erected in cities and towns all over Israel, and representatives of the Islamic stream were elected to various posts in the city and local councils in the Arab communities.

Israeli Arabs also base their plans to a great extent on demographics over the years have been working to their advantage. The demographic clock has been ticking in favor of the Arabs. The natural growth rate of the Arab population, which stood at 3.08 percent in 1989, while the Jewish rate stood at 1.28 percent, effectively ensures that a few dozen years from now, the non-Jewish minority within the Green Line and Jerusalem will have become the majority!

It must be clear to all of us that there can be no possibility of coexistence with an Arab national minority in the land of Israel. And therefore, the time has come to

recognize that in the end this dispute will also unavoidably reach the stage of transfer, either of us or of them—and this apart from the need for borders that will be secure in an extremist Arab environment.

Druze Attitude Toward Golan Questioned

93AA0044A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
21 Apr 93 p 23

[Article by Gogah Qogan]

[Text] "I am waiting for the eleventh hour, and then I will decide," says Samir Da'bus, head of the 'Eyn Qiyniya council in the Golan Heights, when asked whether he continues to be an Israeli sympathizer due to the chance that the Syrians will return to the Golan.

Da'bus, a declared member of the Likud center, was appointed to his job in the era of the Likud government. Lately, he lost the sparkle in his eyes that characterized him in the era of the previous government, when he appeared glued to every Likud party meeting in the Golan Heights. Signs of trouble can now be seen on his face: What will he do if Rabin's government hands over the Druze enclave to Syria within the framework of the phased peace agreement?

One who has not waited until the last moment to change loyalty is Muhsan Abu-Salah, head of the Masa'da council, who expressed himself on television recently as one who belongs to "the Syrian homeland." Since that report, Muhsan Abu-Salah no longer wishes to speak with the media. He is holed up in his office, with the complaint that "the reporters are liars."

Abu-Salah's change in loyalty does not surprise the people of Masa'da. "In the Syrian era, he was the village Mukhtar, a registered member of the Ba'at party," they say in the village. "After the Six Day War, he became pro-Israeli until he was appointed head of the council, and, since then, he has been a Likud man, even a member of the center. His son, Salim Muhsan Abu-Salah, receives a salary from the Histadrut as a 'coordinator of neighborhoods.' Despite the fact that, on the outside, he spoke in favor of Israel, internally, in his living room, he spoke against the state, and he sent his son to study in Syria."

Another pro-Israeli among the Druze, the head of the Majdal Shams council, Salim Shufi, is not so quick to change his loyalty. Despite the fact that two days after he started his job, someone took the trouble to burn down the offices of the local council, Shufi has not budged from his consistently pro-Israeli position. He does not believe that Israel will ever leave the Golan: "The heart is quiet, Israel will stay here," he says while chewing kebab in the restaurant that he owns in Berekhat Ram.

"A person must be straight, one line for the entire life. If Muhsan changed his taste, that is his business. I did not appoint him, and I will not go into it."

Of 15,000 Druze residents in the Golan, about 250 remain with Israeli citizenship, the majority confiscated by the religious leadership, which is openly and declared pro-Syrian. Now, when al-Asad speaks about "everything for everything," a great fear has befallen this minority. The Syrians do not forget and are not quick to forgive.

Even in the framework of peace and normalization with Israel "there will be a great migration among those who received Israeli citizenship," says one of those with Israeli citizenship who, under Israeli rule has acquired a large house and a BMW automobile. "If peace breaks out and the territory is returned to Syria, the most reasonable probability is that we will move to the Druze villages in the Karmel; we will see how peace develops and then we will consider whether to return to the Golan."

Despite the fact that most of the participants in the protest processions against the state and in the recent disturbances in Majdal Shams were youth born under Israeli rule, in the opinion of many in the Druze villages, it is actually they who will have difficulty adapting to Syrian rule. "They, who have been educated in the democratic atmosphere of the state of Israel, in which it is permissible to say everything; who raised their standard of living by thousands of percents in comparison to the situation in the Syrian era—they will suffer the most."

"They know this, but they must take out insurance policies for the future, for their own sakes and the sakes of their adult relatives. No one asks the adults under which rule they would like to live."

Salman Muhammad Abu-Salah, founder of the Druze Zionist group, a person who has fought his entire life for an Israeli Golan, has not changed his opinion, either, but he says under his breath: "How can I be an activist, the moment that the Israeli Government stated that the entire matter is be questioned?"

Abu-Salah does not blame Muhsan for changing his loyalty, despite the fact that he has a clear opinion of his political path. "All of the responsibility is in the hands of the Israeli Government. Up until now, all of the governments, including the present one, have not known how to deal with 'goyim' [as published], both in the Golan Heights as well as in other places."

In his opinion, this year there will be a great increase in anti-Israel demonstrations in the wake of the peace talks. "People feel that they have half a foot in Syria, and they know that Syrians are treating the talks seriously. Israel is a democratic state in which anything can be said and nothing will happen to you. So, why not take out Syrian insurance?"

Last Saturday, in Majdal Shams, the Druze mass assembly marking the Syrian Independence Day was dispersed by tear gas. After the dispersal, the district commander, Ya'aqov Ganot, said to the dignitaries who

came to inquire about the detainees, "You got the gas, now you are O.K. with the Syrians. Go home."

The dignitaries laughed, shook hands, and instructed their people to disperse to their homes.

Begin on 1967 Borders, Labor Government

93AA0029E Tel Aviv HAYARDEN in Hebrew
30 Mar 93 p 3

[Article by Ze'ev B. Begin: "Meetings"]

[Text] The allowing of meetings between Israel and members of the PLO gang is another signal, clear and serious, of the tendency of the majority in the Government of Israel to pull back to the 1967 borders.

A few weeks ago, following the amateurish expulsion of the Hamas members to Lebanon, the ministers of the left explained that the goal of the action is to defend the PLO terrorists from a takeover by the Hamas terrorists. The prime minister himself focused all the words of propaganda for the action on the religious fanatics, and granted immunity to the secular fanatics of the PLO, despite his knowledge that most of the terror actions in recent years were carried out by factions of the PLO, foremost among them the central faction, the "moderate" one, of the PLO.

The reason for hiding the PLO terror is the same as that for changing "the law of meetings" with its murderers. The left headed by Rabin seeks to grant a label of approval to this terror organization, even though it has not changed its strategic goal: the liquidation of the State of Israel by stages. That this is, indeed, its goal was clarified only a few weeks ago by the darling of the Israeli left, Feisal Al-Husayni, when he said (in Amman) that it is necessary "to dissolve the Zionist entity, gradually." The significance of this chemical equation is that in Stage A, they will roll Israel back to the 1967 borders and will establish the PLO state in Samaria, Judea, and the Gaza region. In Stage B, they will demand the realization of the right of return with the support of acts of terror, the Arab citizens of Israel in the Galil and Wadi 'Ara will be a target for incitement, so that they will demand their integration with the Arab state in Samaria.

It is saddening to say, but one cannot refrain from stating the facts: Stage A in the PLO plan is identical to the diplomatic plan of most of the ministers in the government, most of the Labor members of Knesset, and all the Meretz Knesset members. What does the PLO seek in the first stage?—The establishing of an independent Arab state under it in Samaria, Judea, and the Gaza region. What does the Israeli left seek?—The establishing of an independent Arab state headed by the PLO in Samaria, Judea, and the Gaza region. The PLO wants to get exactly what the majority in the Rabin government wants to give, and, therefore, the serious conclusion is inescapable: in the short run, there is a clear, painful, and

dangerous identity of interests between the terroristic monster of the PLO and the majority in the Israeli Government.

From this similarity in plan, stems the common desire to anesthetize the public. The PLO, for its part, puts on again the diplomatic jacket, after it was stained at the time of the Gulf war, and on our side the left prefers quiet in the debate. This week, when I expressed in a radio program my opinion on the significance of the establishment of a state headed by the PLO 5 km from Jerusalem, Knesset Member Dadi Zucker of Meretz calmed me: "I do not engage in futurology," he said, "and this state has not yet come into existence. We are just conducting negotiations now with the Palestinians." That is: we need quiet, comrades, and do not wake up the public before matters are concluded.

Why the PLO? Why the yearning for an organization that continues to murder Jews and Arabs after it "renounced" terror four years ago? Why the embracing of those who embraced Saddam Husayn two years ago? What is the origin of the attempt to grant approval to a group of murderers that is trying to take under its aegis, with organizational limitations, the Hamas, and that recently reached an agreement with the Hamas in Khartoum for coordinating the terror activities in Eretz Yisra'el?

The answer is known: Hamas and the PLO have an identical aim, but the Hamas does not try to hide it. The PLO hides its full plan, and it is willing to reach an agreement with Israel on the basis of the realization of Stage A of its plan. Hence the PLO is the factor that is willing to supply the Israeli left the piece of paper that it needs in its struggle for public opinion in Israel. There will be an "agreement," there will be a document, and they will wave it in front of the citizens of Israel in order to justify their abandoning Samaria, Judaea, and the Gaza region. Meanwhile, the government tries to realize the malicious slogan "to dry up the Jewish settlements in the territories," in order to try to empty them of their residents and to facilitate the turning over of the territory to PLO sovereignty.

This is the central idea of the left in Israel, which, according to the statement of Minister Ya'ir Tzaban several weeks ago, won a majority in the government. But it must be asked, where is all this leading, even according to the approach of these gamblers. In a debate in the Knesset, I asked those who demand abandonment, what will happen, according to their approach, if Israel abandons Samaria, Judaea, and the Gaza region, a PLO-run state arises, while the Hamas tries to take it over. For according to the logic of the left, the government of Israel is now acting against the Hamas, in order to protect the status of the PLO. But when we won't be in the field, when the security forces withdraw to Tel Aviv, who will deal with the Hamas? Who will defend the 'Arafat government?

I received a reply that was astounding in its simplicity from Ya'ir Tzaban, who called out to me: "There will be a defense alliance!" Did I understand? The Hamas terrorists will threaten the PLO terrorists, and according to a paragraph in the defense pact between the PLO state and the State of Israel, the Israel Defense Forces will become the Yishma'el Defense Forces, and will enter Ram'allah in order to save 'Arafat! When these are the solutions that are proposed to a serious problem, which will be created according to the diplomatic approach of the left in Israel, doubt arises as to the seriousness of those who propose. The rush to abandon makes them illogical, and they endanger Israel in the far future, in order to achieve mental peace in the near future.

And Yitzhak Rabin?—He continues to be dragged along, as is shown by his position on amending "the meetings law" with the PLO. A few weeks ago, he opposed an amendment, and even explained his opposition with convincing arguments. Afterwards, he announced that he would freeze the proposed amendment in the ministerial committee for national security, and now he lends his hand to the amending of the law and to the granting of striking approval to the PLO.

Spurred by the extreme left in his government, he has already differentiated between a moderate PLO and an extreme PLO, and with a sharp analytical distinction he already has terrible terrorists (Hamas), bad terrorists ('Arafat), and good terrorists (Nabil Sha'at). This is not a left-government headed by Rabin but rather a Rabin-government headed by the left—a bad government for Israel.

Schiff on Dangers of Remaining in Gaza

93A40024B HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 Apr 93 p B1

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff: "A Lost War in the Gaza Strip"]

[Text] I have never struggled so much over the question of how to word the sentence that would sum up what is currently happening in the Gaza Strip and Israel's chances in this war. Should I say that the conclusion is that Israel is conducting a battle of withdrawal in the Gaza Strip? Or perhaps I should say it adamantly—that Israel has, in effect, lost the war there?

In the first draft, the meaning is that it is still, perhaps, possible to turn the wheel back after one withdrawal, but the meaning of the second draft is that we are referring to a loss without any chance of change. The facts in the field indicate that the second possibility is the one closer to reality. What is currently taking place in the Gaza Strip is, in effect, a battle over the terms of withdrawal in the future.

When speaking of war, this does not refer only to military contention. Despite the difficulties in dealing with terrorism, the security branches can become more efficient and more successful. They can pressure the Gazans more, continue to kill them, starve them, and make them more desperate. Such suggestions also exist.

The problem is that the war that Israel is conducting in the Gaza Strip is more inclusive, almost total. The struggle is, among other things, in the demographic and economic realm. When considering these factors, Israel has almost no chance of gaining anything; it can only lose. This will be defeat by points, but it will be such that it will exhaust us in many aspects. Everything that has been done in the Gaza Strip, and there are honest efforts to make it easier for the local residents, is like spilling a bucket of water into the ocean. This is not only a war over national aspirations and self determination but, first and foremost, a war against an oppressed proletariat devoid of hope in almost every realm. Time will not heal the ills, and it can be only worse in the future. This is more than Israel can bear in almost every respect, including the moral perspective.

Since Israel captured the Gaza Strip, its population has grown almost threefold. It currently amounts to 830,500 people, according to the statistics of the Civil Administration. Approximately 70,000 of them are temporarily abroad. Currently, a Palestinian baby is born every 14 minutes in the Gaza Strip. Every year, approximately 35,000 babies are added to the population. The birthrate in one month is greater than all of the residents of Gush Katif and the other settlements in the Gaza Strip. This birthrate is among the highest in the world, 4.6 to 5.8 percent. Because approximately 60 percent of the residents of the Gaza Strip are under the age of 18, the population growth will be tremendous. Toward the end of the decade, over 1 million people will live in this tiny area, approximately 365 square km.

The factor that renders this population a critical mass for us is the fact that we are incapable of building a minimal infrastructure and minimal sources of livelihood for it. There are not enough sources of water there. The salination of the wells increases from year to year. In order to establish desalination plants, many hundreds of millions of dollars are needed. We turned the world upside down in order to add approximately 1,200 jobs there over the past two years, while between 5,000 to 10,000 more people seek employment there each year. The opportunities for newlyweds are horribly miserable. The Gaza Strip is currently dependent on Israel, and we do not have the ability to provide it with the minimum in terms of water, electricity (the residents owe the electric company approximately 14 million NIS [new Israeli shekels], and the company will ultimately disconnect the current), sanitation and medicine. Approximately 2 billion dollars are needed in order to partially rehabilitate the Gaza Strip, which Israel cannot provide. It is doubtful whether others will do so. And even if Israel were very wealthy, this would not be the place to invest in.

A visit to the Gaza Strip leaves one with the feeling that hundreds of thousands of people are living on a wave of garbage. Each year, the picture is more desolate. Those serving in the Civil Administration, both soldiers and civilians are, for the most part, good people. It is strange to hear military personnel currently fighting against the Palestinians transmitting the distress of the residents to

us. If the Likud returns to power, and Israel remains in the Gaza Strip, conditions will worsen, because they will continue to take the land reserve away from the residents on behalf of the settlements. The refuge will be in religious fundamentalism and increasing terrorism.

Therefore, there is only one conclusion to be drawn from all of this: the Gaza Strip is a time bomb for Israel. The trouble is that this is not explicitly said to the public, perhaps because this government stammers when it comes time to explain itself and perhaps because there is a fear of presenting the bitter truth in full. It was, of all people, the Minister of defense on behalf of the Likud, Moshe Arens, who reached a similar conclusion.

From the military perspective, as well, we are subject to deterioration. This is a struggle that requires our troops to kill civilians and children endlessly. The military control of the Gaza Strip is currently occupation in its bad sense. The IDF [Israel Defense Forces] is slowly becoming the army of the intifadah. Due to this, there are currently divisions that are unable to complete their training. It is depressing to see 18-year-olds doing their entire military service in the Gaza Strip, and guarding jails full of bitter workers as if they were cattle. The command is contradicting itself. The troops, some of them idealists who are endangering themselves in the war against terrorism, are witness to the public debate, asking questions that are difficult to answer.

Other countries, as well, have been forced to shorten lines and fight over terms of withdrawal, but for us, this is on the threshold and within our home. Those who say that it is [part of] the land of Israel are perhaps technically right but, all in all, this is a new Philistia, in another country, that we must get out of, if only for the reason that we must not fight a war that is a lost case from the outset. The danger of remaining is greater than the danger deriving from withdrawal within the framework of an agreement with the Palestinians.

Benvenisti on 'Bantustanized' Palestine

93AA0029C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
9 Apr 93 p B1

[Article by Meron Benvenisti: "Bantusan and Palestine"]

[Text] Many signs indicate that finally, at the end of the 26th year of the conquest of the territories, an essential change in the status quo is imminent. This change is not coming, as many had hoped, following peace negotiations and it does not fit any of the "solution alternatives" that were debated in the last generation. Yitzhak Rabin's declaration that what preceded the imposition of the quarantine on the territories "will not be repeated," the enthusiastic agreement of Minister Yossi Sarid and the detailed action plan that he submitted, and also the establishing of a special committee headed by Minister Ora Namir, which will plan an almost total separation from the territories—all these testify that we are on the

eve of an event of great significance: the foundation of a Palestinian Bantusan; not the State of Palestine, rather the State of Palestin.

The similarities between "the black homelands" in South Africa and "the regime of almost total separation" that is about to be established here are fascinating and frightening. Here and there, the authorities sought to battle the ethnic mixture that was created and widened due to the growing need for cheap labor. This mixture, the result of market forces, generated friction that led to violence, and this motivated the authorities to take measures of imposed separation—spatial and functional.

The complex system that the white minority authorities established for the purpose of imposing prohibitions upon free movement and on sleeping outside of the black areas, called "the regime of the permits," did not cope successfully with market forces, and then the need arose to take drastic measures, the most brutal of which was the exile of the blacks, which was termed in sanitary language—"repatriation." The territories that were located for the Bantuists were lands of poor quality, and the government's pretensions of furthering their economic development came to nothing. There was no chance there for the development within them of a separate and independent economy of the blacks, and there was no chance for the whites' economy to flourish without the blacks' labor and their purchasing power. Needless to say, the entire system of the Bantusans collapsed together with the apartheid regime.

Israel is not South Africa, and the demographic and economic relations between Jews and Arabs are not similar to those that obtain there. But the difference in the conditions cannot hide the similarity in the manner of implementation of the measures of spatial and functional separation: in both cases, it is a one-sided system, operated only against the subject population and according to the sole interests of the ruling community. As long as the ruling community holds a monopoly of power and means of imposition, it is possible to implement a separation whose character changes according to the changing interest of the rulers.

It is no coincidence that the minister of labor heads a special committee that will prepare recommendations for a special session of the government that will decide how "the situation will not return to what it was"—and will ensure that Israelis will be able to cope permanently with the separation. It is not the government's concern how the Palestinians will bear the separation, aside from nonbinding talk about the need to ensure some income to the unemployed, so that "the frustration will not increase and, with it, the motivation for terror."

As the territories are seen as a giant labor camp that has no right to exist except for employment in Israel, there is no need to bother to understand what is the significance of the closure for an Arab merchant who seeks to do business in Israel, to a sick Arab who seeks medical assistance in Israeli hospitals, to an Arab family that

wants to go bathing in the sea, in the Kinneret, or at Sahneh, to the Gazan who seeks to travel to Hebron, or to tens of thousands of Palestinians who live in metropolitan Jerusalem and work in the city. For all of these, "there is nothing to do among us": just as the Jews stopped eating hummus in Ram'allah, so the Arabs must also get used to living separately, is this not their burning aspiration? From this symmetry arises an odor of cynicism: the rulers will never need the ruled, aside from their services, while the ruled depend upon the rulers for everything.

Minister Yossi Sarid, "who does not shed a tear for persons who employed Arab laborers in conditions of servitude," displays some sensitivity when he proposes "to release development and infrastructure plans in the territories and a massive intensification of Israeli and international investments." That has more than a grain of self-righteousness. As a minister in the government, he knows, it is to be hoped, that the volume of investment required so that the territories will be able to stand on their own comes to billions of dollars, and a period of at least 15 years is necessary. Is his support for the continued separation conditional upon the allocation of defined amounts from the state budget for releasing development plans? Will he initiate releasing water quotas and agricultural production quotas to the Palestinians? Will he add to the long line of his proposals also an action plan that will place an equal burden on Israel and the Palestinians in implementing the separation? Will he include Palestinian experts in the preparation of the plans? Is he aware of the suffering of the hundreds of thousands who are under closure?

But one should not complain about Yossi Sarid; his colleagues, including die-hard doves, view with concern in the Palestinians [text illegible] "hypocrisy—pity for the hungry Arab and longing for 'the neighborly relations' of the knights of Eretz Yisra'el." "I do not understand the basis for the assertion that it is our duty to provide employment to the Palestinians," says Minister Hayyim Ramon, "we have no responsibility for them." It has already been said that several die-hard doves call for separation from the Palestinians not out of love but rather from the contrary, out of fear and hatred.

And this matter is taking us to an additional comparison with South Africa's Bantusans. The regime of closure and separation wins the support of the right, the left, and the center—and every bloc justifies it according to its ideological positions. In the eyes of the left, the separation is the means for establishing an independent Palestinian entity, and in the eyes of the right, it is the means for the violent eradication of the Arabs. That is exactly the way it was in South Africa. The public's desires for separation between the races received contradictory justifications: the "Liberals" said that "this is a systematic and gradual decoupling of the two groups, which allows each group to realize its political rights and to enjoy economic opportunities, each in its own territory," while the racists declared: "only by means of apartheid can the

whites maintain themselves, their civilization, culture, and way of life—and defend themselves from the barbarians."

When a senior officer in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] was asked about the efficacy of the closure, he replied: "it is a political decision, not a military one." Politicians who define a closure as a goal and not as a means and turn it into a permanent regime will have to eat the rotten fruits of their decision to establish in Eretz Yisra'el the State of Palestine.

Bney 'Aqiva Movement, Relations With NRP

93A40033A 'Ofra NEQUDA in Hebrew April 93 p 32-33

[Article by Eyal Davidson: "Values Are Not Politics"; first paragraph is NEQUDA lead]

[Text] Bney 'Aqiva: to the "Land of Israel" Right

"Bney 'Aqiva is not a youth movement any more. It might just as well be the youth branch of the NRP (National Religious Party)," a worried parent complained to me: "You have turned it from a symbol of unity and bringing people together in friendship, into the vanguard of the extreme right that is alienated from Israeli society." Since the elections, when Bney 'Aqiva took an open stand, both declared and active, on the side of the NRP (when it took part in demonstrations of a pronounced political shading), every activist in the movement was exposed to complaints of this nature from members, parents, and political critics, who do not approve of a youth group taking a line of action like this.

The Land of Israel was at the center of the lesson plan last winter, and the educational direction was uncompromisingly nationalistic in character. The movement's seminars were held—not by chance—in "sensitive" areas far from the plain of consensus—and, more than once, all the branch youth centers ended up at demonstrations of identification—whether with Talmon or with Alonei Habashan.

We all know the problem: where does a youth group get the right to take a unilateral political stand and use its members like clay in the hands of potters with distinct party interests? And what should the movement's attitude be toward members, as well as more than a few counsellors, who are not followers in the "Whole Land of Israel" movement?

More serious: at the very basis of religious Zionism stands the belief in cooperating with the public at large to fulfil the goals of the State, and the need to be a bridge between Torah values and those who follow them, and the various other groups within the people. Political categorizing in the difficult debate over the future of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza puts us into one drawer with a specific political segment, which sometimes arouses hostility and rage, and immediately cuts off any opportunity for mutual communication. And are we not

paying dearly for the distinct political identification we are taking, at the price of losing the chance to achieve popular consensus?

And above all, if a youth group becomes politicized, has it not lost its way?

But the very fact that such questions are being asked testifies to the confusion of attitudes, and the vagueness of concepts that the Israel public in general, and we as part of it, are sunk in. In such a situation, educational guidance turns into "political incitement"; values are now "party interests." Bney 'Aqiva is a youth movement that teaches and fulfills. It teaches the values of Torah, including love for People, Land, and State, hard work, love for others, good character traits, and fear of Heaven. It fulfills its teachings through the various types of settlements, yeshiva learning, service in the IDF (Israel Defense Forces), volunteering in absorption centers, and participation in all avenues of life in the State.

We said, "teaches and fulfills," not "political." Bney 'Aqiva is not a political movement, but there is almost no realm that does not touch on politics: today, there are branches of Bney 'Aqiva in all the [immigrant] trailer parks(!)—and is that not politics? And raising your voice in outcry against public Sabbath-breaking—is that not politics? And are the beliefs of religious-Zionism not politics, too?

And the reason for this is simple: politics is the national and administrative expression of those values the public's elected officials represent. Values are the result of education in home, school, and youth group, and politics derives from values. Bney 'Aqiva, from the very fact that it is involved in values, is also involved in politics. Therefore, the overlapping of its religious-national values, and the opinions that the National Religious party (which is political), represents, is quite natural.

If the NRP is the only religious-Zionist party, why should Bney 'Aqiva ignore that? If the only party that worries about Religious-Zionist education in Israel (including economic support of Bney 'Aqiva, although it has never asked anything in return), is the NRP, why should we deny this? If there is only one party that fights for the values that we, in Bney 'Aqiva, teach morning, noon, and night, and whose representatives are our graduates and are realizing Bney 'Aqiva's teachings, why should we distance ourselves from it? And here it is important to emphasize: the tie to the NRP is not binding on us, and does not depend on action from us. On the contrary, the movement has criticized the party in more than one case. Bney 'Aqiva has never coordinated its steps to those of the NRP, and in many cases, it would be correct to say that the NRP was the one that followed Bney 'Aqiva, not the other way around.

The line of thought that tags certain values with that badge of shame—"politics"—is totally twisted, and is the product of the way the Israeli ideological movements have gone off the track—in this way a central topic in the

world of Jewish-Zionist values—love of the land—has turned into something almost illegitimate.

It is worthwhile to listen to the sounds we hear in the street and the media—settlement as a value does not interest realists. They are interested in the quantities in water sources, on facts about hostile population concentrations, in the security value of the settlements versus their political value. Our belief is the antithesis of these approaches, and this is why we demonstrate at town squares and crossroads. We teach unconditional love of the land, and cry out bitterly when we see the values of Zionism being eroded away. The land of Israel is a value, not a "rightist tendency."

We believe we were born in a great time. The foggy about the basic concepts of Judaism and Zionism, and about the pangs of building the Land of Israel, are nothing but national clarification. The people of Israel are deeply examining values that were naive and literary for 2,000 years, and have suddenly become reality. The people need a special answer to its problems because they are so unique, and it cannot make do with shallow, temporary solutions that have no significance for its national survival. And therefore it will also return in the end to its true roots, but until then, we must fight against weaknesses of society, and teach our members to live by the eternal values, which have become so muddled over the last generation.

Our openness to general Israeli culture is an essential characteristic of our movement, but our influence on it is not one-way. We also are not immune to Western culture. Its technological influences are a blessing, but they are cold, material values. It is a noisy, litigious culture, that emphasizes materialism, pleasure seeking, living for the moment. This expresses itself in everything: clothing, way of life, leisure, and worst of all—the view of the world.

Someone who tries to talk about eternal values in an environment like this sometimes might just as well be speaking a foreign language. Longing for peace is no educational problem, but demanding peace "right now," "this second," out of a weakened sense of love for the land, is. The readiness to give up values that does not come from full identification with them, and from pain over their loss, but rather from keeping oneself at a distance from them—is dangerous and has serious consequences. Precisely in this hour of weakness, and precisely at the time when the Land of Israel is on the auction block, we see strengthening our ties and our love for her—as an educational goal.

We do need to mention, even so, that within Bney 'Aqiva, too, there is not complete agreement. A minority among the members and counsellors protest this educational line, and at various opportunities speak out—which is completely legitimate. Every opinion is worthy of respect, no matter how different, and we should not even consider trying to silence or ostracize anyone

because of it. Every member whose opinions are different, knows his place in the ranks of the movement is assured. Still, the opinion of the majority is also worthy of respect. The B'nai 'Akiva movement makes decision through an open democratic process—a convention—once every three or four years, (during Passover, this year). There has been no convention that has not given special attention to the question of the Land of Israel, and never has come to any decision other than that which demands loyalty to the settlements and holding on to all parts of the land, and supports teaching that will deepen the tie to it.

Yes, taking a stand on these issues may undermine the bridges between us and considerable segments within the people, whose approach is different. "until the days of Sebastia," the director of one of the youth movements said to me, "we had a common language. Today the abyss is too wide to be bridged." So, it is amazing to see movements waving the flag of patience and openness, but actually showing blatant narrowmindedness. A situation like that should make us sorry, should make us search for what we have in common and can unite us, for love and brotherhood, but without losing the belief that our path is right. We will not compromise on our life's values, including the love of the land, and we will not go back to covering our yarmelkes with baseball caps. We will teach our members, as long as we can, to persevere in our path and be true to our identity. With patience we will build a bridge that can connect two points, but not by crawling from one point to the other, and not by weakness and bowing our heads.

And if it seems as though uniting the land of Israel is the only thing Bney 'Aqiva is interested in, that is a mistake. In Bney 'Aqiva we are more involved with teaching to help bring people together and close social gaps than we are with the question of the land of Israel. Our educational programs deal with relations with secular people, love for all Jews, helping others, and service to the community, by helping out in absorption centers, development towns, bringing in the harvest, helping the needy and elderly, etc. Because Bney 'Aqiva is, of course, an educational, socially active youth group, not a political group.

Rav (Rabbi) Zvi Yehuda may he rest in peace, was asked during one of the difficult crises: "Rabbi, what will be?" And he answered, "Know, all of you, that the problem is the very fact that you are asking: 'What will be?'"

We must take heart and be firm, and see Bney 'Aqiva as an educational tool to help deepen the values of religious Zionism; and may the Lord bring us success.

Ideological Profile of Talmon Settlers

95AA0032B 'Ofra NEQUDA in Hebrew March 1993
pp 12-15

[Article by Ilana Baum: "Talmon: Not Bet EL—But Also Not Kedumim"; first paragraph is NEQUDA lead]

[Text] They call them the "Atara" nucleus.

Talmon Aleph (Talmon No. 1), a relatively anonymous settlement. Four years old; 40 minutes from Jerusalem, 40 from Tel Aviv. There are 55 families and 120 children. The average age of the adults is 25, and most of the families have two or three children. The settlement is the youngest in Judea and Samaria, and perhaps in the entire country: the "elders" are between 30 and 33. Most are in the free professions. There are 10 nurses (one male), five lawyers (or lawyers on the way), students, etc. From a political standpoint, most of Talmon's members would not fit in with the hard core of Gush Emunim. Daniela Weiss or Rabbi Levinger, as I noticed at a group discussion [that I sat in on], are not exactly beloved of most of Talmon's residents. Kedumim, too, (some of the residents of the settlement are second-generation West-bankers, including some from Kedumim), is not exactly their ideal. "We are not Kedumim," they say, with broad agreement and without going into details. The religious identity card: a knitted yarmelke or a fashionable scarf. NRP (National Religious Party) style. Rabbi Yo'el Bin-Nun and Rabbi Amital are more popular than the rabbis of Gush Emunim. The calling card: "propluralism"; and being a member of the middle class is no stigma here. You could say that they are "yuppies" wearing yarmelkes. Conditions of acceptance to the settlement: a yarmelke and army service. Most of them would be willing to accept women who do not cover their heads—but some are opposed; in the last elections, six members voted for SHAS [Torah Observing Sephardim]. It is true that they are in the minority, but it is possible to say that beneath the surface a battle is going on over the spiritual direction the settlement will take. These things are not showing up openly; perhaps because these young people have not yet completely found themselves ideologically. The assured manner in which they spoke to me could not hide the differences on ideology and many other things that I found among them. Their sense of being pioneers may reflect honest intentions, but one is not convinced that they are sure of their world view. It may turn out that the position of Ronen Lubushitz, one of the "elders of the congregation," who at 31, wants to lead a Torah life here, will win out in the end, precisely because it is closed and lacking curiosity. Ronen has the role here of the "loyal opposition." So far, he is in the minority, but he is energetic and set on a course. The question is, who will set their stamp on the spiritual character of the settlement: those set in their belief that Talmon must be a Torah settlement, or those who want an "open" settlement? This will depend not only on the local forces; the result will also be influenced by what happens in the religious settlements on the West Bank and Gaza in general, and the nearby settlements, Dolav and Talmon Bet (Talmon No. 2), in particular.

On Purim four years ago, when the intifadah was at its height, the first five families moved onto the land. The original site was supposed to be about a kilometer from the present one, but due to technical problems, the trailers were unloaded from the truck at the closest spot

it could reach. And as the saying goes, "Nothing is more permanent than something temporary." The temporary location has become the permanent location. That is, Talmon Aleph.

The members of the little settlement have had to live with many discomforts in their everyday life. Ruhama Cohen, second-generation settler in the territories, who came to Talmon from Bet El: "There was a lot of mud and a lot of pioneering spirit. For example, there was a problem getting together a minyan (10 men as a quorum for Sabbath services). Our numbers were small, and there was also always somebody on reserve duty, or somebody sick. We made a schedule of who was allowed to leave for Sabbath: one out of three Sabbaths at most). We also had tons of guests. We still do today—but then we had to. Food had to be brought from afar. Today we have a grocery. There were no basic services, not even transportation—today there is a bus four times a day, 50 private cars, and of course, a regular minyan." **Shmulik Ben David** points out that when the mud disappears, the trend toward becoming middle class begins. This trend is normal. It is impossible to continue indefinitely in a situation where one must always do things only for the whole. At a certain stage, you begin to concentrate on yourself.

Because of infrastructure problems, work on a water line from Shilat in the coastal area has only lately begun. In the meantime, they get water twice a day from a tanker truck. In difficult conditions, they would be able to hold out without a supply of water for just two days. They would have to rely on the army to help if there was trouble. This has its affect on the landscaping, or rather the lack of it. Only lately have most of the families moved into permanent homes (38 new units). The settlement is not connected to the electric line, and a generator, which eats up a lot of fuel, supplies the settlement with electricity. Recently, work was begun on an electric line within Talmon—but a high tension wire that would connect the place to the national network is still a dream for the unknown (political) future.

At the site originally intended for Talmon, a neighboring settlement was founded a year and a half ago: Talmon Bet. It has no connection to Talmon Aleph (more than to any other neighboring settlement: Dolav, for example). The new settlement was erected during the period when settlement building was effectively frozen by the Shamir government, and the name, Talmon, given the new settlement allowed the authorities to authorize building it. Although today they are not one settlement, someday, when Talmon Aleph develops, it will meet Talmon Bet, and they will become a single settlement.

The first summer there were already 11 families in Talmon Aleph, and after a year, that number had more than doubled, to 25. In the third year, the settlement grew to 40 families. During the time of the Likud government, the situation was of "total occupancy." People stood in line, and there were more requests than there were places available. And here is the surprise:

since the Rabin administration took over, 15 families have joined Talmon, including some only last month. Newcomers are constantly being absorbed. You get the impression that the absorption is excellent, because it is hard to distinguish who came when. Who came before whom. You can smell in the air the sense of being the first. The readiness to start something from the very beginning. The enthusiasm that gives them the strength to live with hardships, and downplay them.

Ruham: "For me, deciding whether to stay in Beyt El was no dilemma. Beyt El is a very large settlement. They need no help there. We looked for a place that needed us; building another settlement on the West Bank was important to us. The location precisely here—was a coincidence. A nucleus just started to form, and another two young families came, second generation from Beyt El. The relative closeness to Jerusalem is important, too. I used to work as a nurse at Sha'arei Tzedek hospital."

To the applicants who continue to apply for acceptance to Talmon, the absorption committee explains all the difficulties: the problems caused by the settlement's being located in the heart of Arab villages—the road to or from the settlement passes through three hostile Arab villages, before it even reaches Ram'alla, Al Bira, and Kalandia, where the stone-throwing intifadah has also been in the ascendent of late. Nobody has left because of the intifadah—but there were some who were deterred by the freely given information, and did not come. The Talmon newsletter, which will be coming out soon, and will be called 'Atalmon, will be printing the results of a poll taken after Shoki, a resident of the settlement, was badly wounded in the head by a stone thrown at him from 'Eyn 'Arik (this is the first time that somebody from the settlement has been badly wounded), his friends were asked the question: has anything changed in your daily behavior or your feelings since the attack? "On the personal level, they all identified with the wounded man, and worried about him. From the point of view of behavior, it turned out that nothing has changed. people do not travel any less. If they want to see a film or go to a restaurant, they ride to Jerusalem or Tel Aviv (same traveling time), just as they did before," says Avital Tohar-Lev, one of the editors of 'Atalmon.

New immigrants from Russia do not come, though there is an attempt to absorb them. Those who did come to take a look were put off: "They take a walk around the grocery, ask 'How much is this?' ask about work, and then go somewhere else," explains Ohed Tohar-Lev, a member of the secretariat.

The settlement has the potential for immediate expansion: 10 housing units with 20 apartments. Local initiatives: a playroom and a library. They are both in the lower neighborhood, which is less popular because of its geographic placement.

They built the playroom in that particular place, in order to strengthen the lower neighborhood, which is hard to

reach. They have created something like the sweet American Dream of every middle-class child: Lego, Fisher-Price, and Chico, doll houses, toy cars, games, lots of clay and paint, wall-to-wall carpets, refreshments, and a place for the whole family to have fun. Every family is allotted five hours of playtime a week. There are more than a thousand books in the library—most of them "rescued" from the Bet Ari'ela library and donated to Talmon instead of being thrown in the trash. Additional initiatives: a painting class for the children, and an exercise class. A "Daf Yomi" (Daily Page of Talmud) class, and a Talmud Torah (Torah school for children). And the grocery, which is a sort of social club for the settlement. Everyone here is proud that the grocery is making it economically, even though 55 families live in the settlement and they can also buy in town, sometimes cheaper. There have been much larger settlements, whose grocery stores could not hold their own, and closed down. The owner, who has a pronounced French accent, is active in "Moledet." The slogans in his mouth were things like, "expel the Arabs, right away." Because he is a Jew, when he lived in Paris he demonstrated against Le Pen. But, he thinks that on principle, Le Pen's ideology is right: "Send the foreigners home." Therefore, he emigrated to Israel. Therefore, he wants to see Israel free of Arabs. As free as possible. If possible. A very nice man, but pretty unusual in the ideological landscape of a settlement like Talmon, which is not so committed to ideology.

..

But the intifadah has been escalating lately: the Arabs are more daring; they throw stones every day. An IDF (Israel Defense Forces) division is stationed in Hervata. Until recently they feared the [soldiers]; today they throw stones right under their noses. "The rules of the game have changed for them; but for the IDF, they have not," says Ohed.

[Avital] Sometimes I think that perhaps it is not right for me to expose a child to rock throwing. Perhaps it is a type of irresponsibility....

[Ohed] I think sometimes, "What right have I to endanger the life of my children? I do not have an complete answer. I say to myself that in the city, too, there is a problem with children: you are afraid, for example, that he will be hit crossing the road.

[Re'uven Moshkin], also a member of the settlement council: Where the children are concerned, there is a certain price, but in the end it is a question of the balance: What there is here for children is an absolute Garden of Eden, though at a certain price. The scale dips very distinctly to the positive.

[Nurit Pash] If something happened to a child—none of it would be worth it.

[Ohed] Perhaps it is the Garden of Eden, but it might be a crazy person's Garden of Eden.

[Re'uven] It is not a crazy person's Garden of Eden. I compare my childhood with my children's childhood: in Ramat Aviv Gimel [Ramat Aviv No. 3], they live in a ghetto. Here, my children have 20 friends.

[Shmulik] There is a contradiction here. The modern ideal contradicts itself. On the one hand, there is a high awareness of the rights of the children, and what parents are supposed to give them—and on the other, in actual fact, modern parents are ready to sacrifice their children on the altar of their careers. They uproot children from place to place for the sake of their careers—something that does them exceptional harm—but no one gets excited about that price.

[Ronen] This is a hysterical country. I teach in a school in Jerusalem. I wanted to take the pupils to see a museum in the Jewish quarter, and the security officer said "no." Do you know that parents from the center of the country are afraid to send their children on a trip to Jerusalem?

[Nurit] If the children here are receiving any sort of trauma—it is because of the power outages. . .

[Bilha Ben David] You can see the answer if you look at us, the second generation. I lived in Kedumim from the age of 14. My brothers were born there. There is a vibrant communal life there. Everyone my age rode past Qalqilyah, 'Azon, Nablus, and no one was traumatized. Most of the young people who have grown up and married, have stayed in the area. A few did move to the city, but that, too, was because their spouses did not want to live in a settlement.

[Baum] One gets the impression that you feel superior to people who live in Tel Aviv?

[Bilha] Tel Aviv represents complacency.

[Re'uven] (studying for the Tel Aviv bar—A.B.) It is not a feeling of superiority—that is just a kind of life I would not want to live. In the office, when the air conditioner is not working right, I open a window to let in air—and immediately close it, because the air is worse outside than it is inside. From the social point of view, too. The people there never look to the right or the left.

Life's routines have a power of their own, in Talmon just as anywhere else. The little everyday things—getting up, feeding the children and getting them dressed, taking them to kindergarten, going to work—in the shadow of a pioneering spirit, and the feeling of mission that comes along with that—mean a crowded daily schedule. There is not much free time for asking questions. Nevertheless, we must assume that the subject of the political future of this place is something that may/should/must worry the people living in Talmon just a little more than it does the people living in the "Alef" region, for instance.

[Baum] What do you have to say about autonomy?

[Nurit] We do not know what that means. Everyone imagines it differently...

[Ohed] We put off the subject because we do not know what will be happening. But at communal meals, we do talk about it.

[Baum] And what do you say?

[Avital] We do not talk about it. We talk about generators, day care centers, meals for the children.

[Ohed] I hope they pave an alternative road to Jerusalem, so I will not have to pass by way of the Arabs. Let the Arabs lead their own lives, and let the army guard the road.

[Eli Yemini] When there is autonomy, the situation will be better. Really, there is already autonomy today. We do not interfere with what they do, and they do not interfere with us. As long as there is no violence, then life can be bearable.

[Bilha] I hope we do reach a political solution—but I do not really believe there is a chance. If there is autonomy—it could be the beginning of a dynamic process between us.

[Mordekhai Pash] If, by autonomy, we mean 10 thousand armed Arab policemen, there will be a problem. With the kind of autonomy that exists today, a kind of self-rule, we could live.

[Eli] In Takhla'as, people behave as usual. . . we here ask how it will be, and what do you do with this—but all the questions are still just philosophy...

[Baum] Is this not sticking your heads in the sand?

[Benny Cohen], secretary of the settlement: In our fathers' generation, the battles were over the whole land of Israel. Today they are over Judea and Samaria, the Golan Heights, and Jerusalem. The question we have to ask is not what they will do with Talmon. At the most, 50 families would be turned out. The real question is what is going to happen to Tel Aviv or Kfar Saba. People would have to be on constant alert close to home...the entire State will be threatened if the autonomy ends up the first step toward a Palestinian state.

[Shmulik 'Inbar] The settlement's reputation went before it. I came here from Ma'ale Adumim. It is important to us to live here, to fulfil the ideal of settling the land.

[Shmulik Ben David] I live here because I have a good life here. It is clear to us that we will live in some settlement or other in Judea or Samaria.

[Bilha] I cannot stand living in the city. Here, every one walks around freely.

[Shmulik] Anyone who lives in Tel Aviv is crazy.

[Ohed] We did not insist on Judea and Samaria. Avital would have gone to a development town, too, but we wanted a young settlement, and there is none in the Galilee or the Negev. Actually, the Amana movement is

the only one building new settlements now—and it is building them mainly in Judea and Samaria.

[Re'uven] I have to give Amana credit: it was the only organization that was willing to help single men and women in their 20's settle, and did not tell us, "get married first." They shared our excitement over the settlement. Our first meeting with the representatives from Amana was at the 'Atara coffee-house in Jerusalem, and some people still call us the "Atara nucleus"—also implying that we are "returning the crown (atara) to its former glory..."

Seized Land Cleared for Settlement

93P50183A Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 26 Apr 93
p 10

[Text] Ramallah—Israeli bulldozers have begun clearing land that was seized for the Qiryat Sefer settlement—which is sited on the land of [Kharabtha] Bani Harith and Dayr Qudays villages in Ramallah District—in order to build another settlement next to Qiryat Sefer Number 1. The land area being cleared is estimated at dozens of dunams.

Gaza Withdrawal Scenario Applied to Jerusalem

93AA0024A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 27 Mar 93
p B2

[Article by Dani Rubenstein: "The Difference Between Fear and Fear"]

[Text] "We could not even reach an agreement over the date of the completion of the Ramadan fast," says 'Ali al-Khalili, an AL-FAJR editor who was the chairman of the Writers' Association in the territories, angrily. On the night between Monday and Tuesday of this week, the Muslim religious sages in the Gaza Strip ruled that the fast was over and that the Id al-Fitr holiday had begun—while in the West Bank, the heads of the religious establishment decided (according to the law in the Kingdom of Jordan) that the appearance of the new moon was postponed for one more night, so that the holiday began only on Wednesday in the West Bank (and among the Muslims in Israel).

In each of the Arab countries, the supreme Muslim authority determines the date when the fast ends according to the sighting of the new moon, and sometimes there are differences of opinion. This year, Iraq and Kuwait ruled that the holiday began on Tuesday, and the Gaza Strip joined them. Jordan, Egypt, and other countries decided upon Wednesday, and they were joined by the Muslims in the West Bank and in Israel. Many people in east Jerusalem were bitter: Why didn't the national Palestinian leadership order that a single date be decided upon for all of the Muslims in Israel?

In east Jerusalem, it was difficult to sense the holiday atmosphere. The Jerusalem municipality did decorate the Jaffa gate and several other sites with chains of

colored lights, as is its custom, and the markets were full of people, but there were soldiers and policemen on every corner. On Salah-al-Din Street, border policemen periodically stopped groups of youth, stood them in a line against the wall with their hands up, and searched them. At the central bus station facing the Damascus gate, there were notices from the holy unit of the Movement for the Islamic Jihad in Palestine, including blessings to their member "the hero Nasir Hamdan Matar Shuqayrat, Abu-Anas" who on Monday attacked the students at the Ort school in Talpiot with a knife.

"We are surrounded with hate and the Gaza Strip has turned into hell." Arab newspapers prominently quoted statements made in the middle of the week by IDF [Israel Defense Forces] soldiers to one of the foreign news agency correspondents. In the opinion of several of the advisors to the Palestinian delegation, events in the Gaza Strip are currently spreading through all of the territories, as well as in Jerusalem. Faruq Qaddoumi, head of the political department of the PLO, declared early in the week that, should Israel withdraw, the PLO was willing to take the Gaza Strip into its hands immediately. The Palestinian leadership, however, does not imagine that the struggle will conclude in this manner. Dr. Israel Eldad once said that as long as the Israeli left is willing to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the entire West Bank, and does not concede the Jewish neighborhoods of east Jerusalem, he is not worried. No Arab will accept Israeli withdrawal without Jerusalem. Judging by the mood among the Arab public in east Jerusalem and in the territories, it is almost certain that he is right.

Dr. Nafiz Nazzal of Ramallah, who teaches at the Mormon University on the Mount of Olives, presented the Arab-Muslim position several days ago during a convention at the Notre Dame Hotel, which divides east and west Jerusalem. According to this position, they would under no circumstances forego "a single prayer in Jerusalem, which is equal to a thousand prayers in any other place," as the Muslim Hadith from the middle ages says. Even the king of Morocco, Hassan II, whose positions of compromise anger the Palestinians, writes in his memoirs—currently appearing in installments in AL-QUDS—that any solution for the region is inconceivable without full Arab sovereignty over the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem.

The Israeli proposals for withdrawal from the Gaza Strip are, accordingly, an easy solution, because it is more difficult there and because there is almost no Israeli presence there, and only a few settlers. In effect, this constitutes an evasion of an attempt to solve problems. The knives do not stop at the Erez checkpoint. Nor does Palestinian nationalism, and certainly not Islamic extremism. "The Jewish fear of the Gaza Strip extends to Jerusalem, as well," reads a slogan drawn on a wall of a home in Bayt Hanina. Like most of the Arab areas in Jerusalem and the vicinity, it has recently found itself surrounded by Jewish neighborhoods.

Israeli policy since 1967 created scores of Arab enclaves in the large space between Ramallah and Gush Etzion. Each one of them threatens to become a little Gaza Strip. More than three hundred thousand Arabs live there—over one-third of the residents of the West Bank. Unlike the Gaza Strip, however, these enclaves cannot be cut off from the State of Israel. It is not possible to withdraw from them. Ma'aleh Adumim is rapidly expanding and closing in on al-Azariyah and Abu-Dis, Pisgat Ze'ev and Neveh Ya'akov surround Sho'afat and Bayt Hanina, Talpiot Mizrah creeps around Javel Mukabar and Suwahirah. The Gilo neighborhood, the new ultra-Orthodox city of Beytar, and the settlements of Gush Etzion surround the Bethlehem district. Extremism, knives, and fear exit these enclaves to the Jewish neighborhoods. And as the extremism becomes more and more religious it increasingly has no remedy, because "no tolerant religiousness is available," as 'Azami Bashara, a Christian Israeli Arab teaching at Bir Zayt College, determines.

There is no similarity between their fear and ours, said one of the heads of the Waqf in Jerusalem last week, appearing to close to two hundred thousand Muslims who, in spite of the great tension, came to pray last Friday at the Temple Mount on the last Friday of Ramadan. In the offices of AL-FAJR last week, one could hear Arab journalists making statements such as: "We have no army, no troops and policemen, no security fences and checkpoints. We do not need any of that because we live in our homes, on our land. We have not plundered anyone and have not taken anything by force. Only the Israelis who come here to live are afraid, and demand guards and brigades of soldiers." On Tuesday the AL-QUDS editorial answered all of the Israelis who asked this week how it was possible to continue to live in such an atmosphere of terror and fear: "Regrettably, the key to the solution is not in the hands of the defenseless Palestinian people. The Israeli political leadership, forcefully occupying another people, is the one that could bring about a change, had it been blessed with a measure of historic courage."

Debate on Future of Gaza, Security Issues

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[Panel discussion moderated by Ze'ev Schiff]

[Text] [Ze'ev Schiff] Many are toying with the idea that if we close off the Gaza Strip with barbed wire fences and prevent the people of the Strip from entering Israel, the internal security situation in Israel will change significantly. What would happen if we were to implement such a quarantine and how would that affect the peace process?

[Hayyim Ramon] It is impossible to impose a quarantine on the Strip as long as we are responsible for what happens there. We can impose a quarantine for a short period of two weeks or a month, but it is impossible to

impose a quarantine while the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] and the settlers remain there. Therefore, I view a quarantine as a permanent solution as impossible, from the security viewpoint, from the economic viewpoint, and from the diplomatic viewpoint. There was already such a quarantine on the Strip during the Gulf war, there was also a quarantine on the territories, and this caused very troubling problems within the Strip and it was very difficult to control what happened there.

The State of Israel has four possibilities regarding the Gaza Strip. One is the continuation of Israeli control in Gaza forever, and according to that, in all circumstances, whether by agreement or as a result of the continuation of the status quo, we are responsible for everything that happens there. In my view, this possibility is tantamount to Zionist suicide. The second possibility is that the status quo will continue. The significance is that the unemployment rate there will reach 40 to 50 percent, and the infrastructure will continue to collapse. About \$5 billion are necessary, according to estimates in one of the recent studies, in order to improve the infrastructure and to lift them to about 50 percent of the level in Israel. That is, this involves intensifying the desperation and increasing the phenomena that exist today.

The best option is to leave there according to an agreement. This is the ideal thing, and that is the government's position. This government does not want Gaza, it wants an agreement so as not to be in Gaza.

[Benny Begin] I hear this for the first time.

[Ramon] In 1986, at the Labor Party convention, it was decided that we had only a security interest in the Strip, and we removed the settlement paragraph.

[Begin] In 1986, the defense minister, who is the prime minister and the defense minister today, went to the Katif Region and said that this region has an important significance, economic and security.

[Ramon] I think that the settlement in the Katif Region is one of the mistakes that were made. Now I am speaking about the government that was formed in 1992. This government does not want to annex Gaza, rather it wants Gaza not to be included within the State of Israel according to an agreement.

[Begin] The entire region, all of the Strip?

[Ramon] Yes. And, therefore, the fourth option—to announce, without any connection to the current negotiations, that within a year or two we will leave Gaza even unilaterally if there will not be an agreement. The sending of a letter on this matter to the Security Council would be an important factor from the diplomatic viewpoint, it would speed the negotiations and would obligate the countries of the world to relate to the Gaza problem and to take responsibility for it.

[Begin] A permanent quarantine on the Gaza region is one of the illusions that are being flung occasionally to the public, pulled out of the sleeve as a solution to the

problem of the Arab terror against Jews. It is easy for me to agree with the opinion of Minister Hayyim Ramon, that there is no hope for such a quarantine, that it is impossible to shut in forever the residents of the Strip and to keep them from seeking work in Israel. The result would be that this terror would continue and that to the hatred whose basis is historical would be added the bitterness of the unemployed, and that from this pressure cooker would come terrorists in order to harm Jews in the environs of Gaza, whether Be'er Sheva or Ashqelon, and perhaps even farther.

[Efrayim Kleiman] A quarantine has implications in two directions—the Israeli economy and Gaza. The impact of the thing on the Israeli economy as a whole is negligible. There will be contractors who will be hurt; from one-fifth to a quarter of the construction workers in Israel today are residents of Gaza. The enterprises that were established next to the Erez roadblock, which were built entirely on the labor of the residents of Gaza, also will be hurt. But from the viewpoint of the Israeli economy as a whole, it is not significant.

The big problem is, from what will the people of Gaza live? About 40 percent of the incomes in Gaza come directly from the wages earned by the residents in Israel. The entire income of Gaza is about NIS [new Israeli shekels] 2.25 billion, that is, 40 percent is approximately NIS 670 million per year. In addition, there are incomes from exports to Israel, and from the fact that demands are created there that are supplied by local manufacturing. That is, half of the incomes of Gaza today come from Israel. Even so, the economic situation in Gaza is not glorious; it is not a coincidence that the Gazans are more open to the messages of the Hamas. The feelings of bitterness there are on the background of living conditions, and as a result of the comparison with living conditions in Israel, they are tremendous.

A quarantine means, therefore, the creation of a pressure cooker. Israel must have a diplomatic and security interest that no matter who rules in Gaza, there will be quiet and stability there. If the State of Israel really wanted it, it would be possible to buy it with money. All of this income—NIS 670 million, this is about \$200 million. If you were willing to give economic assistance of this magnitude, you would solve one thing. That still doesn't solve everything, the level of existence, but people would not begin to starve there.

[Yitzhak Segev] Regarding the economic side—in 1967, when we arrived there, most of the people were unemployed and they all stood in line for UNRWA [UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East] to receive the unemployment benefits. The central problem that was created was that the Arab there had lost his honor within the family as the provider. It is not only a matter of money. When Israel opened the gates for working within it, it gave them back their honor as providers. Israel created a working class in Gaza, because there were sources of livelihood, and in contrast, fishing was hurt due to security problems and the citrus

groves dried up. The only source of livelihood that was left was Israel. If we quarantine Gaza, the people there will have nothing left to lose and they will commit acts of desperation.

I oppose completely a quarantine when there are diplomatic negotiations, also because Gaza will become the capital of the entire extreme world. The moment that we put it under quarantine, we will turn Gaza into the center of world terrorism. And then the implications for us will be ten times worse.

[Mordecai Gur] It should be remembered that in the Gaza Strip live thousands of Jews, as well. Beyond the political debates on the issue of the justice or injustice of their being there, it is a fact that they live there, and they are inextricably linked to the State of Israel. Therefore, a complete cutting off of the Gaza Strip from the State of Israel is impossible.

[Schiff] In fact, everyone here agrees that a quarantine is of no benefit. The next question is whether we could have acted differently. Some of the things that are happening today were foreseen, it was writing on the wall, and nevertheless, we froze in many respects in inaction, and contrary actions were even taken, such as expropriation of lands and seizure of water. Would you agree that this was one of the most severe strategic mistakes of Israeli governments?

[Kleiman] There was one very basic mistake, that not only did we not encourage economic development in the Strip and in the West Bank, but we even prevented it by all manner of excuses, also in an attempt to protect enterprises in Israel, without thinking that in this way we also worsened the situation of consumers in Israel. They thought that if we exerted pressure and harassed, the residents would leave. There was a certain basis for this belief in the West Bank; emigration from the West Bank during the years of Jordanian rule was much larger than during the years of Israeli rule. In contrast, it was not like that in Gaza, because they had nowhere to emigrate, they did not have Jordanian passports. In any event, the deterioration in the existing situation, in which there are no sources of livelihood in Gaza, need not have occurred.

[Begin] It should be remembered that the policy on the Gaza region and the raising of the importance of the Katif region as a barrier between the Sinai Peninsula and the city of Gaza and the refugee camps was instituted by Yigal Allon and Yisrael Galili. This is a policy from the Labor Party school, which saw, and justifiably, the strategic importance of creating that barrier and preventing the Arab continuity, sovereign or not sovereign, between Egypt and Sinai and Ashqelon and Tel Aviv. I agree with Prof. Kleiman that the correct conclusions were not drawn from this long-term strategic decision regarding our responsibility for creating to the extent of our ability sources of employment for the Arab residents in the Gaza region.

[Gur] As I was appointed the commander of the IDF forces in the Gaza Strip and in Northern Sinai three weeks after the Six Days War, I was able to stand at the cradle of the policy of the various Israeli governments in the various functions that I carried out. And, indeed, in retrospect I say with sorrow, that our sojourn in the Gaza Strip was an unceasing story of mistakes, that stemmed from confusion regarding the possible future of the Strip.

The various governments were undecided whether the Gaza Strip would in the end become part of the State of Israel or not. And as this problem was not given a clear answer by any of the governments of Israel, a large part of the deeds that were done and the failures stemmed solely from daily events, not from a clear policy. The question whether the Gaza Strip would in the end become part of the state, did not receive an answer to this day, and it is one of the focii of the sharpest political debates in Israel. It should be remembered that most of the impetus for settlement in the Gaza Strip, that is, the Katif Bloc, was carried out many years after we were already in Gaza.

[Segev] Part of the mistake that was made here stemmed from the fact that the planning was carried out together with that for Sinai. They decided to establish the Yamit region, so at the same opportunity they thought about the Katif region, but emphasis was placed on the Yamit region. After the peace agreements were signed and it was clear that these regions would have to be vacated, they thought that the Katif region would take the place of the strategic strip that Yamit was supposed to be. They took a small mistake and turned it into a big mistake: the area of Yamit was open and devoid of population, and it was indeed possible to try to settle there. But to try to establish a broad Hebrew settlement in the Katif region—in a region of 700,000 residents, where there is almost no vacant piece of land and water; and to place the Hebrew settlements precisely on the highest point, as if to emphasize the difference between our standard of living and theirs—this is a terrible strategic mistake.

[Begin] There are many empty areas in the Gaza region, one only has to fly over them or to glance at a satellite photograph—

[Segev] Empty of what, Mr. Begin?

[Schiff] It is a reserve for the inhabitants, who are multiplying there at a fast rate.

[Segev] I wish to note that in the Yamit region the settlers employed the Bedu'in, and, in fact, a new model of Zionism was created: the state invested tremendous resources and the Bedu'in worked in the settlements. And then we thought we had learned from this experience, and in Katif we would create a compact bloc, and instead of plastic hothouses we would set up glass hothouses and in the glass hothouses would work only Jewish settlers and no Arab laborer would enter. How many murders would have been prevented if only this principle had been observed?

[Ramon] I think that there was no mistake that we could have made in Gaza and did not make. When it was proposed to Ben Guryon that Gaza be annexed, when we retreated from Sinai in 1957, there were 300,000 inhabitants there. Abba Eban came to him and said, Mr. Prime Minister, the Americans brought up some idea that Israel would remain in Gaza. And Ben Guryon laughed at him: "One does not limit [as published] the body by annexing cancer."

After we conquered the Strip in 1967, there should have been a clear policy that Gaza is not part of the State of Israel. Anyone with eyes in his head could have seen the developments in a graph. And then they began to make one mistake after another regarding the inhabitants and the economy. It is the victory of Moshe Dayan's conception: at the end of the 1960's, Pinhas Sapir and Dayan argued whether the West Bank and the Strip should be integrated with Israel into one economic unit, with the territories supplying the labor. The decision was never made, but, as was desired by Dayan, who was for the integration of the territories so as to prevent all possibility of breaking away, they were turned over time into an inseparable part of Israel from the economic viewpoint.

And afterwards came the biggest act of stupidity, diplomatically, socially, economically, and morally. When one takes from 700,000 persons 28 percent of the state lands there, it is an immoral act. And there, after twenty and some years of settlement, sit 3,000 persons. That is the number of newborn in the Gaza Strip in one month.

[Schiff] Can the noninstitutionalized terror of knifings and murder that is being conducted by residents of Gaza in Israeli territory be prevented?

[Segev] It is impossible to think of a military solution for that, the solution must be integrated. First of all, the problem must be contained. The balance was upset in Gaza, where there is a body that is very difficult to control and there is no tradition of democratic life whatsoever. There is no voting, no elections, there is the strength of the threat, of the knife. When the PLO threatens they are not so frightened, but when the Hamas threatens, they know that the next stage is a death sentence, and they obey.

[Gur] I do not see how they accept of their own will continuing Israeli rule, and, therefore, I estimate that if that will be our intention and if that will be our plan, we will confront unceasing, escalating terror, impossible from viewpoint of the democratic existence of the State of Israel, from the viewpoint of our partnership with the entire Jewish people, and with the modern world. And, consequently, I have no doubt that, in principle, the only way to put an end to the terror is to arrive at an arrangement of co-existence, the motivation to act against us will be lower among the majority of the Palestinian population and the scope of the terror will be smaller, but it is definitely possible that Israel will have to defend itself here and there against terrorist dangers.

From the viewpoint of the security future of the State of Israel, it will be a minute risk in comparison to the dangers that are building up against us, such as the danger of weapons of mass destruction, such as the fundamentalist world joining those who are liable to have nuclear weapons. The State of Israel, for the sake of its future security, must improve the situation on all possible fronts. The terror front in the Gaza Strip is one of the easiest fronts from this viewpoint, for in principle we must leave there under one or another territorial arrangement. In the platform of the Labor Party there is explicit mention of a territorial compromise in all the sectors, and it was no by chance that we did not specify exactly how and also not which portion, except for several central issues. And this question remains open also in the region of the Gaza Strip.

[Begin] When we leave Gaza, who, in your opinion will rule there the day after?

[Gur] The regime will be a Jordanian-Palestinian regime. I understand the nuance of the question—whether in any arrangement and any solution there is not liable to be a danger that extreme elements will rise up, both in the Gaza Strip and in Judea and Samaria? This danger is definitely possible, and, consequently, the State of Israel must be strong to meet any confrontation. And I have no doubt that, due to the terrible fear of modern war, this is a period in which there is readiness to arrive at agreements with very reasonable prospects for good security for the State of Israel.

[Schiff] Has Israel not lost deterrence in confrontation with the terror? And have its means of punishment not come to an end?

[Ramon] It is impossible to remove Gaza from Tel Aviv if we do not remove Israel from Gaza. And the personal terror, as distinguished from the organized terror, will increase if we take all the measures that MK [Knesset member] Benny Begin proposes. For every Palestinian for whom we arranged a house in Gaza, five were born who live in the bushes, and that is where the personal terror comes from, the terror of desperation, the unexpected terror.

As long as 40,000 Palestinians come to Israel and as long as Israelis live next to Gaza, in the present conditions of a social pressure cooker, the result will be terror that stems from a decision of the moment or of a day and not from some order from Tunis or another place. There are no means to fight against this terror.

But terror is not the only thing being discussed. In Israel there are property crimes of \$1 billion each year, with 25 to 40 percent of them committed by the Gazans. There are automobile slaughterhouses. The director-general of the police said that when the Strip is closed for several days, there is a decline of 40 percent in crimes against property. A more thorough research reaches a magnitude of 25 to 30 percent. That is, the economic damage of

crimes that are committed as a result of the fact that Gaza is in Israel comes to approximately \$300 million a year.

[Schiff] What is the place of the settlements in the Gaza region from the security viewpoint?

[Gur] In my estimation, it is possible to defend the settlements that are located in the Qatif bloc, because they are territorially concentrated in a rather limited area. We can provide these settlements with better solutions relative to, for example, not a small proportion of the settlements in Judea and Samaria, which are located in completely open areas, are very dispersed, each one by itself.

[Schiff] We did not mention the settlements in the Strip that are not in the Qatif bloc.

[Gur] There are almost none. There are two blocs: one is the Qatif bloc, which, except for Qibbutz Netzarim, is almost entirely behind a single fence, and there are the settlements that are located in the north, that is, the industrial area of the Erez roadblock and the group of settlements next to it, which are also more or less concentrated.

[Kleiman] The fact that in the answer to the question on the security issue of the settlements you speak of the way to defend them shows that you do not view them as having any security function for the defense of the State of Israel.

[Gur] That is a completely different issue. The entire settlement next to Erez has no connection to the defense of the state. In Yamit, it was still possible to say that if there would be an open expanse between the border of Israel—the Green Line—and El-'Arish of a distance of approximately 30 km, and within it there would be a strip of settlement, it would have a security significance.

The assumption that a few settlements within the Strip could be an integral part of a modern defense system—especially after a peace agreement—is something that almost no one presents in a serious manner.

[Begin] Aside from the prime minister, who presented, and I did not hear that he recanted, the settlements in the Qatif region as having security importance of the first order.

[Schiff] Do you [plural] favor a unilateral withdrawal?

[Kleiman] The question is, what will be the system of relations with Gaza. From the economic viewpoint, the first question is whether the entry of workers from Gaza into Israel will be permitted, and if there will be a need for that. In the short run, there is not now an alternative for the Gazans to work in Israel. Enterprises are not established from one day to the next. Even if there were all the necessary capital for that, at least two years go by from the time a factory is planned until it is established. And that is under optimal conditions. A question with which I am grappling mightily is whether the economic

and social solution for the Gaza Strip can be achieved within the geographical framework of the Strip.

[Schiff] Are you hinting that it will be necessary to transfer part of the population?

[Kleiman] They will not want them in the West Bank, there is a problem here. But on the assumption that it can be done, these are things that take time.

We are in a trap, because the entire defense system is operating in the opposite direction. If a manufacturer must send something and it is held up at a roadblock for inspections, for example, then all the good intentions of the Civil Administration are negated in view of the situation in the field.

[Schiff] Due to inevitable security measures?

[Kleiman] Also because of people in the field, who due to the daily friction with the residents act not infrequently in a severe manner. If the reference is to the European market, then it is not correct that we always courted them; for a long time we interfered when they wanted to do things in the field.

[Begin] I quite agree from the professional viewpoint, which is largely apolitical, with things that Brig. Gen. Segev and Prof. Kleiman said. And confronted by those things, my conclusion does not change: here we are speaking about, both on the part of MK Gur and also on the part of Minister Ramon, sowing illusions that have no connection whatsoever with Middle East reality. The territorial compromise in Gaza, like the territorial compromise on the Golan Heights—is a fantasy. There will be no agreement on the basis of a territorial compromise, even one of 10 meters in the Gaza Strip, even one of a kilometer on the Golan Heights. People are still stuck in some ideas from 1967.

The second illusion is with whom will be the agreement, whether we withdraw unilaterally or not. We abandon the Gaza region, by agreement or without an agreement, on Friday at 12 noon; by the next morning, there will be a take-over by the terror organizations. I do not know at this moment whether the PLO will take over first, and afterwards there will be a war and after a month or two the Hamas will take over, or whether the Hamas will take over immediately and the war between them will continue by the Beirutization of the Gaza region when we won't be there.

There is no Jordanian option, and I hear that from the prime minister. So to say after the announcement by Hussein in the summer of 1988, which dismissed the parliament and went to that experiment that brought him the Hamas in the parliament, after all that to say that he will extend his rule not only over Judaea and Samaria but also over the Gaza region, that is indeed a disproved assumption.

In any settlement in the Gaza Strip, in any settlement—I say this according to your approach, not according to my approach—the border will have to be open. If there will

be a border, it will have to be open, otherwise, what will we have done? Imprisoned persons. There is no possibility of transferring the refugees somewhere else, that is a great difficulty.

[Schiff] What in your [plural] opinion is the desirable settlement in Gaza?

[Ramon] MK Benny Begin says—because Gaza is part of the entire Land of Israel, we are obligated, neither by logic nor by common sense, to be there, and from this moment we must rule out a priori any departure from any centimeter. Then another government comes and it tries to bring peace on the basis of a good compromise, and he says—this is impossible. So why did you conduct negotiations? You misled the people. That was a trick.

[Begin] We never said we would bring [it]. We conducted negotiations in an attempt to reach a settlement.

[Ramon] It is our obligation to give a solution in which Gaza is not included within the State of Israel and the border is not open. The border with Egypt is an open border, only whomever gets there must present a visa. If we wish to, we let him in, if we do not wish to, we do not let him in. We have no responsibility towards them. Do you know what the percent of unemployed is in Egypt, what kind of terrible economic distress is there? Does someone think that we are responsible for that? For that, we have to open the borders? I do not understand the point of the argument that it is our obligation to supply employment to the Palestinians.

[Begin] We have an interest that they will live in relative tranquillity, so that they do not murder us.

[Ramon] Benny Begin, we have an interest, but that we will give work, and they will murder us, and also steal our property—that seems to me an unwarranted altruism. If they would come and say, we give them work and there is no terror, then I wouldn't want that either; but there is also terror, and also to give them work, and the Israeli economy cannot even supply these jobs.

Therefore, the border will not be open. It will be open like the border in Rafiah. And Rafiah is split, so the residents of Egyptian Rafiah will be able to come to Israel and work?

[box p 11]

The Gaza Border, 1956

In the morning, on 29 April 1956, Ro'i Rottenberg, the Regional Commander of Qibbutz Nahal 'Oz, went out, on horseback, to chase away Arab peasants from Gaza who had crossed the border and harvested from the settlement's fields. When he arrived in the area, the Arabs shot him, killing him, and dragged his corpse to their territory. After they desecrated the corpse, they turned it over to the U.N. observers.

The next day, Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan spoke these words in eulogy, beside Ro'i's grave: "Yesterday, Ro'i

was murdered in the morning. The silence of the spring morning blinded him, and he did not see those who were waiting to ambush him on the edge of the furrow. Let us not cast blame today on the murderers. What purpose have we to assert their strong hatred for us? For eight years they have been living in the refugee camps that are in Gaza, and before their eyes we are making the land and the villages in which they and their fathers lived our own.

"Not from the Arabs, but from ourselves shall we seek vengeance for Ro'i. How did we shut our eyes from looking clearly at our fate, from seeing the destiny of our generation in all its cruelty? Have we forgotten that this group of youths, which sits in Nahal 'Oz, bears on its shoulders the heavy gates of Gaza, gates on the other side of which crowd hundreds of thousands of eyes and hands that pray that we will be weak, so that they can tear us to pieces—have we forgotten that? For we also know that in order for the hope to destroy us to wither, we must be, morning and evening, armed and ready. We are a generation of settlement, and without the steel helmet and the barrel of the cannon we will not be able to plant a tree and build a home. Our children will not live if we do not dig shelters, and without a barbed wire fence and a machinegun we shall not be able to pave a road and drill for water. The millions of Jews, who were destroyed while having no country, look at us from the dust of Jewish history and command us to settle and to establish a land for our people.

"But beyond the furrow of the border swells a sea of hatred and yearnings for revenge, which awaits the day on which tranquillity will dull our readiness, the day on which we heed the ambassadors of hindering hypocrisy, who call on us to lay down our arms. The blood of Ro'i calls out to us from his torn body. Even though we vowed a thousand times that our blood shall not be spilled for naught, and yesterday we were again deceived, we listened and we believed."

"We shall today settle accounts with ourselves. We shall not shrink from seeing the hatred that accompanies and fills the lives of hundreds of thousands of Arabs, who live around us and await the moment in which they will be able to spill our blood. We shall not avert our eyes, lest our hands be weakened. That is the edict of our generation. This is the choice of our lives—to be ready and armed, strong and tough, or the sword will be knocked from our fist—and our lives will be cut short."

"Ro'i Rottenberg, the slim, blond youth, who went from Tel Aviv to build his home at the gates of Gaza, to be a wall for us; Ro'i—the light that was in his heart blinded his eyes, and he did not see the glint of the blade. The yearning for peace made his ears deaf, and he did not hear the sound of the murder that was waiting. The gates of Gaza were too heavy for his shoulders, and they overcame him." [end of box]

If there will be a settlement, it will be reached with someone in the hope that he will rule. But even if we

make an agreement, he may not observe it and someone else will rule; and I still say that this is preferable to the status quo. The terror organizations might take over, and if there will be terror in Gaza we will reply resolutely and with force and in a freer and less limited way than we respond today: because today, I cannot hit the electrical line there, I am responsible for fixing it.

This is in contrast to the situation that will worsen, which is a terrible prospect, of a million Gazans in another three to four years. There are approximately 600,000 to 700,000 persons there under the age of 30, and 500,000 jobseekers who have no chance of finding jobs. This is your vision, Benny Begin. Motta also says that we will not be in Gaza when the settlement comes, that is, Motta also agrees that we have no strategic interest there. It is not like the West Bank, certainly not like Jerusalem.

[Schiff] Including the settlements?

[Ramon] Certainly that includes the settlements. The settlements are superfluous, they do not contribute to security, not to the future of the agreement. In my estimation, the moment that we leave there, the 3,000 persons who live there also must leave. The mistake that was made must be corrected.

[Segev] You are all talking about 25 years of mistakes on the strategic level and on the other level, and one must stand up and say that mistakes were made, but if for 25 years we held back and now the negotiations have begun, it would be foolish to take a unilateral step before negotiations.

[Schiff] Is the question of unilateral withdrawal on the agenda at all, or is this more public or other pressure?

[Gur] This question is not on the agenda. On the agenda are negotiations that we are conducting with the Palestinians, with the Jordanians, and with the Syrians, and we hope to arrive at optimal results in these negotiations. I do not know to what extent talk about a unilateral withdrawal hinders our position in the negotiations, I do not know if it encourages acts of terror, as some of our residents in the Gaza Strip assert, but I certainly think that my comrade Hayyim Ramon, who is a member of the government that is conducting the negotiations, can and must restrain himself in making proposals that are completely unnecessary while negotiations for a settlement are under way.

[Begin] Is the news item that was published, according to which the government will hold in the near future a discussion of the future of the Gaza region, correct?

[Gur] It is the intention of the prime minister to remove from the agenda in the coming period this talk by Hayyim Ramon about a unilateral withdrawal.

I find it very difficult to see a serious reason to initiate a unilateral withdrawal in the foreseeable future. If Minister Ramon thinks that if the negotiations are delayed forever it will be necessary at a certain stage to take this

or that strategic or tactical action—let us wait and see, after all, the negotiations have only begun. Therefore, I think that the talk about unilateral withdrawal is premature, is unnecessary, it is at this moment not relevant. The main effort must be directed towards the success of the negotiations, to extract from them the maximum possible.

I think that an agreement has a chance, and there is a chance to solve within it also part of the economic problems. Terror of one kind or another may, perhaps, continue, but there is no doubt that the State of Israel can live more or less in calm circumstances, with development like that of a western country, with a quality of life such as we desire.

[Schiff] I would like each of you to sum up what he thinks about the desired settlement for the Strip. Is the PLO necessary for such a settlement, or is one possible without it? What is the role of Egypt in such a settlement?

[Kleiman] I agree with Hayyim Ramon that it were better for Gaza not to be part of the State of Israel. And I think that there is an optical illusion here; we do not have Gaza, Gaza has us. At the same time, we have an interest—not an obligation, rather an egotistical interest—that there should not be hardship there, because economic hardship there will hurt us.

The ideal thing would be if we were able to attain there maximum welfare with minimum work in Israel, because the matter of work in Israel, in contrast to other economic links with Israel, is definitely critical: it is the presence in the street, that is exactly the place for friction.

[Ramon] But then the hardship there will increase.

[Kleiman] I think that this requires a different approach to investments and development there.

[Ramon] In two more years you will employ more Gazans, or you will have greater distress.

[Kleiman] That is not entirely correct, because the employment situation in Gaza itself is much worse today than a few years ago. And that stems from the use of certain economic measures and from the repression of the intifada. A settlement also has a certain role of reducing the level of confrontation. It is correct that separation or closure today reduces the possibility for acts of terror, but in the present situation they will increase the hardship, which will spur the acts of terror. And the economic price of withdrawal is not so big in budgetary terms: half a billion dollars, or \$600 million, that is not a large sum for the State of Israel. If the people of Israel wants to get out of this so much today without increasing the economic hardship there and it willing to pay this, okay.

[Segev] I am in favor of finding a settlement in the framework of which we will not be in the Strip. We have nothing to look for there, just people with a different

culture, with different problems, any way that we try to rule over them we will find ourselves in infinite problems, unceasing. Since Egypt also does not want the Strip, it must be some part of Jordan. It should be remembered that today the residents in the Strip are the only ones who do not have passports. And if they will be part of Jordan, by an entity-federation between the Palestinians and Jordan—the situation will be good. In the framework of the concession, Israel must ask the United States and the European Community to try to help in a massive way to find economic solutions in the Strip.

[Ramon] It must be remembered that the subject is not a settlement that is desirable for Gaza, but a settlement that is desirable for the State of Israel. If it can be done with a minimum of distress for the residents, that is good. If it can be done with more distress for the residents, that is not as good, but I will still do it. And if it must be done involving great distress for the residents, then I will also not be afraid to do it. I know that this has a price, but the price is smaller by far than the price we are paying and will pay.

I never said that we must leave the Strip from one day to the next. I always said, and I also say today, that simultaneously with the negotiations there must be a target date for our departure from the Strip. Not only does the presentation of a target date not impair the negotiations, in my opinion it aids them.

The moderate Palestinians in the Strip are clarifying with concern with the members of the military government whether we are really leaving. Haydar 'Abd E-Shaafi said: just not a unilateral withdrawal. This means that half of the Strip will ask us to stay and the other half will stone us and will come to Tel Aviv to murder us. This is the reality. The world must understand, the Arabs must understand, the Palestinians must understand that we do not intend to continue to be the losers who bear all the ills of the Strip forever and ever.

The Gazan reality harms the peace process, because the daily friction, the murders, the intensification of the hatred and the hostility are important components in public opinion, which is despairing of peace and the possibility of a settlement, and will prevent the governments from arriving at a settlement. And, therefore, also from this aspect of the peace process, it is desirable that the public in the country know that this is not going on forever, and that we are not talking about negotiations without a target date.

[Begin] I seem to misunderstand the concept of negotiations. Minister Ramon says that the announcement of a unilateral concession of the Gaza region aids the negotiations. But with the announcement of a unilateral concession—the negotiations are over, and negotiations mean that you have something to give so that someone will give you something in exchange. This government, and the Labor Party, certainly Meretz, announce: we

have no cards for bargaining, we hold cards that are burning our fingers, just take these cards.

As to the permanent settlement, from my viewpoint, there is no difference in this matter between the Gaza region and Judaea and Samaria. In the Camp David agreement, as well, there is no difference between them. A Jordanian federation—in my opinion, has no basis, the Jordanians cannot impose themselves even symbolically beyond the Jordan River. In the permanent settlement, the parameters, as they were determined at Camp David, apply also to the Gaza region, also to Samaria and Judaea, the Gaza region in its entirety and the Qatif region and the B'sor region, all of them are regions of Eretz Yisra'el that must not be abandoned to foreign sovereignty. And I think that here, again as in Judaea and Samaria, it will become clear in the final analysis, as it becomes clear also from large parts of this discussion, that there is no contradiction between this fundamental approach and the long-term strategic security requirements of Israel. Whether they want it or not, it is impossible to cut off the Gaza region in one way or another from the State of Israel.

[Segev] When I was the military commander of the Gaza Strip, I attempted to express my opinion on the danger that was inherent in continued control over Gaza. I said this in several forums, and in the end I decided to write a letter to the prime minister and minister of defense at the time, Menahem Begin. I wrote a letter to him in 1980, in which I specified all of the dangers and the risks that I see in our continued control in Gaza. Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman had already resigned, and Chief of Staff Rafa'el Eytan viewed the very writing of the letter as disloyalty to him. And then the prime minister and defense minister summoned me...

[Begin] Who apparently did not view this as disloyalty...

[Segev]...called me and told me to explain the letter. And I explained to him the letter and I went over all of the risks. And in the end he said to me: Esteemed Brig. Gen. Segev, first of all I want it to be recorded in the protocol that you had the right to write your proposal and whoever disagrees with this should know that you had a complete right as a military commander. Secondly, from today on I ask you to mention this no more. The Gaza region is one of the regions of Eretz Yisra'el and in the future it will be part of the State of Israel. I am sorry that this will not be in my lifetime, but it will surely be.

[Gur] It was clear from the entire conversation that, from the economic viewpoint, the future of the Gaza Strip is shrouded in mist. Any diplomatic settlement must take into account the economic life of the Strip. Therefore, the settlement must encompass a larger framework, and for me this is the Palestinian-Jordanian framework. In everything that concerns the corridor to the Strip, I see no difficulty. Trucks can travel or are actually travelling on the road between the Gaza Strip and Mt. Hebron, not to mention that the intention is to turn it into a national road, or it will be possible to call

it international, and in that way it will be possible to maintain a fruitful economic link. The moment that such a development is possible, the motivation of a large part of the population to continue with terror activities will decline considerably, and we will be able to find the common way to refrain from terror. And, therefore, a free and close system of relations is desirable between the State of Israel and a joint Arab-Palestinian state. Each state will have its own government, and also extreme terrorist bodies, when they become members in the government, they change their behavior. Therefore, I foresee cooperation.

[Begin] With the PLO?

[Gur] Between us and the Arab population. I have no certainty that this will be the PLO, I have no certainty that this will be Hamas. I imagine that the moment the possibility arises to enter a reasonable, normal life, there will be many changes also among the Palestinian population.

[Kleiman] When there is no responsible government in a place, there is also no one to whom to go with complaints. Today we have no one to go to with complaints, besides ourselves, for what is happening in the Strip.

'Inside' Perspective From Territories on Closing

93AA0034A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 9 Apr 93 pp 1-2

[Article by Tzvi Gilat: "Pesah Closure"]

[Text] "I have been working in the factory for 15 years," the voice lamented quietly in the darkness. "Morning shift, afternoon shift, night shift. I know all the jobs, all the kinds of premiums. As you are drafted into the army, we are drafted at the age of 18 into Polgat."

It is 0400, at the Erez checkpoint, this Wednesday. Eight laborers are waiting on the Palestinian side of the checkpoint for the vehicle of the ra'is [boss], who will take them to the factory in Kiryat Gat. Last night, one of the foremen telephoned the home of one of the laborers, and ordered him to go to the offices of the Civil Administration. A special permit for entry into Israel was waiting there for 17 laborers. "In the period of the closure," it is written on each permit, in red letters. Exclusive.

Of the 17, only eight arrived at the checkpoint. Their voices—they asked that their identities not be revealed—are a mixture of resentment, disgust, and gratitude. A week of closure has reinforced their awareness that they are screwed. On the other hand, compared to their brothers in the refugee camps, they are lucky. Polgat needs them. In another half an hour, at daybreak, the feelings of resentment and anger will grow. Then it will become clear that the ra'is, whose Volkswagen they await, will not arrive. He, apparently, did not win the sought-after entry permit. At 0600 (now, they say, the shift is beginning) they cross the road heading south. Now try to find three shekels to go back to Gaza.

The IDF Also Closed the Secret Routes

Like everything that has happened in the territories in the last two decades—you hope for one thing and get exactly its opposite. After 25 years of conquest, Minister of Labor and Welfare Ora Namir demands that the laborers from the territories receive the customary wages in the economy. But it is clear to the laborers that this benefit has only one meaning: that they will find themselves outside of the economy. Namir will now act to institutionalize organized labor—but in doing that will create an organization of big wheels and middlemen for labor. Rabin wants a cutting off, but in the morning, next to the roadblock, each side feels the degradation of mutual dependence.

At 0500, about 20 women in traditional peasant garb come down from the hills near Bet Lahiya. Experienced agricultural laborers. One works for Moshe Tuqa in Moshav Yad Natan, another for Tziyon Dahan. For years already. They are sure that they have work, there has never been a problem for women to enter.

Near them awaits an agriculturist from the region in a Mitsubishi pick-up. He, too, wishes to remain anonymous. Now, for a few minutes, the game of honor is conducted. Who approaches whom—the agriculturist to the female laborers, or the contrary. He is next to the wheel, they are next to the fence. After 15 minutes he starts the vehicle, parks near them, lowers the window a bit. Five female laborers get in. But this time there is a surprise. He is stopped at the checkpoint. Beginning this morning, it turns out, women also need a work permit.

The owner of the Mitsubishi argues, gives up, makes an irritated reverse, and turns towards the seashore. The agriculturists in the region know of a number of paths that circumvent Erez. At 0615 he returns, extremely irritated. The female laborers get out silently and sit near the fence. The army has blocked the secret ways, too.

Now a Subaru Justy, license plate 25-084-03, enters the picture. On the front windshield there is a prominent Israel police sticker. There is a short discussion and four doubting female laborers get in. They are stopped at the checkpoint. "It's all right," says the owner to the young lieutenant who stops him. I am from the vicinity, everybody knows me, ask him who I am," he says and points to one of the policemen who are regularly at the checkpoint. The policeman nods his head enthusiastically. This time, it does not help. The Justy refuses to accept the edict. In another five minutes, he, too, will return in reverse. Now both the female laborers and the Justy are cursing Rabin and the government.

In recent months, the Erez checkpoint has become a border crossing in every sense. One kilometer south of it, on the road to Nisanit, an Israeli-Palestinian task force has prepared what is termed a "VAT[value-added-tax]-circumventing-road." Through the dunes they paved a road on which trucks from the Strip and trucks from Israel meet—concrete blocks, cement, cloth, whatever, is transferred from pallet to pallet, they try to

smuggle. A Gazan vehicle will be checked carefully, and in general will not be allowed to pass. The bills of lading are not always requested from Israeli trucks.

At 0600, next to the Erez checkpoint, they park—each one in its place—five local trucks. Two persons in a cabin. All of them are laden with jeans, from the underground sewing shops of the Sag'iyah neighborhood. Among them drives about an Israeli commercial vehicle, on which is written "Peace Laundry." He does not yet know who is his contact man, so he checks each truck. When he finds him, they go off and at one of the curves in the road the jeans are quickly transferred from baggage compartment to baggage compartment. When the transfers are over, Peace Laundry goes back to the checkpoint. The driver smiles from behind his sunglasses. The soldier lets him pass.

"It is all one big lie," say the laborers next to the checkpoint, "everything is Abu-Ali [empty threat]." Soon it will be mid-April, and most of them have not yet received their March wages. They know that when, if ever, they are finally allowed to cross the border into Israel, the chances are great that the employer will say 'come tomorrow, you screwed me with the closure, now I don't have money to pay.'" They will swallow [it], for lack of choice, because now they depend on him more than ever. Without him, they haven't a chance even to enter Israel and to try to collect what is coming to them.

Here, look, they show the wage slips for their work. Name, identity certificate, name of employer, employer number. Everything is in order. But in all of the wage slips, the amount of NIS [new Israeli shekel] 0.00 appears in the space for the payment. In all of the slips, all of them, it is noted that the employee worked only 12 days in the month. This is an agreed lie, which has become common since the great closure of the Gulf War. The worker works 30 full days, the owner pays him in full in cash, at the rate of NIS 60 per day, and notes in the report to the employment office that they only worked 12 days for him, for which they received payment in advance of the entire amount. It is worth it to him on paper.

Why precisely 12? Because more than 14 days per month is considered regular employment, which entitles the recipient to certain social benefits. While income tax and national insurance and Histadrut organization dues are deducted from 12 days' pay—there are no benefits, nothing. The Arab laborer knows that he is being had. He also knows that he has no choice. He only accumulates the knowledge.

Returns From the Checkpoint. Curses Rabin.

At 0600 he strides towards the checkpoint, his basket in his hand, Musa 'Abd El-Rahman, from El Bureij. He is over 60 years old, has been working in Israel for 25 years, is completely convinced that on account of his age, his seniority, and his good nature, that no one will stop him at the checkpoint, even the special permit on which is written "in the period of the closure."

When will the closure end, Chief of Staff Ehud Barak was asked a few days ago, during a tour by journalists in the Strip. "I do not think that we have to reveal our plans to the opponent," Barak said, as if the subject were an intelligence exercise. The opponent, Musa 'Abd El-Rahman, over 60 years old, comes back after a quarter of an hour at the checkpoint, surprised, and he, too, curses Rabin.

In recent weeks, the front has passed, it seems, to the employment bureau. The declarations that "the employment bureaus will be open until 10 PM" sounded similar in tone to the announcements that the light is on all night in the Ministry of Finance and in the prime minister's office when they are preparing some plan, whose purpose is to make a fundamental change.

So the employment bureaus are open, but they are generally empty. As a result, the image of the Arab laborer has grown until he has become a legendary figure. "An experienced Arab laborer does in half a day what five female soldiers do," said an agriculturalist from Tel Mond this week, dissatisfied with the solution that the army had arranged for him in order to save his flower harvest.

The Jews have no output at all, say the Arabs in Gaza, but not a gram of ego was added to their self-image. They have used the word "ya'ash" many times in order to describe what is going on in the refugee camps in the Strip, until it has almost lost its significance.

And, indeed, this week I found it difficult to discern a dramatic change in the Shati camp. The eyes are simply more [text illegible]. The masses of the newly unemployed are swallowed up in the sea of the veteran unemployed. In Gaza's market, one can see persons standing for many minutes next to the meat stalls, and afterwards continuing on without buying anything. Unemployed persons with initiative, who up to a few weeks ago were laborers with a steady wage, opened small stalls, where they sell one or two products—tricot shirts or cheap toys. The initiative will soon flicker out for lack of buyers, and with it, the hope. How do they get by? It also is not clear how we got by until now, they say in the camps. One gives to the next one what he has. We Palestinians can get by in that way until the end. What is the end? The end is that you go out of here.

On a large lot, next to the neighborhood of Sheykh Radwan, Gazan laborers are dismantling piles of IDF [Israel Defense Forces] gas shelters for babies. Working and laughing. Here are your gas shelters for babies, which cost you a pile of money during the war, which you did not want to give to our babies, now you are selling them for 70 grush each. The aluminum is sold by the kilo, we will put the plastic at the entrance to the house for doormats. Four pieces of plastic for a shekel. The dismantlers are working slowly, there is no urgency. What do you call this? Mamatim [gas shelters for babies]? What does one die from? [play on words]

In the Rimmel neighborhood, a prestigious neighborhood in Gaza, six members of the "Union of Laborers' Associations" are having breakfast together, for which the total price is NIS 5. Two large plates of hummus with beans and vegetables, NIS 2 each, and 10 pitas that together cost NIS 1. In Shati and Jabaliya the same menu can be had for half as much. The price, on account of the distress, falls continually. A crate of tomatoes is sold on Gaza's main street for NIS 7. Three kg of peas for NIS 2.5. Three cartons of 30 eggs each—for NIS 10. If you have NIS 10, thanks be to God, you will have eggs for the month.

There are individuals who for weeks already have been eating only dates, the laborers say after a while. There are others who for months already have been eating only hummus. The sack of flour, in many homes in Shati, is getting smaller. According to the statistics, the Arabs of the territories consume on the average 100 kg of flour per capita each year, in contrast to 60 in Israel. Carbohydrate-rich foods swell the body, proteins strengthen it. As for proteins, there is almost nothing to say.

Since the Gulf war, they note that war again and again in Gaza, because the present closure is reminiscent of that lengthy closure. Since then, the PLO assistance to the residents of the territories has almost ceased. The orphans and the widows of those killed in the intifadah once received a monthly allowance. Today, they find it hard in the Strip to collect charity money to rebuild the house of one, Mukbal Tewfik Shur'ab, of Khan Yunis, whose home—so they say—was burned by settlers from the Qatif bloc, and whose jaw and arms were broken. The refugees from Kuwait and the Gulf Principalities have joined the circle of unemployed in Gaza in recent years, and their savings are dwindling.

Faher Abu 'Awad, who is a marble worker in the synagogue of Abu Hatzeyra in Be'er Sheva, invites me politely into his home. Twenty-three souls depend on him for their livelihood—his children, the nine sons of his brother, who suffers from brain paralysis, his father and mother, and another brother who got out of detention a short time ago. Two years ago, 'Awad was a teacher in Kuwait, and he sent home a salary every month. He still wears, in his home in Shati, among the open sewage channels, nice clothing from that period. His speech flows, his eyes glow.

He shows me the broken door at the entrance to his home, the result of "the point pressure" that was applied by Golany in the camp the past week. What will happen when the closure is lifted? If and when, he will return to Be'er Sheva, in the hope that his employer will pay what is coming to him. And if he won't pay? The expression "his face darkened in anger" seems to have been tailored for Abu 'Awad.

Yes, he has already thought about that possibility. A real possibility. In that case, he chooses his words carefully, I hope that I will come home exactly as I left it in the morning, that nothing else will happen. For the sake of

my honor, the honor of the guest, he asks not to go too much into politics. What do you think, one of those present shoots, why do people suddenly take a knife into their hand? What do they have left to do?

Go from here, says Abu 'Awad, go. I am not referring to you, now you are a guest. But you, too, it would be better that you leave here, together with the entire army and your Rabin. You also took our air. No, to tell the truth, he does not believe in co-existence. A cutting-off is the necessary thing also in his opinion. Maybe after 100 years of separation, one independent state next to another independent state, something can be built. Maybe not. Because you have to look at the root of the conflict, he says. The root is not the closure. The root is the war between Islam and Judaism.

Collective Punishment. Collective Hatred

During the past year he spent two months in the Shabak interrogation facility, which the Gazans call "the slaughterhouse," perhaps due to the moderate physical pressure that is used there. Afterwards he sat for eight months in administrative detention, without an indictment being submitted against him. There are many more like him. Also Ri'ad Abu El-Marwan, his neighbor, joins the conversation. He, too, is not looking for justice. On this occasion, he shows me a fresh cut on his head. Golany entered him home, he relates, three days ago in the afternoon. They put him against the wall, his wife in another room, afterwards they instructed him to remove the contents of the closets, while others turned the living room upside down. Marwan tried to get on their good side. I am an all right guy, he says he told them, ask my employer, Hayyim Zinger from Ben Yehuda Street. He said that the Golany soldier laughed. Hayyim Zinger? I myself am Hayyim Zinger, and he gave me a direct blow with the butt.

The present closure, like those before it, is the result of distress. After two weeks of especially bad knifings, and in view of the deterioration in the feeling of security, a divider was established. It is intended to allow the Jews to celebrate Pesah quietly, to forget that there are a few Palestinians in the vicinity. In imposing it, the worsening distress of the Palestinians and the attendant consequences were not taken into account.

During these weeks, a process of demonization of the Arab laborer ("one laborer is worth seven Jewish laborers") and dehumanization of his community ("you have to give it to them with full force" said Fu'ad Ben-Eli'ezer at the cabinet meeting, apparently referring to all of the Palestinians). Meretz also supported the collective punishment.

But up to now, it has been proven that collective punishment achieves nothing, aside from collective hatred. On the background of mutual hatred, the Palestinians will return to work in Israel in the coming weeks. The number of passes has increased in recent days. It is estimated that by the time the peace talks begin, on the

20th, the number of passes will stabilize at approximately 15,000, half the number before the closure. There will not be peace, in any event.

At the beginning of 1957, in Algeria, the French paratroopers cleaned out the Kasbah of Algiers. The terror was ended, life returned to normal, but afterwards a great wave broke out, which burned the ground from under the French. Both Hamas and 'Arafat spoke two weeks ago about "burning the ground."

Everyone with whom I spoke in Gaza is convinced that the wave will break out. As for the closure—the Palestinians differ in their estimates whether its purpose is to break their spirit or the opposite—to give a signal to the Palestinian delegation that there is something on the table to talk about. In any event, none of them had a doubt—the closure is another desperate expression of Israel's desire to get out. The question is with what arrangements, if any, will this exit be connected and who will get hit.

On the radio, as I left the Strip, Paul Simon sang "Five Ways To Leave Your Lover." When the subject is not love, there is, apparently, only one way.

Separation of Peoples, Jewish Independence

93A40041A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
23 Apr 93 p B1

[Article by Shabtai Tevet]

[Text] If there is a similarity between the efforts of the Zionists to build a Jewish state and the efforts of the Arabs of the land of Israel to create a Palestinian state, it has been highlighted lately by headlines of closure and separation.

On April 19, 1936, the Arabs began three years of bloody attacks ending with the publication of the White Paper of May, 1939. The Jews and the British called these attacks "the events," to play down their political significance, while the Arabs crowned them "the revolt" to emphasize their national significance. Then too, the government, the Mandate administration, attempted to suppress "the revolt" by military means. By October 1938, 18 infantry battalions, two cavalry brigades, an artillery battery and mechanized units, a total of some 20,000 men, were engaged in this assignment, not to mention two companies of royal air force troops, one warship and police reinforced by auxiliary guards and mobile Jewish border patrols. Then too, the government, in the person of the High Commissioner, expressed "sorrow" for each Jew murdered. Two hundred and five persons were killed and thousands wounded. The Jewish community increasingly grumbled about the inadequacy of the government and of the steps taken to "pacify the Arabs."

Thus, along with the differences, the "events" closely resemble the intifadah. Then as now, the Arabs expressed their national aspirations through murder and terrorism; then against the Jewish community and the

British Mandate administration, today against the Israeli state and its Jewish citizens. Then as now, the struggle employed a quarantine; the Arabs imposed it then on the Jewish community through strikes and a boycott, while today they do so by means of Jewish public opinion against the Israeli Government. Whatever the tactics, the result is the same: separation.

But the separation the Arabs brought about between them and the Jews during 1936-39 fostered creation of the foundation on which the state was built in 1948. One prominent example was the pier constructed in Tel Aviv as a substitute for the Arab port in Jaffe, which was closed to Jewish citrus exports. The first to realize that this development was a positive one, and that the Arab "revolt" was aiding realization of the Zionist dream, was David Ben-Gurion. When he toured the pier in 1937 during its construction, he saw the port of Tel Aviv as the first bud of Jewish independence. "The mere sight of the pier...was enough to encourage me and dispel all my worries and gloom...." he wrote in his diary. "If not for the losses in human life, which nothing can replace, the economic cost would be worth this victory, and we should give a prize to the rioters (the Arabs-ST) for spurring us to this great achievement.... We now stand before a project that will inherit the place of the Jaffe port."

From its start, the labor movement had worked for economic separation between the Jewish and Arab communities in the land of Israel and flown the flag of "Hebrew labor." Ben-Gurion strengthened this policy when he called for "Hebrew labor 100 percent." The separation that the Arabs imposed through the "events" was a positive development in his eyes because it promoted partition. And indeed, when the British Government proposed partition, Ben-Gurion gave the proposal his blessing, for he understood that it was a necessary and indispensable condition for creation of the state.

With hindsight, one may, therefore, discern three stages without which the state of Israel would not have arisen: "Hebrew labor," the fruit of Jewish initiative; closure causing separation, the fruit of Arab initiative; and partition of the land of Israel between Jews and Arabs, which was the fruit of efforts made by the United Nations at the behest of the British. If history really is repeating itself now in reverse, and if the Palestinians' own Ben-Gurion should spring forth, perhaps he too will bless the closure and welcome a revival of the UN partition proposal, which the Arabs rejected in 1947 in favor of a war of annihilation against the Jewish state at its birth.

A fundamental difference, which is likely to bring about a Palestinian state, exists, however, between the history of the creation of the state of Israel and its mirror image. The Jews exploited the "events" and the closure, converting them, through their enterprise and strength, into a firm foundation for the state. Today, by contrast, the work is being done by government policies related to the closure, whose goal is to create sources of employment in

the territories and improve the base of services and infrastructure there. The result is likely to be development of a port in Gaza, similar to construction of the port of Tel Aviv.

If the government undertakes these actions with open eyes and forethought, perhaps it will win the Palestinians' blessing, just as Ben-Gurion gave his, for its assistance in realizing their national hopes. But if that is its goal, it would seem that better means, less bound up with bloodshed, exist for its achievement than those of the "events" of more than 55 years ago. One of them is to recognize the right of the Palestinians to a state and to condition its creation on a peace agreement and secure borders for Israel.

Settler Strategies for Confronting Autonomy

93AA0040B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
22 Apr 93 p B1

[Article by Nadav Shragai: "The Intimidating Paper Will Be Distributed Shortly"]

[Text] Dozens of lists and articles have been written in the last few years on the manner in which the Jewish population in the territories is likely to greet autonomy. How will they wrestle with it? Will they wrestle with it at all? Will they be comfortable living alongside it or within it, or will they prefer to pack up and move back within the Green Line? How will they relate to the Arab population and Arab officialdom that will operate on the strength of autonomy council authority? How will contact be maintained between the State of Israel and the Jewish islands within the Palestinian autonomy? All of the answers to these questions and to many others have been based up until now on the moods of the population of religious settlers, represented in large measure by the Judea-Samaria-Gaza Council, most of whose officials were appointed with the first generation of religious ideologues or with the second generation of this group.

Nevertheless the fact that the majority of Jewish residents of the territories are not religious has been almost total ignored. The silent majority of the settler population lives in Ariel, in Ma'ale Adumim, in Alfei Menashe and in dozens of other settlement points. They form a large secular-urban community that is estimated today to constitute about 60 percent of the Jewish population of the territories. It barely makes its voice heard on matters directly affecting its future in the area because its presence in the territories is first and foremost a bedroom presence, not a political one within the context of the historical-religious-national struggle for the Land of Israel.

The reaction of the Jewish majority to autonomy is, thus, unknown. The heads of the Judea-Samaria-Gaza Council know it, and in off-the-record discussions express the hope that the religious community will succeed in sweeping the silent secular majority along with them into an active struggle for autonomy, but they

are not convinced it will happen. Even in demonstrations on the security issue, the secular settler population took little part, and there is no way to ascertain how it will behave on the autonomy issue.

July and August are generally the test months for settlement strength. At this time, after the academic year is over in the kindergartens and schools, a new population joins the settlements, and those settlers who want to move back to within the confines of the Green Line also do so in these months. Therefore it may be that the coming summer months will supply the first indication of the real mood among the secular population. Exodus would indicate fears about the political process, which weighs heavily on the future of the Jews in these parts of the country. Continuation in the growth of population, even in clearly secular areas, would indicate one of two things: confidence and optimism with regard to the fate of Jewish settlement in the territories despite impending autonomy, or indifference and stupidity in everything having to do with the nature of autonomy, to the point of being willing to bet homes within the Green Line on an improved standard of living and relatively cheap housing on the other side for the short term, and little thought about the long term.

The Judea-Samaria-Gaza Council is about to launch a propaganda campaign, the purpose of which is to make it clear that autonomy is really a Palestinian state in every way—if not tomorrow, then the day after. This campaign has been delayed until now because of the concentration of the organizational and propaganda effort on the issue of security, but also because of the fear that drawing too black a picture of Jewish existence under autonomy would sow demoralization among the Jewish community in the territories and achieve the opposite goal: despair, helplessness and, perhaps, a wave of emigration.

In a letter to the residents of Judea-Samaria-Gaza that was meanwhile frozen and not distributed, Uri Ari'el, the general secretary of the Judea-Samaria-Gaza Council writes: "The Israeli autonomy program under the American steamroller is almost a state. The trouble is that while the Arabs are already aware of the enormous benefit that will accrue to them under autonomy, a significant portion of the Israeli public, including settlers in Judea-Samaria-Gaza, refuses to recognize the dangers that it portends for them. Ignorance, pressure and indifference are causing many good Israelis to mistakenly treat autonomy as a rather benevolent political program.

"Ignorance," writes Ari'el, "is an excellent tranquilizer for someone who only wants to stay calm, but it is a dangerous drug for someone who wants to live and flourish.... For some reason many of us naively think that it is a question of transfer of a certain degree of municipal authority to the Arabs, and it will have no great effect on our lives and the continuation of Israeli rule in the area. The truth of the matter is that the Arabs

will not only manage their own lives themselves, they are also likely to acquire a whole lot of control over our lives, as well."

At this point Ari'el comments briefly on a possible negative scenario for the event in which autonomy is established: "We will no longer be able to travel the highways that cross Arab cities and towns because, were we to be attacked, the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] would not be able to rush to our assistance. According to the autonomy agreement the IDF is supposed to evacuate its forces and bases from the concentrations of Arab population in the area... Armed Arab policemen will stop us for checks between Elqana and Ari'el, between Ma'aley Adumim and Jerusalem, between Efrat and Bethlehem. The Camp David agreements speak explicitly of a 'strong Palestinian police force.' These policemen will be responsible for our safety in incidents likely to flare up between Jews and Arabs on the highway. They will have the authority to decide who is the attacker and who is the person attacked. Whom to detain and whom to protect. Israeli policemen or IDF soldiers will not be there. The program does not take into consideration very difficult possibilities such as a concentrated attack by Arab ruffraff on a Jewish settlement. In that case, too, according to the Camp David agreements, the IDF would be prevented from intervening, and we would likely find ourselves in the situation of the Mandate days in which the official police were not interested or capable of protecting us while self-defense is illegal.

"In case of the slightest problem in the electricity, water, or telephone service," Ari'el adds, "we would be totally dependent on the mercies of the Arab officials of the autonomy ministries. We can guess that they will not make any special effort to fix the problem quickly. Arab houses will rapidly spring up along the settlement fences and all along the 'bypass' transportation routes."

"Hundreds of thousands of Arabs from Jordan and Lebanon are set to 'return' to the autonomy territory. The Camp David agreements promise them that right. We are talking about a huge reserve of people that would alter for the worse the demographic balance of the entire Land of Israel. All of this is defined in the agreements as just the 'interim agreement.' After three years, negotiations over the area will start, and at the end of five years of autonomy the negotiations must come to an end."

In the period of the previous government the letter was frozen and not distributed to the settlers. The Judea-Samaria-Gaza Council people counted on Yitzhaq Shamir to succeed in dragging out the negotiations for many years and in crushing autonomy. The political coup and the intention of the new regime to conduct negotiations seriously will almost certainly bring the "intimidating paper" out of the drawer, and it will be distributed to the community at large.

Today almost all the heads of the Jewish local regional councils in the territories, even those who up until recently were for municipal autonomy for the Arabs of

the territories, admit that the autonomy program is in every way a state aborning and therefore must be struggled against. The feeling is that sooner or later there will be autonomy in the area. Despite that, no working papers or shelved programs have been prepared for confronting this new reality of day to day life.

"The Staff for Frustrating the Autonomy Program" founded by Elyaqim Ha'etzni is, thus, the only body conducting organized staff work and planning for the almost certain future. The Staff was established in the Likud period against a background of lack of clarity in everything having to do with the stance of the Judea-Samaria-Gaza Council on the autonomy question and the obligation of the Council to a group of leaders of the local regional councils, Likud people, not to frontally attack the program. Even before the elections, the Staff distributed a video tape describing Ari'el's scenarios, which remained in the drawer for being much too sharp and acerbic.

After the political coup there was a rapprochement between the Judea-Samaria-Gaza Council and Ha'etzni's staff, and the two bodies began coordinating positions and exchanging information. The Staff, whose members include Shlomo Baum, a veteran of Unit 101; Avraham Mintz, one of the founders of Elon Moreh; Me'ir Gross, one of the leaders of the Beth El settlement; and Col. (Res) Moshe Leshem, feels that the time is already ripe for a violent rebellion against the state authorities.

At the many propaganda evenings that the Staff arranges on both sides of the Green Line, there is a lot of talk about the limit of obedience by the right to a leftist government. The Staff's message is: "There is a also a limit to the obedience of the national community. Orders from the government to expel Jews from Judea-Samaria-Gaza or from the Golan or that assist the advancement of that goal, will be considered null and void from the moment they are issued. Any attempt to evacuate the settlements will run into nonviolent civil disobedience. An army that tries to carry out such an illegal order must be resisted, and preparations must be made in advance to deal with that kind of possibility."

The Staff's propaganda machine is based in large measure on the extensive literature published by the Israeli left: articles on the limit of obedience written a few years ago by the people of "There Is a Limit," Dina and Yoshi Menuhin, Edi Tzemah, Asa Kasher, Me'ir Pa'il, Yesh'ayahu Liebowitz and others. In the propaganda material that was distributed to schools, the Staff people ask the students: "Is there another community left that the Land of Israel is as dear to as the right of the Arabs to live in the land and not be expelled from it is to Amos Oz, a right for which he is prepared 'to dismantle the state?' Is not Zion a no lesser value than democracy, a value that was handed to the Zionist State as an exclusive trust that it has no right to misappropriate or betray?"

In its "redlines" document, the "Staff for Canceling the Autonomy Program" describes what Jewish civil disobedience would be like: "Jews will continue to move in places that the IDF evacuates and will provide an active defense against any attack. The Jews will defend themselves and even call upon the residents of Israel and the Jews of the Diaspora to come to the assistance of the besieged. Jews and Israelis will not obey the autonomy police. Jewish settlement will spread and hold at least the state lands it needs for its development. Attempts at compulsion by the PLO of planning authorities and the transfer of land registration are likely to lead to clashes. The Jews will start free construction in the territory at hundreds of construction sites, and attempts to remove Jews from their holy places and return them once again to the 'seventh grade' will be frustrated. The Jewish settlements will not use the PLO mail, telephone, water or electricity. If the PLO sets up a radio and TV broadcasting station, 'the voice of captive Zion will still be heard in the mountains of Judea and Efray'im, and fund-raising drives will be held with organizational and propaganda systems separate from those of the State of Israel.'"

The Staff people consider a "law handing over the State of Israel to foreigners" the same as totally illegal laws such as "a law for canceling democracy," "a law for abolishing freedom of religion and conscience," "a law for turning over the territory from Hadera to Gedera in exchange for peace," "a law canceling the law of return," or "a law for the destruction of a people—genocide."

The Judea-Samaria-Gaza Council does not follow the Staff line on the question of the limit of obedience, but there is no doubt that the organizations "Kakh," "Kahane Lives," and "The Committee for Safety on the Highways" founded by the Kakh movement in Qiryat Arba' would adopt that line or even a more radical one if autonomy comes to the territory. Even today the declared goal is to bring about continued physical confrontation between the Jewish population and the Arab population, including bloodshed if necessary, in order to torpedo any political settlement in the future. There is no doubt that when autonomy comes to the territory they will not hesitate to attack Arab targets in order to frustrate the agreement. Activists in these movements that today count only a few hundred members are already declaring this now.

Just a few years ago, before Me'ir Kahane was murdered, Kakh activists established the organization called "the State of Judea." Yequiti'el Ben- Ya'akov, a veteran of the Defense League in the United States, was entrusted with setting up the military arm that was intended, as he puts it, to take the place of the State of Israel in the territories if Israel should decide to evacuate them. The split in "Kakh" in the wake of the murder of Kahane did not improve with the "State of Judea." It seems that the organization itself has been discarded, but the ideology on which it was founded still exists, and the activists are still in the territory. The Tapu'ah settlement in Samaria, where the distinguished nucleus of the "Kahane Lives"

movement resides, could serve as a focal point for activity of the sort that designed the "State of Judaea," which, before it dropped from the headlines, had already managed to issue some stamps and draft a constitution.

Another influential body is the committee of the rabbis of Judaea-Samaria-Gaza. The committee's point of departure is in terms of religious law, and the rabbis will therefore do their best to prevent confrontations among Jews. Even today they forbid the community that listens to them any confrontation with the Israeli army and police. But it is not inconceivable that they might allow, with certain restrictions, a confrontation with the Arab population.

Autonomy, according to the rabbis of Judaea-Samaria-Gaza, is contrary to religious law. The journal of the Binyamin religious council, "Judaea-Samaria-Gaza of the right," published a religious opinion on this matter by Rabbi Avigdor Nevnatz'el, the rabbi of the Jewish quarter in old Jerusalem. Nevnatz'el absolutely disallowed autonomy for non-Jews in the Land of Israel and ruled that "the day autonomy goes into effect in the mountains of Judaea, God forbid, then from the point of view of religious law, every Jew throughout the world is required...to rend his clothes and recite the blessing 'Blessed is the Judge of Truth' in name and in kingdom," precisely like the mourner whose dear departed is placed before him.

Terrorism 'Unaffected' by Closing of Territories

93WR0221A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 8 Apr 93 p 19

[Article by Sever Plotzger: "From Gaza and Back"]

[Text] The magic words float in an atmosphere full of fears: "continued closure," "complete cutting off," "complete separation" between Israel and the territories. Suddenly, this spring, the government discovered the answer to the Palestinian terror—to erect a high and impassable wall between the Israeli economy and the Palestinians in Judaea and Samaria. We are here, they are there, no one goes out and no one comes in, and the land will be quiet for 40 years, at least.

It seems that the only difficulty that prevents the immediate realization of the idea of "the complete separation" is the dependence of some tens of moshavim and some hundreds of Israeli contractors on Palestinian labor. The ministers of the government are angered—angered?, no, crazed by anger—solely by the fact that Jewish unemployed persons are not willing to jump immediately on jobs in the field and on scaffolding that are vacated by Arabs. When a solution to this minor difficulty is found (for example: more imported cheap labor from abroad, or IDF [Israel Defense Forces] labor that will replace the female orange pickers), it will be possible to cover finally with an iron quota the million and a half Arabs of the territories and to forbid their entry into Israel.

Let them stew in their own juices; that is how we will defeat the terror.

No, that is not how we will defeat it, we will only cultivate it. Today, after 26 years of barren Israeli control in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, it is impossible to separate the workers from the territories from their livelihoods in Israel. Prof. Ezra Sadan, who ran the Ministry of Finance during the days of the Likud government, was a central member of "Tehiya," and prepared at the request of former Defense Minister Moshe Arens a special study on the links between Israel and the territories, says: whoever prevents the residents of the territories from working in Israel is condemning them to starvation. And that is very bad for Israel.

The Gaza Strip is not an "economy," it is not a region that is capable of a separate economic existence. Gaza, where until two years ago actually not one single dollar was invested in its economic development, is a terrifyingly poor suburb of rich Israel, a neighborhood of tin shacks whose residents earn their livings almost exclusively from work in neighboring Israel.

The ministers who float the slogan of the immediate and complete cutting off should heed the words that Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Ehud Barak said in an interview that was published in the holiday issue of DAVAR. Barak: "A closure of the territories has a not inconsiderable price of increasing the pressure and the internal burden on the residents of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, and, of course, this causes economic hardship, for they have no alternative places of work. In a certain sense, this is a collective punishment." Cutting off the Palestinian workers from their work in Israel even endangers the security of Israel, as the chief of staff clearly expresses this: "The (the closure) sharpens the frustration. You take tens of thousands of young persons, who until now were workers, stress them economically and morally, and there is a chance that some of them will join the cycle of knifings."

The chief of staff's conclusion: "The shorter the closure, the better."

The demand for absolute separation is accompanied sometimes by two special economic ideas, which are supposed to allow the implementation of the immediate cutting off, but without starving Gaza. One is the idea of unemployment compensation: Israel will pay monthly unemployment compensation to the 120,000 workers who had been employed in it, so that they will not come to work there.

The buying of peace from terror in this manner, aside from being a very costly business, is not practical. No responsible government could pay the residents of the territories hundreds of millions of dollars a year for idleness instead working in Israel. The Gaza Strip would become a sorry camp of mass unemployment, maintained at our expense. The thing would arouse angry reaction in Israel, and extreme ferment in the territories.

Another idea is public works: the Civil Administration would employ those unemployed by the closure in public works projects in the places of their residence. They would pave roads, put up electrical and water lines, repair infrastructure, build schools, etc. This is a noble and nice idea and is worthy of every support. The problem is, that it is impossible to implement it without the cooperation of the local Palestinian factors and without a comprehensive plan for the development of the economy of the Palestinian autonomy. That is, already today it is impossible to solve the problem of the economic backwardness of the territories separately from a diplomatic agreement on the establishment of autonomy. The necessary investment is estimated at least \$5 billion, which no one has yet, and it will continue for many years.

And until then, they, the 100,000 Palestinian workers that come to us every morning to sell the only merchandise that they have plenty of, the strength of their hands and their muscles, will continue to come here. We have created an economic situation in which they have no choice, and we, too, have no choice.

There is no economic solution to the terror.

Need To Open Dimona Reactor After Leakage

93WN0389Z Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
16 Apr 93 p B5

[Article by Dany Rabinowitz]

[Text] The incident at the "Tomsaq-7" nuclear reactor last week began with a mishandling at the radioactive waste dump. It serves as another reminder of a troublesome subject known as the "problem that refuses to go away." Whether one is speaking about a military nuclear installation or its civilian sisters, the central process of a nuclear reactor in the core consumes bars of uranium. Some of the original uranium is converted to plutonium, an element that emits deadly radiation for thousands of years, although not to the extent that it could be called the lord of Hell. Another portion of the uranium changes into other radioactive materials for which the world of technology has yet to devise a sound method of disposal. This is a worldwide problem and, according to reports, Israel is no exception.

Besides that, in recent months the Israeli nuclear industry has found itself in a situation somewhat reminiscent of that besetting the General Security Services after the Bus No. 300 incident. From a sacred tabu that could not be mentioned, this problematic sphere of activity has become everyday grist for the media's mill. Still more is unseen than has been revealed, but it seems that the unholy alliance between the Atomic Energy Commission's aversion to releasing information and the public's lack of interest in knowing is alive and well.

The subject of Israel's dangerous nuclear waste and storage of it is a good example of this symbiosis. The

mayor of Dimona has already publicly expressed resentment that he knows nothing of how nuclear waste is stored at an installation near his city. David Ben-Litai, the chairman of the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) who was interviewed last February during a television program on the environment, agreed to consider locating Israel's nuclear waste dumps in the Nuclear Research Center (NRC) in Dimona—but did so in vague pronouncements lacking in specific details. At the end of March, the NRC in Dimona received a visit from the Minister of Environmental Protection, Yosi Sarid, who publicly announced his willingness to accept personal responsibility for dealing with the subject of nuclear waste. Upon returning from his visit, he told the media that, so far as he was concerned, the Dimona waste facility is operating properly. Nonetheless, he too did not disclose any technical details relating to handling of the nuclear waste.

A close factual examination of what now happens at the site, particularly concerning nuclear waste, cannot escape the weight of the past. The sole source of specific technical data on the subject continues to be Mordekhay Vanunu. Vanunu, who worked at the NRC, spilled what he knew to London's SUNDAY TIMES. At the newspaper's request, Vanunu spent four weeks in the autumn of 1986 telling all. The team that studied his allegations included reporters and nuclear experts, who came to the conclusion that the information that he had supplied was reliable. The SUNDAY TIMES then carried the story on 5 October 1986. A Hebrew version appeared in HA'ARETZ the following day.

One of the central figures of the investigation team was Dr. Frank Barnaby, a British nuclear physicist, who some time ago finished a term of employment at the Swedish Institute for Peace Studies, which, among other things, monitors the proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world. On the basis of the information supplied by Vanunu, only part of which was printed in the SUNDAY TIMES article, Barnaby published a book in 1989 about Israel's nuclear industry called *The Invisible Bomb*. The first section of the book, particularly Chapter 3, is today the most detailed source about the NRC's operations in Dimona, including the environmental issue and the waste problem. *Nuclear Obscurity—the Vanunu Affair*, a new book published in London in 1992 by Dr. Yo'el Cohen of Jerusalem's Davis Institute, also relies on information made public in the wake of the Vanunu affair as the basis for critical study and comparisons with the general picture.

Vanunu, like Barnaby and his readers, was not especially occupied with the environmental issue. By the nature of things, the information Barnaby presented regarding environmental problems is fragmentary; it may also be inaccurate. For all that, against the background of the recalcitrance of officials of the NRC and the Atomic Energy Commission to release details, this information remains, at this point, the sole factual basis by which it is possible to examine the environmental aspects of the

NRC'S norms for operations and storage. The picture that emerges is not encouraging.

First, the reactor itself is located at Institute No. 1. According to Barnaby's book, the original reactor at Institute No. 1, which had a capacity of 26 megawatts [MW] (the measure of the supply of heat generated in the core), was built by the French and gas cooled. To prevent overheating, which could lead to a fission explosion, carbon dioxide pipes were inserted into the core to absorb and divert the immense heat produced inside. In the 1970's, however, Barnaby claims, Israel succeeded in boosting the production capacity of the reactor, at first to 70 MW and later to 150. This was an impressive feat of engineering, performed without the need to destroy the reactor and build another below it. The changes involved a number of features; for environmental purposes, what was important about them was the change in the method of cooling, from gas to heavy water, which enabled increased production of plutonium from a similar quantity of uranium by accelerating the fission process.

There was an environmental price for this change. Cooling with heavy water, Barnaby contends, requires bringing the water into direct contact with the uranium rods in the core, in other words, with the most dangerous source of radiation. The result: the core ceaselessly produces an uninterrupted stream of the most highly radioactive liquid. The question, on which no reliable data currently exist, is, what becomes of the coolant liquid after its discharge from the core? According to Barnaby, it seems that it undergoes some purification, apparently in what is known as Institute No. 2, so it can be used again and again to cool the core. But what happens to the waste produced during this purification?

A second locus of environmental problems is Institute No. 2 itself, described in the literature and the SUNDAY TIMES report as the pancreas of the NRC nuclear complex. Nuclear warfare agents depend on plutonium, an element that does not exist in nature. To produce it, uranium must go through a nuclear reaction in the reactor core, during which some of its mass is converted to plutonium. The problem from then on is separation of the plutonium from the rest of the material. The separation process at the NRC, according to Barnaby, is based on melting used uranium rods and gradually returning the liquid to a solid state while discarding the material not needed in the final product-plutonium. All this, Barnaby claims, occurs in the underground production chambers of Institute No. 2 in Dimona. The liquid, in which some of the used uranium is melted after discharge from the reactor, and which emits up to 2,000 curies of radiation (a lethal dose)—Barnaby reports—is transferred to Institute No. 2, where it is introduced over the course of four years into a 6,500 liter vat. During that time, some of the radiation is released while generating a great deal of heat.

To prevent overheating and a disaster, the liquid must be frequently diluted in fresh water, and hot radioactive gas vented into the atmosphere. As Barnaby states in his

book, "(Institute No. 2) routinely releases air pollution and radioactive gases into the atmosphere. Ever present winds carry these materials towards the Jordanian border, some 40 km east of Dimona. According to Vanunu in the SUNDAY TIMES, there is also occasionally an emission of especially poisonous gases from the Dimona facilities. These emissions, however, are precisely controlled and occur only when the Israeli Meteorological Service confirms that the winds indeed are blowing towards Jordan!"

According to Barnaby, the plutonium components—the final product of the process—are held at least for some time in cellars at Institute No. 2. Cohen writes in his book that Western nuclear experts mentioned in the SUNDAY TIMES and Barnaby's book have expressed amazement at the unnecessary risk inherent in such storage right in the bowels of the central production chambers.

The third site that arouses concern over the level of environmental safety at the NRC in Dimona is Institute No. 4, where nuclear waste is treated. Barnaby claims that this is Israel's national radioactive depot. That is where both nuclear waste produced at the NRC, including the residue from conversion to plutonium, and radioactive materials brought in from outside the NRC, are transferred.

The most significant distinction here is between high-level radioactive waste, such as most of the material originating at the NRC, and the low-level radioactive matter arriving from some 300 medical and industrial sites around the country, some of them government-run, others private, which includes industrial and medical waste such as test tubes, packing boxes, clothing, work outfits, syringes, and so forth.

The impression created for anyone who recently has followed assertions, as reported in the media, of members of the Atomic Energy Commission, including members of the nuclear safety division, is that when they speak about "nuclear waste," it is convenient for them to speak only of low-level waste. It is difficult to entice from them, however, any reply to the claims published abroad dealing with high-level radioactive waste, which is 10 times more dangerous. This situation derives, among other causes, from the fact that the subject intimately involves the production processes of plutonium. It also arises because these processes create an environmental problem much more serious and significant than the types of problems for which any foolproof solution has yet been found anywhere in the world. Clearly, citing storing of nuclear waste at the NRC, without taking up the issue of high-level radioactive waste, as the press reports contend, misleads and confuses the public. This situation resembles that of a man who develops cancer but conceals it from his friends, who know only that he, like everyone else, sometimes catches a cold, and when they ask how he is, he says, "I'm as strong as an ox. I haven't sneezed in two weeks."

The essential information supplied by Barnaby's book is that Institute No. 4 is used to store high-level radioactive waste in liquid form in vats, apparently for permanent keeping. If that is true, this is, to put it mildly, a problematic matter. It is now customary in the West to convert accumulated materials of similar radioactive levels to a glass-like state and bury them in deep shafts, preferably in natural salt formations that seal the space over the years and do not allow the containers to move, which could cause leakage into the earth and, eventually, into subterranean waters and the environment. This practice, of course, also raises the question, who, and how often, checks up on the NRC and the area around it for levels of radioactivity in the ground and air, and where do these reports go?

A further question raised by Barnaby's book relates to the type of containers in which liquid is stored at Institute No. 4. We know, for example, that American standards are far stricter than those in Europe (which will be tightened in coming years). Does Israel follow the American or the European standard?

Despite differences in severity and risk between it and high-level radioactive waste, low-level waste cannot be taken lightly. First of all, there is the question of transporting these materials to the NRC from the rest of Israel. Are the forms of transport fit for this? What routes do they take? When are they moved? What other practices does this involve? How are traffic jams avoided? In the United States, to give an example, a satellite tracks the progress of these special trucks on the roads to prevent traffic accidents and avert a calamity.

As to storage itself, the practice used at the NRC, according to Barnaby, is that low-level radioactive waste is placed in Institute No. 4 in barrels sealed with tar and taken out to a burial site located about 1 km from the reactor zone. Nothing is known of the engineering specifications of the burial site, or of routine monitoring inspections in this burial zone, or of the results of testing for radiation damage to the environment, living creatures, vegetation or people. Rumors already circulated in the media, admittedly untested and unconfirmed by any recognized scientific authority, tell of at least two doctoral theses—one in botany and the other in zoology—revealing anomalies in different populations around the NRC and attributing them to radioactive emissions.

Minister Sarid, whose visit to the NRC and the cooperation he has obtained from area factories have been done on the authority of the prime minister and with his encouragement, accomplished at least one thing during his visit. The results of all monitoring done around the NRC will be open from now on to the staff of the Ministry of Environmental Protection even though, for the time being, they will not be the ones who perform the tests. Sarid believes that the NRC staff understands the importance of oversight by an independent, civilian branch eager for their cooperation.

This is all fine and good. But until the public knows the procedures, the practices and the engineering and environmental criteria by which waste is stored at the NRC, vague and reassuring gestures by the officials in charge—including the Minister of Environmental Protection—will not be enough to banish fears about the NRC aroused by the critical environment call heard from the foreign literature.

Efforts To Acquire U.S. Radar Software

93AA0029A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
9 Apr 93 p B2

[Article by Aluf Ben: "The Lavi Radar—The Resurrection"]

[Text] The deal for purchasing tens of modern warplanes for the Israeli Air Force, which is supposed to be signed at the beginning of next year, will put to the test the promises of the American administration to strengthen the defense cooperation with Israel, and to maintain the qualitative advantage of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] against the Arab armies.

There is no agreement between Jerusalem and Washington over the manner in which the political declarations will be translated into a defense shopping basket. At the center of the controversy is an Israeli request to receive access to computer software of the fire-control radar, the heart of the weapons system of fighter planes. Until today, the United States has refused to open the advanced software to Israel, and in certain instances the software was even treated before it was transferred to the IDF, in order to reduce the capabilities of the radar and the armaments systems in the airplanes.

It is believed in the defense establishment that the way to maintain the qualitative technological advantage of the Air Force over its opponents is the integration of advanced weapons systems and electronics that were developed in Israel in the American airplanes. The importance of exclusive developments has increased in recent years, on the background of Washington's readiness to sell to Arab states modern aircraft, of the same generation as those that were supplied to Israel and even more advanced than those.

In order to make best use of the capabilities of the Israeli systems that will be installed in the airplane, such as the Python air-to-air missile, Popeye air-to-ground missiles, and other measures, they must be adapted to the software of the fire-control radar. The radar tracks enemy targets, in the air and on the ground, and guides the pilot in using the armaments.

Today, the software comes with the airplanes in a "black box," whose contents are closed to the Israeli programmers and engineers. The manufacturers of the airplanes and the radars in the United States are willing to adapt the software to the Israeli weapons systems, according to technical specifications that the Air Force gives them, but demand millions of dollars for implementing such changes. Every additional change that will be required during the operational life of the aircraft, will cost hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars more. Israeli experts estimate that implementation of the software changes in Israel would reduce prices by 50 percent and would provide the IDF with flexibility in making changes and in improving the performance of the weapons systems that it has.

The personnel of the defense establishment asked the Americans many times to let Israel have the source (source code) of the software in the radar and the airplanes, so that the Air Force could itself do the adaptations and the changes that it requires. The request was also mentioned during the visit of Prime Minister and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and of Ministry of Defense Director-General David Ivri, last month in Washington.

Israel is not the only country that has encountered American resistance to turning over the software of warplanes. Singapore and Turkey, which is a member of NATO, requested access to the software of electronic warfare measures—the defense system of warplanes—in order to characterize by themselves the electronic identification signals of the enemy's weapons, which are stored in the electronic warfare computer. "Every weapons system is intended to have changes and improvements, so that counter measures, which were developed against the manufacturer's standard model, will not interfere with our systems," explained the Singapore minister of defense, Dr. Yao Ning Hong.

The tough American policy gave advantages to companies from Western Europe and Israel, whose governments do not impose export limitations on the software. According to the foreign press, the Israeli Elisra company won an electronic warfare deal with Singapore, following the American refusal.

"The Americans learned the lessons of the technological race with Europe and Japan, after they lost to them many technological secrets," say Israeli aviation experts. "In the area of software, the United States still has a significant advantage, and this is a national asset that one does not give up."

Sources in the defense establishment say that the administration has assigned a ranking to every country, which determines the degree of exposure of advanced military software. Israel is defined as a major ally of the United States outside of NATO, and up to now has been in an inferior position as opposed to NATO members. Within the alliance, as well, the Americans discriminated between Britain, for example, and Turkey or Greece.

A few weeks before the presidential elections in the United States, the Bush administration promised to raise Israel's ranking for receiving American military technology, and to make it the same as the status of NATO members. But right after the elections, it became clear that the administration is not rushing to pay the note, and that it also has demands of Israel.

In the bi-annual strategic talks, which were held in Israel in November 1992, administration officials demanded the tightening of the control over Israeli defense exports as a condition for the transfer of the advanced technology. It was agreed to establish a joint committee that would review the requests of the two sides in the area of the transfer of technology and the supervision over its use. The committee is supposed to convene at the next

meeting of the strategic talks, which will be held in the United States in May, and the agenda will include also the request for access to the software of the radar in warplanes. Representatives of the defense establishment will arrive at the talks strengthened by the promise of President Bill Clinton—to raise the level of strategic cooperation with Israel.

But this time, it was decided in the defense establishment not to be satisfied with promises, and to try to negotiate with the Americans from a position of strength. The warplanes deal provided the opportunity. For the first time, the Air Force is holding a close competition between two airplanes, F-16 of Lockheed (formerly General Dynamics) and F-18 of McDonnell Douglas. The two companies are eager to win a deal, which is worth \$1.8 billion, for supplying 45 to 60 aircraft. The former commander of the Air Force, Maj. Gen. (Res.) Avihu Ben-Nun, said a month ago in an interview with YEDI'OT AHARONOT that Israel must take advantage of the competition between the American manufacturers and demand "approval for entry into the software of the computers" in the aircraft.

Israel revealed its cards two weeks ago. The two competing manufacturers were asked to examine the possibility of replacing the original radar of the F-16 and the F-18 with an Israeli radar that was developed for the Lavi aircraft. The Ministry of Defense asked the companies to estimate the price, the technical risk, and the timetable involved in changing the radar.

Not much time passed, and the news of the plan for the resurrection of the Lavi radar reached the weekly DEFENSE NEWS, which published the story on its first page on 22 March. The weekly explained that Israel had turned to the Lavi radar after it had been denied access to the software of the American radar. The message seems clear: it is worthwhile for the American radar manufacturers to put pressure on the administration for transferring the software to Israel, for if this is not done, they will lose the deal.

American officials, who responded to the news, told DEFENSE NEWS that the transfer of the software to Israel would be a significant change in policy. "We do not give the software to everyone, and we have good reasons for that," the officials said. According to them, other allies of the United States would be very angry if Israel received the sensitive information, "because the Israelis would have access to whoever flies our radar."

The Lavi radar, which is called EL/M-2032, was developed by the Elta company, and became an export item after the Israeli warplane was grounded in 1987. Elta adapted the radar to the Phantom and F-5 aircraft, and according to foreign sources it was sold to the Chilean Air Force in the framework of a deal to upgrade F-5 aircraft. It was published in the foreign press that the radar was sold also to China, and that it will be installed in a new warplane that is similar to the Lavi, which the Chinese are developing with Israeli assistance.

Aviation experts say that Elta has the necessary know-how, experience, and technology for adapting its radar to the modern warplanes. The Israeli radar is similar in its basic characteristics to the Westinghouse APG-68 radar, which is installed in the F-16. The two instruments are of the same generation: Westinghouse's radar entered service in the American Air Force at the end of 1984. They have the capability of detecting targets in the air and on the ground, of tracking several enemy aircraft at the same time, and of displaying to the pilot a picture of the ground also in conditions of poor visibility and cloudiness. According to DEFENSE NEWS, the Israel Air Force proposed to Westinghouse the joint development of a radar based on the APG-68.

The manufacturers of the F-18 are proposing to Israel a more advanced radar, the APG-73, which is still under development by the Hughes Corporation, and whose completion is planned for next year. Hughes is promising a considerable improvement in its performance over the existing radar of the F-18, but it is not clear whether the administration will agree to supply Israel the new model with its full capability.

According to the experts, even if it is possible in principle to install the Lavi radar in the modern aircraft of the air force, it is difficult to assume that the proposal is practicable, for two main reasons: the Israeli radar will make the aircraft more expensive, because its adaptation to the F-16 and to the F-18 involves the development of a new model, at a cost of millions of dollars, and there is no economic justification for establishing a production line for a series of 50 to 60 radar instruments. The American administration is also likely to oppose financing the procurement of the Israeli radar with the military aid funds, and the Ministry of Defense does not have enough sheqels in its budget to buy it from Elta.

But even if the plan is not executed, and the Air Force buys the aircraft with the American radar, the entry of the Israeli radar into the competition gives the defense establishment an ability to bargain that it did not have in the past, in the struggle over the sensitive software.

Russian Report: Israeli Space Ballistics Program

93AA0029B Tel Aviv MONITIN in Hebrew
3 Mar 93 pp 6-7

[Unattributed article: "Israel Is Producing Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Is Using Outer Space To Increase Its Nuclear Capability"]

[Text] The report of the Russian Foreign Intelligence (the espionage organization that replaced the KGB) for 1993 must be read to understand Israel's real military and diplomatic strength. The report was submitted to the Russian leadership last week by the chief of the espionage service Yevgeni Primakov. "Not for quotation" has received the full text concerning Israel. If even only a small portion of what is written in the report is true, and the Russian Intelligence generally had and has exact

information about Israel, then Israel is a military power of the first rank. The main points in the report are:

- Since 1990, Israel made a significant and qualitative breakthrough in the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. This development has made possible for Israel impressive conquests in space and its exploitation for military purposes.
- Israel has the largest and most modern missile arsenal in the Middle and Near East. (The reference is to the region extending from the Indian subcontinent to Western Europe. The Editors.)
- Israel is at the beginning of a process of placing a network of military satellites in space. This network will allow Israel to use space to enhance the power of the nuclear weapons in its possession. "[quotation marks as published]
- It should not be assumed that there is no reasonable possibility that Israel is at some stage in the development of a thermonuclear capability (hydrogen bomb).

The full translation of the main paragraphs in the report follows:

The Area of Nuclear Weapons

"Israel is a country that, without any official confirmation by its authorities, holds nuclear weapons and a system of missiles that can carry these weapons. The Israeli leadership does not confirm this fact, but it also does not deny the information on the existence of nuclear weapons on Israeli territory. Israel ignores the fact that the problem of the Israeli nuclear weapons will be brought up for discussion at the next plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly."

"Even though it is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Tel Aviv government signed, but did not ratify the international convention for defense against radioactive materials (to this day, the Russians use the term 'the Tel Aviv government,' when they are referring to the Government of Israel. The chief of the Russian foreign espionage agency, Primakov, is considered to be anti-Israel. Editorial comment.) Israel also refuses to sign a series of agreements that ensure control and supervision of the export of nuclear materials."

"Israel has a nuclear reactor that uses heavy water and a separation and recycling facility for nuclear fuel. Both serve solely for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The production capacity of these two facilities is between five and 10 nuclear weapons per year. Over the years, Israel has improved its reactor so that it has changed from a reactor supplying 26 megawatts [MW] to a reactor with a capability of between 75 and 150 MW. In this way, Israel has increased its capability to produce processed plutonium from 7 to 8 kg per year, to a manufacturing capacity of 20 to 40 kg per year."

"Israel plans to establish in the near future a nuclear electric power station in which a large nuclear reactor with an output of 250 MW will be operated. Experts estimate that in addition to producing electrical power,

the new reactor will be able to produce 50 kg of plutonium per year." (In that way, the capability for manufacturing nuclear weapons will be doubled theoretically. Editorial comment).

"Many times, Israel has been accused of stealing nuclear materials, especially in the United States, England, France, and Germany. These assertions have not been proved to this day. In the most striking incident, Israel was accused in the "disappearance" of 100 kg of enriched uranium from a factory in Pennsylvania in the United States." (The fact of the finding of the material was never published. Editorial comment). "In contrast, Tel Aviv admitted that in the early eighties it succeeded in taking out of the United States illegally a quantity of nuclear triggers. These triggers are a very important component in the manufacture of modern nuclear weapons." (Jonathan Pollard and his Israeli handler Rafi Eytan apparently were involved in this operation. Editorial comment).

"The uranium reserves held by Israel are sufficient to supply its needs, and even for allocating certain quantities for export, for the next 200 years. The uranium goes through a process of fission in three plants in Israel. Since 1974, the Israelis have enriched the uranium in their possession by means of a special laser-ray facility. In 1978, Israeli scientists discovered perhaps the cheapest method for separating uranium isotopes. This method is based on the differences in the magnetic properties of the nuclear particles. On this basis, Israel produced between 1970 and 1980 up to 20 nuclear weapons per year. Today, it possesses between 100 and 200 such nuclear weapons."

And here the report raises one of its most sensational points (the editors).

"Israel's very great capability in the area of launching and testing satellites allows it to continue with its nuclear development with the intention of improving its nuclear weapons in the directions of speeding the nuclear reaction and intensifying the radiation. In this context, it should not be excluded from the realm of possibility that Tel Aviv is interested also in producing nuclear hydrogen weapons." The exact meaning of these words, if they are correct, of course, is that Israel is using its space research for the purpose of increasing the power of the nuclear weapons that it holds (upgrading), old ones as well as new ones. Only Russia and the United States have such a technological capability (the editors).

Chemical and Biological Weapons

The report of the Russian Intelligence continues, saying: "At this stage, Israel is capable of manufacturing all of the basic poisonous materials required for the manufacture of chemical weapons. This capability includes the manufacture of nerve materials, materials that cause severe wounds, and materials that can cause partial paralysis. There is no real proof that Israel has biological weapons. But at the same time, it should be noted that a large-scale biological study was conducted in Israel,

several of whose characteristics could have military uses. Israeli research laboratories are closely linked with military research laboratories in the United States. Most of the studies conducted in these laboratories relate to ways of defending against biological weapons. The Israeli scientific infrastructure is so ramified that Israel would have no problem in very quickly turning its efforts towards the manufacture of biological weapons."

Missile-Launching Systems

"Israel possesses the largest and most modern stockpile of missiles in the region of the Middle East and the Near East. Systems and parts that were manufactured outside of Israel are found only in the short-range Israeli missile system. The rest of the missile systems are manufactured entirely in Israel." In the short-range area, Israel manufactures two MRA-type missile systems. MRA-290, whose range is 40 km and MRA-350, whose range is between 40 and 150 km. The launcher of the MRA-350 missile is mounted on a tank chassis. Each tank carries 4 missiles."

"The development of the Jericho ground-to-ground missile began in 1963. In the beginning, the Israeli Army was equipped with the Jericho-1, which is a short-range missile, up to 480 km, and it is operated with solid fuel. In 1973, the Israeli Army was equipped with mobile Jericho-1 missiles. Between 1977 and 1981, the army was equipped with more than 100 Jericho-2 missiles. The range of these missiles is 750 km, and they are defined as medium-range missiles. In 1989, Israel completed and tested successfully the Jericho-2B missile, whose range is 1,300 km. Following the entry of this missile into military service, Israel is capable of hitting any target in the Middle East and in the Near East." And here comes the second sensational revelation in the report (the editors). "Along with the development of the 'Jericho' missiles, at the end of the eighties, Israel achieved a most significant breakthrough in the area of manufacturing intercontinental ballistic missiles and using space for military purposes. By means of the series of 'Ofek' satellites, Israel placed in space a series of military satellites, each of which has a different capability, purpose, and use." Understandably, the Russians would not provide in the report all that they know about us. But even granted that, the material that they publish about us is very impressive.

Quality Control Plans in IDF Reported

93AE0450G Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Financial Supplement) in Hebrew 23 Mar 93 p 1, 3

[Taken from Lt. General Ehud Baraq's Remarks at the "Industrialists' Forum"; words within slantlines published in English]

[Text] It is hardly necessary to go on at length about the importance of quality in the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces]. Under conditions of numerical inferiority against any combination of enemies, equality in the

types of systems that we and they activate, and lack of any advantage in our favor in timing when new weapons systems are supplied—quality remains our only source of relative advantage. I am referring to the advantage that has its root in quality of manpower and chain of command, the advantage that comes from quality in the processes of planning, operation, and training, and the advantage that original Israeli technological development gives us.

The IDF is an operational system on a very high level, not only in comparison with our neighbors, who are well aware of its caliber, but also in comparison with other armies in the world. But it is very dangerous to encourage self-satisfaction. A look straight to the depths of the IDF system reveals that there are large islands of excellence and high quality, but that between these many islands stretches a swamp of lower efficiency.

Therefore, the main goal of the quality revolution in the IDF is to drain this swamp and combine the islands of excellence into a single continuity.

How do we do this?

First of all, we must understand what it actually is that turns these islands of excellence into what they are. What happens there, that does not happen in the swamp around them? In my assessment, there are five main factors that make up the common denominator for excellence in the IDF:

Continuous light contact with the enemy—even in times of relative quiet.

An advanced "working environment." Such an environment, whether it is one of innovative weapons, or of computer systems, forces the soldier to relate to it in a certain way; it is simply impossible not to do quality work, when the working environment is high quality. It forges the patterns of behavior of the people who are within it.

Permanent location of installations; cutting down the nuisance of constant jumping from place to place.

A high proportion of career soldiers as opposed to conscripts. This is a problem that exists in any organization that has a large proportion of temporary workers and a minority of permanent ones. The IDF has far more than 100,000 "temporary workers" who stay for three years—conscripts who have gone through short training periods of just nine to 18 months.

The fifth factor determining excellence is a certain pattern of behavior, which needs to be imprinted deep within the soldiers and commanders. I am referring to the process that begins with the preparation of an action in all its minute details, continues with accurate reporting and investigation, quick absorption of the lessons to be learned, and ends with immediately application of those lessons. This is a cyclical process of continuous internal improvement.

The problem is, of course, how to fit these quality factors to the entire IDF. What do we do to start the entire system on the way upward?

For two years now, we have been trying—methodically, broadly, and in stages—to bring about a quiet quality revolution in the IDF. We do not expect immediate results; we do not believe in wonder drugs. There is no place, in my opinion, for making a religion out of any one of the common approaches to improvement in management quality that we know of. We must not “freak out” in the IDF over one particular method of quality control.

For what, actually, is common to the entire collection of approaches to quality improvement, as they have been crystallized in the business management schools, and applied, one way or another, in the civilian economic sectors? Their common basis is creation of tools that help the management of the organization to imprint on it patterns of behavior whose ultimate source is common sense. Yes, common sense. Without common sense, there can be no quality.

But for common sense to translate itself into quality actions, a methodical and consistent process is needed, and it is to this process that we are dedicating our time now.

From the variety of modern approaches to quality improvement, the IDF has finally chosen TQM (Total Quality Management) as its leading approach—chiefly for its philosophical aspect, but also for certain of its practical aspects. What do I mean when I say “practical aspects?”

I will present some examples of things that create an environment in the IDF that spurs on the quality revolution:

Creation, distribution, and application of norms, measures of action, and measures of readiness. As surprising as this may sound, in the IDF, we still lack norms for measurement, and accepted indexes for execution of tasks in a great many realms of military activity, including simple realms. Without these, how can we measure quality? How can we teach its importance, and how reward it?

Bringing the reality in the field up to a preset standard, in the realms of manpower, vehicles, weapons, etc. Here, of course, we see the true bottlenecks of the IDF at their worst—the budgets, the money.

Giving preference to units on the periphery. In the IDF, as in any large organization, there is a natural tendency to concentrate the best men at headquarters, at the expense of the “field”—at the expense of the units actually doing the work. We are trying to change this set of priorities, and to start from the bottom up.

Determining the reasonable workload for all IDF systems—battalions, squadrons, companies, etc.... Many of our units have been asked in the past to work at 130 percent of their capacity. Since this was impossible, the

commanders were forced to decide which, of the missions loaded on them, they would NOT carry out. This system of assigning excessive workloads led to lack of discipline (for some of the missions were obviously not carried out), and to “glossing over things”—partial, shoddy execution of other missions. From this standpoint, an army is no different from any other economic organization, and excessive workloads will not lead to quality. I think that if we require that the army work at 90 percent of capacity, and do reach that capacity, things will be healthier, and quality will be higher.

Giving flexibility and freedom of action and decision-making to commanders up to the level of regiment commander within the framework of a given set of resources. Freedom of choice—even partial—makes it possible to tie together authority and responsibility—a tie that is vital if quality is to be improved.

Activating the cycle of raising efficiency and cutting costs. The cycles are applied to a broad range of economic topics, like telephones, water, electricity, computers, food, clothing, etc.

Preparing properly for the unexpected. The implicit assumption among young commanders in the IDF is that everything, if only we plan it out clearly enough, will go exactly according to plan—and that is not right. There is no way we can avoid surprises. Therefore, we must teach the thousands of IDF officers who come and go all the time, that any military action can go wrong. To combat these unforeseen mishaps, we must set up roadblocks at the most vulnerable spots, to prevent sliding into chaos.

Fostering the concept of “the customer first.” The IDF is already carrying out customer surveys—from the Chief of Staff’s office right down to the airbase infirmary. We want the customers to tell us about the service they are receiving from us. This approach—of service to the military “customer,” when the customer is sometimes a solitary soldier, sometimes another military entity, and sometimes a civilian entity—is very important for forging an organization culture in the IDF. The message of this new culture is: the main thing in carrying out the mission is not how you succeed in looking to those above, but what you really do, below. This emphasis on the needs of the customer, in its broadest definition, is, of course, one of the foundations of “Total Quality Management.”

As part of the process of starting the IDF off on a quality revolution we have set up a steering team at headquarters, to ensure that the methods of treatment are uniformly applied. Still, as I said, we are not “sold” on any single approach, because when it comes time for us to apply the quality revolution in the military, we will face problems stemming from its unique character:

The IDF is a very large system, rich in manpower, scattered across the country in hundreds of installations, communicating through complicated channels, and

working in a tremendous variety of fields of action. There is nothing to compare to this in the civilian economy.

The IDF only spends money, almost \$20 million a day; it does not make money. Therefore, the IDF has no profit-and-loss report, and no bottom line on a balance sheet, which could be used to judge the financial side of the activity.

The IDF is not tested in times of relative quiet, but rather in times of emergency or battle. The calm, routine everyday activities, are not the reason for the army's existence. The supreme test of the army comes in time of war, but what the real battle will be like cannot be imagined when things are quiet.

The IDF cannot know how well-matched it is with its opponent, as long as it is not fighting its enemies. When there is no war, there is no "feedback," and the IDF, like any other army, does not know how it stands relative to its competitors-enemies. The army is like a long-distance runner who is separated from the rest of the competitors by a curtain or high fence, and has no idea how he is doing in the race. Still, the IDF must always be first when the curtain goes up for a moment, or the wall falls down.

In the operational/military realm, which is, of course, the reason the IDF exists, it is **very difficult to measure** either input or output. For the "production line" of operational military activities there is no clear quantitative model, and even more so—there is no routine review of processes that allows for measured improvement. You manufacture something again and again, but you carry out a military action or fight only once; it is a unique event. There is always the danger, if we want to carry out quantitative quality methods in the IDF, that we may try to do set the kind of indexes, pseudo-indicators, that could distort the true results. The quality improvement process is liable to lead to faking at work, to paying too much attention to what can be measured, at the expense of what is really important for execution, and at the price of serious damage to the system.

In the IDF, there are frequently conflicts of interest between fulfilling short-term and long-term goals. When involved in processes meant to lead to improvement in quality, it is easy to lose sight of the balance between these two perspectives.

These special characteristics require careful thought and great caution in the "quality revolution" in the IDF. Caution, but not concession: quality is our only source of relative advantage. Improving quality in the army will be, I believe, a very long effort that will take years, not months. I estimate that within a year and a half, we will begin to see results, especially in the area of security, which, of course, part of the overall quality problem.

Will all the things I have listed here be enough to promise us a quality army? In my eyes, these are necessary conditions, but not enough. They lack that basic foundation of leadership, of quality in the chain of command.

Leadership is something creative. It is something that cannot be precisely measured. Responsible leaders that can take the initiative are the main thing, and without them, even if we apply the entire array of the most modern methods for ensuring quality, we will still fail. And so, for the quality revolution in the army to really succeed, for the striving to create a flexible and high-quality military environment to really work out, it is vital that we know how to keep the IDF a leader in quality.

The leadership of the commanders is what makes the difference, in the end, when it comes to quality, too.

Israeli Nonconventional First-Strike Option

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pp 28-31, 64

[Article by Yo'av Gilbar: "Again, a Threat to Survival"]

[Text] Near the end of the War of Independence, Ben-Gurion convened the high command of the IDF (Israel Defense Forces), to hear and be heard at an event that was a kind of early summing-up of the war. The commanders talked about technical, tactical, and organizational lessons that had been learned in battle, and brought up problems in the realm of discipline and conditions of service. Ben-Gurion's mind was on other things. He was looking ahead to the days after the war, and was not swept along by the general atmosphere of exultation (the word "euphoria" had not yet come into use) after the liberation of the Negev and Galilee.

Will there be an "end"—even if the war ends now?...and if there is peace...was there ever a war that was not preceded by peace? The Arab peoples have been beaten at our hands. Will they forget...this insult? We must assume they have a sense of pride. We will try to make peace—but you need two sides for peace. Is there any certainty that they will not want to take revenge on us? Let us face the truth: we won, not because our army works miracles, but because the Arab army is falling apart. Will it always be falling apart?

From this start, Ben-Gurion went on to raise a series of basic questions about the place of security and the IDF in society and the State, questions that would continue to be the focus in the years to come. Israel's security concept was consolidated in those years in response to the geopolitical facts the War of Independence had created. True, it was never actually put down in a document, but it expressed a line of thought that was accepted by the IDF's top brass, and by the political leadership, and was reflected in the army's structure, goals, and plans. It was founded on two assumptions:

A) The border of the State of Israel is difficult to defend; actually, almost impossible to defend. The ratio between the area of the State (20,000 square km) to the perimeter of its land borders (988 km) means that it does not have depth or breadth for maneuvering, even in tactical terms. The effect of this lack of depth was even more

serious, for nowhere was the long land border based on natural obstacles. The natural conclusion from this basic assumption was that the State of Israel must endeavor to wage war beyond her borders, in enemy territory. First in terms of "carrying the war into enemy territory as quickly as possible," and then by following up with an early counterattack, called in jargon "preventive war," which is in effect a war initiated [by us.]

B) Within the confines of the Green Line, most of the population is within hostile artillery range.

The natural conclusion from this basic assumption was that the State of Israel must keep an air force so powerful that it will be able, not only to keep the skies clear and protect the land army and the populace from enemy air forces, but also to protect them from his artillery and, in effect, to tip the scale in the land battle quickly.

From these conclusions, and from the restraints of human and financial resources, the Israeli security doctrine which determined the structure and size of the army, the balance between its various components, its military doctrine, and its operational procedures, was fashioned. This "doctrine" was partially applied in the Sinai Campaign, and completely applied, with stunning results, in the Six Day War.

When the State of Israel and the IDF were overcome by euphoria (the word was already in use by then) in the aftermath of the Six Day War, there was no one around to slap them in the face and say the kind of things Ben-Gurion had said when the War of Independence was coming to an end. Moshe Dayan, who, in contrast to Ben-Gurion, was a product of the IDF, did not have the distance from it that he would have needed to say them. The political higher echelon lacked the perspective and vision. The geopolitical changes the Six Day War had brought about required a renewed and thorough examination of the security conception, to adapt it to the new reality the war had created. Such an examination was never done. The State of Israel and the IDF stayed with the defense doctrine that had been fashioned in 1949 to fit the geopolitical reality the War of Independence had created, and which had changed markedly since then.

The new land border (600 km along the borders and 118,000 square km of territory) gave Israel the dimension of depth she had lacked within the Green Line. Of course, this means depth in relative terms. Also, considerable portions of the new land border, 180 km in Sinai and 166 km along the Jordan and Dead Sea, were based on natural barriers. Another problematic section, in the Golan Heights, was short enough that an artificial barrier could be created to complete the natural barrier.

Most of the inhabitants of the State of Israel were now out of artillery range, and even out of the air range of the main confrontation state, Egypt. Even more important, the situation was reversed, and important enemy centers, even capitals, were close enough from then on for the IDF to threaten them.

Despite these changes, the State of Israel went to war in 1973 as though she was still inside the Green Line and facing the dangers inherent in it: from inflexible lines, and without using the territorial depth to wage a defensive battle in places where that could have been helpful, relying too greatly on the air force, without taking into account its limitations and priorities, because of the desire to bring the war into enemy territory as quickly as possible, at the expense of the orderly deployment needed for defense and for absorbing the first blow.

An additional fact that had been true since the Six Day War, and resulted from our control over all of the western part of the Land of Israel, was the return of the Palestinians as a factor in the arena. Against this background, terror renewed internally and intensified all along the new borders. Internal terror, which had been the Palestinians' main line of action against the Jewish community since the 1930's had disappeared after their mass flight during the War of Independence. Terror along the borders, which had characterized the period from the War of Independence up to the Sinai Campaign, stopped after 1956, except for occasional actions by the PLO, which though they renewed in January, 1965, were very far from being a real problem, or even the threat that infiltration had been in the 1950's.

Terror within Israel was already sharply curbed in 1968. The campaign against terror along the Jordanian border lasted until September, 1970. But, its successful conclusion did not stop the phenomenon. It started up again on the Lebanese border, which had been almost completely quiet from the War of Independence until 1969, and to this day no solution has been found there. Again in 1968, terror extended to the international airports, and since then has spread over the entire world. How central it was in the range of Israel's security problems can be disputed. But is hard to disagree that it was and is a nuisance that has frequently distracted us from the main thing. It is enough to mention Golda Me'ir's trip to Vienna on the eve of the Yom Kippur War.

The combination of terror inside the State, and shooting incidents and incursions along the borders quickly put an end to the illusion that the brilliant victory in the Six Day War would bring an end to the conflict, or at least an extended lull. When the number of such incidents, and the number of casualties, grew, the euphoria gave way to disappointment, which grew deeper and deeper as more and more incidents mounted into an actual war of attrition.

Despite the disappointment, the State of Israel stood up in the War of Attrition with more self-confidence than she had in any previous war. The Six Day War put an end to a 30-year period that had continued since the Arab revolt in the 1930's, in which Israeli society felt that its very existence was threatened. The question of whether the threat was real or not does not change the reality of the feeling, natural to a society living within artillery range, and without depth. The transition may not have been sharp and clear, but the defeat of the

threatening armies and the distancing of the borders gradually brought a sense of relief. True, some talk of the threat to survival was heard later, too, and still continues to be heard, but this was, and still is, more just lipservice and a kind of traditional way of expression in times of public discussion of defense questions, or just an argument to use in political debates, than a reflection of authentic feeling. The weakening of the sense of a threat to survival was reflected first and foremost in the exacerbation of the centrifugal tendencies in Israeli society.

Within the heterogeneous immigrant society that has developed here were hidden the sources of many tensions—political, cultural, ethnic, social, and economic—that could have easily burst if not for the counterweight of the external threat to its existence: in the days of the Arab revolt, the Second World War, the struggle against the British, the War of Independence, and since. The threat to survival, clear to all, created a common denominator for the opposing elements, and strengthened the tendency toward solidarity in society as a whole, despite the internal tensions between the new and old Jewish communities, Right and Left, secular and religious, oriental and westerner, rich and poor. This solidarity crystallized around what was called the "community consensus," or "national" consensus," which set the bounds and rules of the game for internal disputes and defined all that was outside them as "dissent."

After the Six Day War, the consensus crumbled more and more, and the various polarizations in society worsened. Removal of the threat to survival made it possible to demand that topics other than security be emphasized, and lent legitimacy to opinions that earlier would have been considered heretical. It also undermined the rules of the game in battles between those holding opposing views. The process was gradual but steady, and at its center was the dispute over how to translate the military victory into a diplomatic achievement. The debate over the division of the land, which began when "partition" was first suggested in 1937, and was pushed to the fringes when the division became a reality, was reignited when it again became a theoretical option, and has been throwing its shadow over every other question on the national agenda ever since.

The reality that the whole land of Israel is united, with all the problems that come along with that, versus the theoretical option of redividing it, and the hope—or illusion—that redivision would solve at least some of these problems, was, and still is, the basis of the political polarization. The swift economic growth following the war, and abandonment of the policy of restraint that preceded it, increased the social-economic polarization, and made the gaps worse. Society was swept up in the lust after material goods, and without the counterpressure of the external threat to reign it in, this lust grew stronger than most other values on the ladder, [finally] becoming almost the supreme value. The "quest for success" became a symbol and something to be emulated without worrying too much about how the success was achieved or how authentic it really was.

These social changes did not take long to influence the IDF, which after the Six Day War, to a certain extent provided an alibi for the society with the new values. Its prestige skyrocketed as a result of the victory and from the public repercussions of it, and the quest for success depended on it and fed from it. Within both the old and new urban middle-class, for which "prestigious" army service was not at the head of its interests before the war, there began a growing rush to try to get into the units, which had begun to be called—first in newspaper jargon, and later also more officially—the "elite units." That expression itself suggests the social makeup of these units as much as it does their professional expertise and level of motivation.

Another measure of the rise in prestige of the army was the growing return to regular service after the Six Day War, which cannot be explained by economic circumstances alone. This happened during a period of rapid economic growth, in which the civilian market presented attractive alternatives, but nevertheless, no one had been knocking on the regular army's doors during the period of the restraint which preceded the war, and was characterized by widespread unemployment.

The change in the army's place in society had far-ranging implications internally as well. Until the Six Day War, army commanders had been anonymous to most of Israeli society. The circle of officers who were exposed to the general public through the media was limited and included mainly generals of the general staff and regional commands, chief corps commanders, or their equivalents. This practice was enforced by strict censorship and had existed since the end of the War of Independence. Among the rules Ben-Gurion set as part of the depoliticization he imposed on the army at the war's end was also this rule of limiting personal exposure.

In the atmosphere of euphoria that prevailed in the State, the entire layer of division commanders in the war, and even a few of the regiment commanders and staff officers, not to speak of the more senior officers, was exposed to the eyes of the press and public with great fanfare a few days after the end of the Six Day War. The commanders were not exposed as "Colonel R." or "Lieutenant Colonel D." but by their full names. Their exploits, decisions, and biographies filled newspapers, radio programs, albums, and books on the war. Everyone sang their praises. The units starting being called by their commanders's names, not by their own numbers or names: Shmulik's, or Albert's, brigade; Yosi's, or Uzi's regiment, etc. It had been done otherwise in all the descriptions of battles of the War of Independence, and the actions since, including those in the Sinai Campaign, which had been written about in *Ma'arakhot*, and in most of the brigade memorial books that appeared in the 1950's and 1960's, no names were mentioned except for casualties, (and even they were mentioned mainly in the commemorative literature), these: Company Commander G. tells how second in command No. 2 led the attack," and so forth. Nobody would have dreamed of

calling the 82d Airborne Division in the World War the "Ridgeway Division," or the 8th Camp, the "Montgomery Camp"!

The commanders, men who had worked for almost 20 years in relative anonymity, turned almost overnight into the darlings of the public, and were a subject of a personality cult that attributed the victory to them. They were not ready for this revolution, and not all of them knew how to deal with it. The exposure, and the public relations that followed, became the norm, and even became the subject of competition and a model to emulate. This did not end with the group of officers exposed to the public eye immediately after the war, but widened to include to the officers who replaced them, and took on full legitimacy. Little by little, reporters and bohemians turned into the camp followers of the senior officers and fostered their public image.

When the dam of exposure burst under the pressure of admiration and flattery, it was impossible to close it again. But the connection between the army commanders and the world of the media and entertainment limelight, and business, was not automatically positive. When the army disappointed expectations in the Yom Kippur War, it was exposed to criticism from the public and the media with the same force as it had been to their admiration after the Six Day War, and again—it was not prepared for it, and had not learned how to deal with such a situation. Today, with the process that began then still continuing, dealing with the public exposure is a problem not only for the senior staff, but also for every company commander who has had any trouble with his men, or an accident in his unit, and sometimes even for his wife or girlfriend.

This personality cult and public exposure has had its effects on the military/professional level, which this is not the place to go into in detail. Nonprofessional "public opinion" that sought out heroes attributed the victory to individuals—actually, to the military genius of the commanders who led their units in war and would be leading the army in the years to come. Some of them truly believed what "public opinion" attributed to them. The result was gradual but steady erosion of the stature given to military theory and professional training, in favor of experience and achievements of the past, which could not be relied upon to always repeat themselves in the future. The conclusion reached in the atmosphere of worship and flattery after the war was not that proper laying of infrastructure and good preparation—or, alternatively, the weakness of the enemy—were what had brought the victory, but rather that it was due to the brilliant leadership of the commanders. The inevitable result was that the only thing the IDF still had from left from its battle doctrine, when it was fired upon by surprise on October 6, 1973, was what the platoon commander of the spearhead always yelled: "We've found them! Forward! Attack!"

It is not the only case in military history where exaggerated dependence on experience—which is nothing more

than a coincidental combination of successes and failures of an individual in certain circumstances he was tried in—instead of on study, which is the application of universal professional experience, ensured that an army would prepare for the same war it had just fought, the one where it had amassed the experience. The IDF expected a war just like the Six Day War. At the same moment, the enemy was preparing for a war of a completely different kind, which would highlight components of the force which had not sufficiently been taken into account, for there was not enough experience in how to use them or stand up against them.

Some of the changes that took place in the character of the army and society after the Six Day War were unavoidable, and resulted directly from it. But, others were unnecessary, and were the result of the intoxication of victory. The problem was not necessarily the changes themselves, but rather the low awareness, at that time, of their significance, and the lack of remedies for some of them, and answers that could lighten the damage from others. The shock that came over Israeli society and the IDF after the Yom Kippur War made people think, and over the years led to correction of some of the deviations from the norm in the professional and normative realms. Other distortions in the two realms actually deepened, as became during the Lebanon War and the intifada. But the greatest change is still before us, and the sooner we become aware of its significance the better.

After 26 years in which Israeli society was free of the feeling that its very existence was threatened, when it felt it could make mistakes and even pay a price for them, but that this would not be the price of survival, this feeling has returned and becomes stronger the more the reports pile up of the arming of the confrontation states and the Arab and Muslim periphery with missile and unconventional weapons. Signs of this could be seen during the Gulf War, and they will grow stronger the more the nuclear capacity of the Islamic countries grows, and the more we are within range, this time of missiles, and in a situation of asymmetric threat before which we have no depth and no second strike option. Under conditions like these, there may be no escape from return to the basic assumptions that were the foundation of the security doctrine fashioned after the War of Independence. The State of Israel may be back in a few years to a situation where it will not be able to take the chance of absorbing a strike, and therefore will be forced to make the first strike, which could be unconventional.

A situation like this requires a society that can come together around a basic consensus, and produce reliable leadership that will be acceptable to the majority of the public and hold an open dialogue with them—to clarify the situation for them and hear what their hearts are saying—and make difficult decisions, that affect survival, quickly and under pressure. In light of the experience of the last few years, and the last few weeks, does it look like this is on the horizon?

IDF Multiyear Weapons Systems Planning

93AA0040A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
25 Apr 93 p B3

[Article by Aluf Ben: "The Era of the Small, Smart Army Has Not Yet Arrived"]

[Text] Alongside her entry to the peace process, Israel is also occupied with a military buildup of almost unprecedented scope. The defense establishment's multiyear program calls for the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] to replace or enhance most of its combat assets, on the ground, in the air and at sea, by the end of the present decade. Billions of shekels will be spent on the modernization of combat systems that went into operational service after the Yom Kippur war.

In the coming weeks and months Yitzhaq Rabin, the prime minister and defense minister, will conclude the discussions on the IDF's major development and equipment programs. Rabin's decisions will set the shape of the military for the next 20 years and the nature of its deployment on the battlefield of the future.

Discussions thus far have covered the program for defense against missiles, the Merkava tank, artillery modernization, and the "main project" under development. Soon to be discussed are a big program for the enhancement of tanks and for the upgrading of their mechanics and defenses against infantry tanks, and the Air Force's next fighter plane will be selected.

An analysis of the decisions taken and of the proposals up for discussion shows that the IDF of the year 2000 will be a military with greater firepower and improved capability for long range precision strikes, but will not be the "small, smart army" foreseen by the previous Chief of Staff, Dan Shomron. The prophets of "War by Buttons," that will be decided at long range with precision weapons, will have to wait for the implementation of their vision: The smart weapons will be acquired in amounts that will add to the IDF's strength, but will not replace those with which we are familiar.

Reinforcement for this appraisal can be found in the remarks that a senior officer made a few months ago. The officer opined that over the next few years the battlefield would be basically traditional, with a few changes. In order to make the transition to a new military doctrine based on long-range precision weapons, the government would have to make fundamental, high-resource decisions. Such decisions will be on the agenda, in the estimation of the senior officer, only at the end of the 1990's. The entry of precision weapons will require a reduction in the military, and, in his opinion, as long as Israel is in danger of war, that is impossible.

The peace talks have weakened the threatening image of Syria that was nurtured in Israel in the 1980's. Iran has replaced her in the capacity of the principal threat according to Israeli propaganda. Prime Minister Rabin

discussed the danger from Iran in his recent meetings with the president of the United States and the president of Egypt, but Defense Minister Rabin is preparing the IDF to meet the traditional threat, which is still understood to be the most serious danger: an overall Arab attack on the eastern front, central to which would be a Syrian assault on the Golan Heights with the assistance of expeditionary forces from Iraq.

The defense philosophy underlying the IDF's build-up plans has not changed since the 1950's. The two fundamentals are: a defensive strategy, whereby Israel will not initiate a war and the IDF mission is to defend the existence, integrity and sovereignty of the country and to deter the enemy from war, and an offensive operative philosophy, the essence of which is to move the war to the enemy's territory and to achieve decisive victory in the event of the failure of deterrence and the outbreak of war.

The Yom Kippur war brought home the difficulty in realizing this defense philosophy: The blocking and breakthrough battles on the Golan and in Sinai exacted a heavy price but did not bring about a crushing decision. After the war the IDF absorbed thousands of tanks and guns and hundreds of American fighter planes, increased the number of fighting units and began the development of ambitious projects, chief among them being the Israeli "Lavi" fighter plane. The growth of the military continued unabated for about 10 years, until 1984.

In the mid 1980's a debate arose over the defense philosophy and the future of the IDF. The participants alluded to several important factors:

- The country's economic collapse required big cuts in the defense budget, which put the brakes on the expansion of the military and forced it to do away with divisions, close units, and take tanks and planes out of service.
- The buildup of the army of Syria, which set up a dense and fortified defensive deployment on the Golan, brought about the recognition that an attack on the Syrian deployment ala the Yom Kippur war was likely to cost the IDF heavy losses and attrition.
- The long-range precision weapons technologies developed in the defense industries in the wake of the Yom Kippur war had come to fruition and penetrated the consciousness of IDF commanders.
- The judgment that the next war was not to be expected in the near future, against the background of the Iran-Iraq war, created the opportunity for reform within the IDF.

The criticism of the traditional army was summarized in 1987 in the report of the Meridor Commission—a Knesset subcommittee for examining defense philosophy and application.

The Meridor Commission recommended that the ground forces be based in the future on precision weapons that would improve the target strike capability and enable the IDF to hit enemy armor, artillery and

headquarters from long range. Thus, IDF attrition would be prevented in blocking battles, in the counterattack and in the deciding phase.

Precision weapons would release the Air Force from the mission of close assistance for the ground forces and allow it to concentrate on its primary and exclusive missions: purging the skies of the enemy's planes and anti-aircraft missiles, and attacks deep into enemy territory.

Opponents of the philosophy proposed by the Meridor Commission warned of the "worship of precision weapons." Smart weapons, they said, are not a proper response to Arab war doctrine, that integrates tanks with masses of infantry. They warned against over-reliance on technological toys and the belief in a "secret weapon," that would cause a weakening in the traditional strength of the IDF.

As Minister of Defense, Rabin supported the reform. "I accept completely the approach of precision, smart weapons with ranges beyond the range of contact, as a top-priority issue," he said in June 1987. "Today we have to give more weight to the strength of firepower, more sophistication, more precision, greater depth, therefore I thought we had to reduce the size of the armor forces." On that same occasion he announced: "We have to preserve the correct balance in moving to smart weapons, to make a gradual transition that will allow the army to maintain continued readiness for war."

In 1987 Rabin appointed the supporters of reform, Shomron and Ehud Barak, to Chief of Staff and Deputy, stopped the Lavi project and directed research and development resources to smart weaponry ("the alternatives to the Lavi"). Nevertheless Rabin opposed the idea that the Air Force's mission of assistance to the ground forces is over and said that its implementation would be a strategic mistake.

The intifadah caused a delay of several years in the modernization of the IDF. The present multiyear program, "Fabric," was formulated in 1991 after the Gulf war and the appointment of Barak as Chief of Staff. Since then the program has been updated and supplemented, among other things because of the gap between the military's fiscal requirements and the budget at its disposal.

Meanwhile several processes have occurred that affected the formulation of the "Fabric" program:

- The Gulf war accentuated the superiority of the modern army with precision weapons and full control of the skies, over a large army that is technologically and aviationally inferior. But the course of the war also showed that in the era of smart weapons the huge firepower of the coalition forces was no substitute for ground maneuvering as the decisive factor in the war.
- The Scud attacks on Israeli cities made it clear that the Air Force cannot deter a distant country from

launching ground-to-ground missiles, and it is hard for the planes to locate the mobile launchers and destroy them. Prior to the Gulf war it had been thought that deterrence and attacks on the launchers were a sufficient response to the missile threat.

- After the war Syria launched an expanded weapons campaign, the essence of which was the addition of hundreds of quality tanks and guns for the ground forces, the acquisition of modern airplanes and the enhancement of its Scud missile array.
- The bombings in the Gulf war made clear the need for a reinforcement of the Air Force's night attack capability as well as its array of battle helicopters.

"Fabric" is a program for the modernization of the IDF in several directions: continuation of American aid and purchase of advanced weapons systems from the United States; equipping with sophisticated and exclusive assets developed in Israel; retrofitting of tanks, guns, planes and ships in order to lengthen their operational service life; the accelerated development of original "force doublers" of Israeli manufacture that would go into service at the end of the decade.

Israeli industry holds a leading position in the world in several military technological areas, including aerial armament, pilotless planes, aerial electronic warfare and long-range precision weapons.

The ground forces component of the "Fabric" program is intended to strengthen the firepower of the armor and artillery and to improve the survivability and mobility of the tanks and APC's. The ground forces will also gain new and sophisticated assets developed in Israel, that will give them the ability to destroy targets with precision fire from long range. A senior officer in the General Staff says that in the ground forces alone there are today some 600 to 700 projects under development.

According to the program, the tank will remain the IDF's principal combat asset on the ground. But in order to survive in the modern battlefield, the tanks need improved protective covering and have to fire modern ammunition. The IDF took many tanks that had been at its disposal in 1984 out of the order of battle and, according to senior military sources, the size of the armor forces will not decrease any further in the coming years. The program for the development of a fleet of tanks calls for the majority of them to be quality tanks by the end of the decade.

The armor corps will continue acquiring the Merkava tank, Mark 3, which went into operational service in 1990. This tank has a 120-mm gun, a new fire-control system and improved protection. Development of the next model of the Merkava, Mark 4, has, in the meantime, been frozen, and will be reconsidered next year. The level of tank manufacture over the last few years has been only 40 percent of potential.

In addition to the acquisition of the modern tanks, hundreds of "Patton" ("Ram") tanks are undergoing improvement, including enhancements to protection,

mobility and the fire control system. A program for improving hundreds of additional tanks will soon be brought up for decision. There is also a plan for the improvement of Merkava Mark I tanks that were absorbed into the IDF starting in the late 1970's.

According to "Fabric," the Gunnery Corps will be equipped with dozens of American rocket launchers of the MLRS variety. The scope of the deal will be about \$300 million, and this is the first time since 1974 that the ground forces are acquiring new weaponry from the United States. In Ta'as they are developing a new model of a path-correcting rocket that will greatly improve the accuracy of the strike—the weak point of rocket artillery as compared to guns.

IDF artillery is based on the M-109 gun, that was developed about 30 years ago and has a short range, a slow rate of fire and lacks protection. Rabin accepted the recommendation of the Chief of Staff not to acquire the Israeli gun "Sholef," that has double the range of the M-109, a rapid rate of fire and protection and mobility comparable to those of the Merkava tank. The program calls for hundreds of M-109 guns to undergo partial enhancement that will include improvements. The cost of the enhancement will be 260 million shekels. The Gunnery Corps also acquired the American TPQ-37 radar a few years ago, intended to detect enemy mortars, guns, and rockets.

Critics of the multiyear program claim that the dependence on improved rockets and guns will not give IDF gunners enough weight against the thousands of Syrian artillery pieces: The rockets were not intended to provide close fire assistance to assaulting forces, but rather to lay down long-range field fire. The supporters of rocket artillery claim, on the other hand, that the rockets are more flexible than guns in their ability to lay down concentrated fire strikes and to carry varied armament.

The infantry, according to the program, will undergo a process of protection and mechanization that will improve its mobility and survivability in the battlefield. This week the defense establishment unveiled the Puma, the APC developed in Israel and mounted in the Armor Corps on the chassis of a Centurion tank that had been taken out of service.

The equipment program for the ground forces stirred up two-fold criticism: The proponents of precision weaponry were disappointed with what seems to be its overly slow acquisition and, as a consequence, the reliance on the tank, while its opponents expressed the fear that even at the end of the decade the ground forces will suffer from a lack of firepower and will be forced to continue to rely on aerial assistance.

The Air Force, which traditionally receives most of the purchase and development budgets, will continue, according to "Fabric," with the modernization of its fleet of fighter planes, with the addition of sophisticated armament developed in Israel and with the reinforcement of its helicopter array.

Today the Air Force is absorbing 60 F-16 fighter planes that were purchased in 1988, and this year will also see the completion of entry into service of the Sledgehammer 2000—a veteran "Phantom" that underwent enhancement and was improved with a modern ground-attack radar. The radar was developed by the American Norden firm, that almost went bankrupt because of the project's large cost overruns.

The Israeli Air Force generally operates in daylight, and its next fighter planes are set to strengthen its capability for attacking at night and in wet weather, as well as its ability to penetrate enemy territory. At the end of the current year the fighter plane will be chosen that will go into service at the end of 1996 or the beginning of 1997. Competing for the deal, worth \$1.8 billion, are the F-16 and the F-18. The new fighter planes will be equipped with sophisticated armament developed in Israel such as air-to-air missiles, guided bombs and air-surface missiles.

The Air Force's primary interceptor will remain the F-15, which went into service in 1976. Last year five new two-seater F-15's were acquired, plus another 25 surplus planes from the American Air Force, some of which will be dismantled for spare parts but most of which will be improved and put into service.

The special military aid that the American congress granted Israel in the period of the Gulf crisis strengthened the helicopter fleet, in particular. In addition to a squadron of Apache fighter choppers acquired in Israel at the end of 1990, an additional squadron will be added next year along with 10 "Blackhawk" assault helicopters that the Air Force had been prevented from purchasing because of budget difficulties. The fleet of transport helicopters was reinforced with "Puffin" helicopters from American military surplus, and project "Puffin 2000" is under way to upgrade the existing Puffin choppers.

The Air Force's anti-aircraft assets were boosted during the period of the Gulf war and afterward with the addition of three "Patriot" missile batteries (one of them financed by Germany), which have the ability to intercept planes at long range. Hundreds of shoulder-fired "Stinger" missiles will soon be added, intended mainly for hitting helicopters. These missiles were successful against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The IDF has mounted the Stinger on the APC so that the anti-aircraft unit can move with assaulting ground forces.

The multiyear program calls for the Navy, the smallest of the IDF corps, to undergo a modernization program approved in 1988. The program includes the acquisition of three "Lahav" ("Sa'ar 5) model corvettes, built in the United States and two "Dolphin" submarines from Germany. "Sa'ar 4" missile boats are being enhanced, whereby the body of the boat is being replaced, and its weapons systems are being installed on a new and larger

structure. Budgetary problems are hampering completion of development of the "Baraq" ship defense missile and have caused the cancellation of the pilotless cruise helicopter project.

On the eve of the Gulf war the previous defense minister, Moshe Arens, decided to develop a national defense system against surface-to-surface missiles, the "Wall" program, the centerpiece of which was the "Arrow" antimissile missile, alongside a deterrent system, fire-control radar and further assets for missile interception.

The highest echelons of the military opposed investments in defense assets that, in their opinion, would bring about a decisive victory in battle. Rabin agreed to a certain cut in the development budget for the "Wall" project and froze the purchase of the deterrent radar for missile detection, but decided to continue the development of the main components of the program.

The Defense Ministry estimates that in 1996 it will be possible to set up the first emplacement of "Arrow" missiles, with partial capability, and in 2001 to deploy a defensive array against missiles over all of the country's territory. The development and equipping costs are estimated at \$2 billion, but critics of the program claim it will be at least twice as much. Thus far the United States has financed most of the development costs of the "Arrow" and will, apparently, participate in the development of the fire control radar, as well.

There is a price to the massive equipping with new combat assets included in "Fabric". Senior sources in the military have warned against "eating up supplies," that would cause a reduction in the purchase of stocks of ammunition and equipment for emergencies and affect the IDF's logistic breathing space. According to them, when you buy a lot of new weapons, there is less money for fuel, ammunition, training time and maintenance.

Support for that can also be found in the wording of the military aid budget for Israel drafted by the American government last year. There it was stated that the IDF had been successful in the principal purchase and enhancement programs on the ground, in the air and at sea, but budgetary limitations had caused a reduction in the critical purchase of spare parts, logistic support and training.

During the implementation of the IDF's multiyear program, Israel might reach peace accords with her neighbors. Peace would require a rethinking of national defense philosophy and the nature of the IDF in the 21st century. Technological advances are likely to help in consolidating a new military doctrine, by which the defensive component would be strengthened. Precision weapons would allow the IDF to block a long-range Arab attack, and Israel would no longer have to station hundreds of tanks on the line of contact to meet the enemy head on. A defensive philosophy that would emphasize fire power and destruction of the opponent through movement and shifting the war to his territory, would

permit a reduction in the military. Peace might inaugurate the era of the small, smart army.

New Technology Detects Dangers to Aircraft

93AA0044E Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
19 Apr 93 p 41

[Article by Arye Egozi]

[Text] The Infratherm company, of Haifa, is proposing a modern, thermographic mapping system that makes it possible to identify areas of danger in aircraft. An early localization such as this could prevent tragedies.

With the aid of improved, thermographic equipment, it is possible to locate areas in which there is excess warming. Such warming attests to a defect that is likely, if not treated in time, to cause flight failure. Localization of the warm areas is achieved through detection of intensified infrared radiation, which issues from excess warming.

With the aid of Infratherm's equipment, it is possible to locate excess warming of helicopter engines and other aviatric engines, the emission of warm gases in dangerous areas, excess friction of tires during landing, excess warming of various systems, and more. The company, which has been operating in other spheres with the aid of their thermographic equipment, has recently begun to offer the service to aviatric companies in Israel.

Reserve Guard Duty on Bases Not Required

93AA0044D Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
22 Apr 93 p 17

[Article by Dani Sadeh]

[Text] A reversal in the security arrangement in the Israel Defense Force (IDF): Reservists will no longer be called up for guard duty and base security. In the defense system, they have understood that the drastic rise in the number drafted for regular service must be utilized—and save on reserve days. Savings that, in any case, prevents enormous losses to the labor economy.

And, indeed, in the planning branch, extensive staff work has been performed in recent months, with the goal of finding ways to save on reserve days. The staff work, under the auspices of Colonel Yisra'el, focused on the jobs in which regular soldiers could, indeed, replace reservists.

According to the formulated plan, regular soldiers will be drafted into the IDF as guards. They will undergo a short, month-long training period, in the course of which they will receive basic training on military and weapons subjects. Afterward, the soldiers will be stationed at various IDF bases, where they will undergo a number of enrichment days, in order to give them better tools to contend with the subject of guarding.

Among other things, the soldiers will receive basic training in hand-to-hand combat, and target practice will be held with a higher frequency than regular soldiers. "They are not undergoing a course that trains them to be the defense minister's protectors," the IDF said yesterday, "but they will receive training so that they will be able perform basic guard duty without incident."

By the way, a first attempt of the new plan has already been made at the naval bases in Haifa. In the first phase, half of the reservist guards were replaced by regular soldiers, and in the second phase, all reservists were replaced.

In the next phase, the reversal will be introduced into all of the IDF, and, within one and a half years, all of the guards will be soldiers in the regular army.

Yesterday, a senior officer defined the plan as a real revolution. "The main part of our work plan, with everything that is connected to the reservists, focuses on the desire to drastically reduce the number of reserve days, not only in operational employment, but also in the installations of active military service."

"In this framework, we are trying to replace all reservists dealing with automotive work in repair shops with regular soldiers, and also to replace the reservists in operational employment in the territories. For example: for each company of regular soldiers now set up as a company in the territories or a frontier force company, we are freeing up two reserve companies."

According to one estimate, the IDF can save many hundreds of reserve days costing millions of shekels. "The main part of the IDF's manpower plan," they say in the planning branch, "is to replace as many reservists as possible with regular soldiers. Every reserve day that is not put into effect reflects savings for the economy and increases the defense budget."

"In simple words: The removal of reservists from various projects will make it possible to increase the equipping of the IDF with combat means."

And an important comment for anyone who recently received a reserve order for base security: There is no reason to contact the base and verify if these reserves are canceled. The order is in effect. The reversal has only begun, and it will conclude toward the end of 1994.

Aspects of Pressure To Cut Aid Package Explored

93AA0041B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
20 Apr 93 p B1

[Article by Uri Nir]

[Text] Israel received a hint this past week of the challenges it faces in the struggle for aid from the United States when the leaders of both parties in the House of Representatives announced that, in order to fund the supplementary assistance that the administration intends to provide Russia and other nations in the Commonwealth of States, there would be no recourse but to cut aid to Israel. Democratic congressman Richard Gephardt and his Republican colleague, Newt Gingrich, both prominent friends of Israel, made clear that approval of the administration's budget request for aid to Russia will require fresh review of a great number of line items in the American budget, including money earmarked for foreign assistance to countries such as Israel and Egypt.

The Israeli aspect of the question of aid to Russia is merely the tip of the iceberg. In the minds of policymakers in Washington and the American public in general, support for Russia and Boris Yeltsin's reform movement now presents the most important strategic challenge facing the United States in the coming decade. President Bill Clinton has spent recent weeks in an intensive public relations campaign whose goal is to convince American lawmakers and the leaders of the world's industrial nations both that this challenge requires generous financial investment and that these expenditures will pay off. America's share of the international assistance package proposed for Russia is some \$3.5 billion. Only a small part of this sum will be a grant; the rest will be given as loans, on credit and so forth.

President Clinton's top foreign affairs advisers have scheduled a series of congressional hearings at which lawmakers will hear reports on the dimensions of the assistance needed to revive Russia's economy and on the dangers predicted if the situation in Russia and the other Commonwealth States is neglected. By all appearances, they will also offer the budgetary framework for meeting these challenges. President Clinton and his staff have promised not to reduce financial assistance to Israel and Egypt, which represents the largest portion of American financial aid to foreign countries, in order to fund aid to Russia.

Clinton's task, therefore, is two-edged: domestic and foreign. Washington is seeking to spearhead the international effort to rehabilitate Russia's economy without imposing unduly high burdens on the American taxpayer. At the Clinton-Yeltsin summit in Vancouver, Canada, held two weeks ago, the United States offered Russia an assistance package amounting to \$1.6 billion (apart from international aid), which included the following components:

- Agricultural credits of \$700 million for buying grain in the United States. This vast sum shows that, in light of Russia's grave problems in the agricultural sector, the American administration has put the heaviest emphasis, in the short term, on preventing hunger in Russia.

The decision to earmark extensive farm credits has special significance because according to the regulations of the American government-sponsored commercial credit corporation, Russia has not been eligible for additional credits since last December, when she stopped payment on debts owed for agricultural aid granted in the past. Russia has received farm credits totaling \$5 billion in the last two years. What's more, the administration has offered to postpone for seven years Russian payments on debts for grain purchases in the United States and to cut the rate of interests on debts accumulated over the past seven years. The administration hopes that these measures will buy "peace for food" (the name that the administration has given this program) in the long run.

- Commercial credit guarantees of \$232 million.
- A grant of \$220 million for food and medical purchases.
- A grant of \$215 million to help dismantle Russia's nuclear arsenal.
- Six million dollars (a symbolic sum, of course), to help finance construction of housing units for Russian soldiers who served in the republics of the former Soviet Union before it dissolved.
- A fund of \$90, which will provide loans for Russian industrial entrepreneurs, to foster privatization of Russia's industries.
- An American-Russian fund of \$50 million, to provide loans to investors in both nations interested in joint business projects.
- A grant of \$38 million for repair of damaged oil pipelines.
- Twenty-five million dollars to underwrite studies for 3,000 Russian students in the United States.

At the meeting of the seven industrial nations held last week in Tokyo, Secretary of State Christopher announced that Washington would allocate an additional assistance package of \$1.8 billion but did not spell out its features. Nor did he specify the budgetary niches from which these additional funds would be drawn.

Administration officials have been telling American reporters in recent days that the administration appears poised to ask Congress to approve the aid to Russia as an additional budget item to be tacked onto the budget deficit because of its importance and urgency. That step may make it somewhat easier for Clinton to overcome the reservations of the American public and many lawmakers against cuts in other budget items to fund assistance to Russia. Secretary of State Christopher began the work of persuasion when he told the American public and America's allies last week that this was a matter not of charity but of the highest interests of the United States.

Without solid domestic support, Clinton will have trouble convincing his allies, the leaders of the industrial nations, to commit themselves to this mission. The subject was raised at the summit of the seven industrial states in Tokyo and, after that, during Japanese Prime Minister Kaichi Miazawa's visit to Washington.

The Japanese Government, to be sure, is no longer making aid to Russia conditional on Moscow's surrendering sovereignty over the Kurile Islands, which Russia seized during World War II (Yeltsin has conveyed his intention to visit Japan early next month), but it has made clear that it will not set aside money for Russia beyond the \$1.8 billion included in a supplementary aid package on top of the international assistance program. The United States expected that Japan's share would be larger; moreover, most of Japan's aid to Russia (\$1.1 billion of the \$1.8 billion) will be in the form of guarantees for commercial loans. The Japanese apparently have signaled the Russians and the Americans that they might increase their offer if Russia withdraws from the Kurile Islands.

The package on which the seven industrial states agreed at their meeting in Japan is the largest, amounting to \$28.4 billion, based primarily (\$12.4 billion) on long-term loans from the IMF, the World Bank and the European Bank for Development and Construction. An additional \$6 billion has been allocated for an international fund, monitored by the IMF, for stabilizing the ruble, and another \$10 billion will be loans and guarantees for taking loans from the American Import and Export Bank and from banks in other countries.

This international package does not include all the programs for spreading out Russia's debts, totaling \$15 billion, and the aid package of \$1.6 billion that Clinton offered Yeltsin in Vancouver, nor the United State's promise to provide an additional aid package of \$1.8 billion. Only Japan has pledged to go along with the United States, announcing an aid package equal to America's. But both Tokyo and the other members of the seven industrial states have refused to bind themselves to making contributions to the fund that the United States has offered to establish, in the sum of \$4 billion, whose purpose is to promote privatization of Russia's industry and closing unprofitable factories. The United States has promised to put \$500 million into this fund. The other states, however, have promised only to consider the proposal.

The Clinton administration has made clear to Congress that it is interested in mutual efforts with it to fulfill the United State's obligations under the aid package. If this condition goes unmet, it must be assumed that the entire international initiative, which is led by the United States, will collapse.

The scope of aid to Israel stands out in this context like a "fat shnozz," as a senior member of Congress once put it. A nose so bloated that pro-Israel congressmen are suggesting that Israel make a small, symbolic concession

in its request for the aid it receives (\$3 billion per year). One congressman, counted among Israel's best friends, recently presented such a proposal to Israel's ambassador in Washington, Itamar Rabinovitch. If Israel offers to take a cut in aid, sources in congress explain, it will be able to avoid the unpleasantness involved in a rear guard action against cuts in the years to come and will earn great sympathy in public opinion. Israel studied the proposal and rejected it immediately.

The pressures on Israel will grow so long as pressure increases on the administration to find money for aid to Russia and so long as public awareness in America becomes more attuned to Russia's pressing needs and the disproportion between the level of aid to Israel and her size and importance, given the great strategic interest the United States has in stabilizing Russia's economy and society under a pro-American democratic regime.

Peace Process Encourages Japanese Business

93AA0055A Tel Aviv YEDIO'T AHARONOT in Hebrew
29 Apr 93 p 33

[Article by Nehama Do'aq: "Peace Is Pushing the Japanese To Do Business in Israel"]

[Text] Yesterday the President and General Manager of Keidanren, the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations, Masiya Miyoshi, declared: "The peace process has enormous influence on the decision of Japanese businessmen to do business in Israel." This organization comprises all the giant economic corporations and is considered the largest in Japan. One of its delegations, including representatives of the giant conglomerates Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Toman, Marubani, Naykhman, Itushi and others, is visiting this week in Israel.

Yesterday the delegation met with the Minister of Industry and Trade, Michael Harish, in his office in Jerusalem, and held a news conference at the conclusion of the meeting.

Among other things the president of Keidanren was asked to give some "tips" to Israeli investors. He indicated that the Japanese market is harder than markets that Western businessmen are used to. In order to succeed you have to:

- develop long-term personal and official relationships with Japanese businessmen
- decipher the traditional marketing system, for which purpose you have to take on local marketing experts, and it is also desirable to seek the assistance of government officials.
- BE PATIENT. The Japanese decisionmaking system is totally different from what is usual in the West. In an American firm the general manager makes the decisions. In a Japanese firm the general manager only cuts the ribbons and provides the final touch. Decisions are made by mid-level managers, who they try to convince those above and below them to accept the decision. Only when there is agreement at all

levels is the decision made. Therefore there is no point in setting up meetings with the general manager, but rather the mid-level manager, and if he decides that you are appropriate, he will do the work for you.

During the press conference the president of the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations was asked about the issue of the Arab boycott, that for years has stopped Japanese corporations from doing business in Israel. According to Miyoshi, the Japanese Government has officially decided to join the international pact opposing the Arab boycott. "But, unofficially, there are corporations that will not rush to do business with Israel until after the peace process is on the road." Miyoshi added that, on the other hand, there are corporations that believe that even if the talks drag on for several years, they have reached the point of no return.

Minister Harish said that Japan has taken an unequivocal position on the matter of the Arab boycott and thus created the atmosphere necessary for the advancement of trade between the two countries. "The decision of the Japanese government has paved the way for the visit of the delegation," Minister Harish said, adding that the visit was an additional step in the framework of advancing relations between the two countries.

The day before yesterday the delegation visited the Aircraft Industries and yesterday, plants in Jerusalem, especially Intel.

Tadiran To Assist Mexican Project

93AA0055B Tel Aviv YEDIO'T AHARONOT in Hebrew
29 Apr 93 p 33

[Article by 'Edna Ays: "Tadiran To Set Up a Media Supervision Facility in Mexico"]

[Text] The systems division of "Tadiran" has won a project to set up a broadcast supervision facility in Mexico worth about \$20 million. The Israeli concern won out in this bid over giant companies in the field from the United States and Europe.

According to the general manager of the systems division of "Tadiran," Mandi 'Irada, the project is for the establishment of an electromagnetic spectrum control system for the Mexican ministry of communications. It will oversee civilian radio communications services such as radio sets, cellular telephones, television, satellite communications, identification and locating channels, paging, etc.

The project includes the establishment of a system to handle civilian communications signals from the range of the lowest frequency of 10 Khz up to the 2-Ghz range and includes remote-controlled computer-based systems and special vehicles for media locating and siting.

According to Mandi 'Irada, this win will help the firm accelerate its transition from military to civilian activity, as per company strategy.

Israeli, Arab Worker Productivity Compared

93AA0044G Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
21 Apr 93 p 29

[Article by Tzvi Alush]

[Text] The first thing that I saw at the Bedloah settlement in Gush Qatif was a long line of Arab workers waiting for work authorization in the hothouses. "Just a minute, just a minute," I turned to Shantal, who accompanied me on behalf of the employment services. "We agreed that I am posing as an unemployed Israeli coming to work for a Jewish boss in the Gush. We did not say anything about doing this with workers from Han Yunis."

Thus, I discovered that the Gush Qatif settlements very quickly returned to employing Arab workers from the Gaza strip. The latest murder of Sha'ya Deutsch was shocking and resulted in tough declarations—but, they were quickly forgotten.

Regarding "Hebrew work": The position of the Jewish workers in the Gush is one of being "tolerated." They can be combined skilled workers. Nothing more.

Let us return to the Bedloah settlement. A few dozen red-roofed villas on the shore of the Mediterranean Sea, golden sand, and fresh air. Tired from waking up early, I got on the bus taking the unemployed from Shederot to Bedloah, wearing the uniform of the unemployed Jew: jeans, knit shirt, visor, and a bag in hand.

The Jewish employer to whom I was sent was not the image of a boss. A nice Yemenite, wearing a yarmulke, a smiler who accepts the stubbornness and suggestions of Tzipi Ohna, the spirit of life on the bus of unemployed, with understanding and a smile.

Tzipi, an unmarried 34-year-old woman, has already been working in the hothouses of the Gush for a month. She organizes the order of work with energy and loud shouting, and sends me, Ilana, just released from the army, and three new immigrant women from Baku to the tomato hothouse.

At 0705 we reach the hothouse. It is still pleasant. We start gathering tomatoes. They say in the hothouse that it has already been picked and that now we have to finish with the harvest in order to go to the next hothouse. The work seems easy, albeit, uncomfortable. The fingers turn green from the broken branches, and boggy sand penetrates the shoes.

The Russian women work relatively quickly. Much more quickly than Ilana, for example, who is careful not to soil the white jeans pulled tightly across her behind and not to ruin her manicured nails. Ilana also tells me that her romance with the hothouses will continue for only two more months, because, anyway, after that she is planning to visit Paris.

After a number of buckets full of tomatoes are poured into crates, I straighten up, pull out the expensive watch hidden in my pocket, and I am astounded to discover that only an hour and a quarter has passed. "Nu, sit, rest a little," Angelica, the Russian worker startles me, striking a restful pose. "Here, drink cold water. Eat a tomato. Since working here we have not been buying vegetables."

I rest for a few minutes, but my conscience sends me forward to the next row. Except that after about half a row, I am invited to have a cup of coffee by Tzipi, the one in charge, who explains her theory to me: "The Jewish workers are all right, only the employer must know how to treat them nicely. Let them rest, let them drink cold water. These Arabs were not born with pruning shears in their hands, either. It took them time until they learned the profession."

In the opposite hothouse, the rose hothouse whose gathering time is still premature, three Arab workers from Han Yunis are working energetically. The one in charge of them is 'Abd. Through a good deed by the energetic Tzipi, I am transferred to the roses to work alongside of 'Abd, to learn the work from him.

'Abd, who returned to Badloah after two weeks of detention, interrogates me a bit and tells me that he will be happy to teach me the work, because his heart is breaking over the condition of the hothouse.

Me: "Aren't you afraid to teach me the profession? After all, it could be that they brought me here to replace you."

'Abd, smiling: "I have seen fellows like you come and go. You do not have patience, you are shielded at work. I do in five minutes what a Jewish laborer does in an hour."

Afterward, he shares with me some secret-like information that reached his ears: They put a new laborer from Gaza in the adjacent hothouse this morning. "I am angry about this, because this is not fair. They left an experienced friend of ours outside and they brought in a new laborer who is perhaps dangerous to both you and me. Who knows, maybe he will pull out a knife and will do something terrible here."

These words remind me of the risk in working in one hothouse with three Arab laborers, and I return to the tomato hothouse, to the three new immigrant women, who have already begun to hum sad Uzbeki songs, influenced by the heat.

At a quarter to 10 in the morning, the heat became truly overwhelming. I do another row and sense that I am losing my patience, due to the boring and annoying assignment. Sweat pours out like water, and the business becomes very unpleasant. The need for another drink break becomes immediate.

Someone says that, last week, during a heat wave, a number of female Russian laborers decided to take off their blouses and stayed at work in the hothouse in bras

and shorts. The Jewish employer asked the one in charge to insist on modest dress "in order not to provoke the Arabs."

At 1000, a shriek was heard from the tomato hothouse. Ilana forgot that today was Holocaust Day and the siren made her jump a mile in the air [lit: to other districts]. The siren is another good reason for a light break of a cup of coffee or concentrate with cold water, and a chance for a quick conversation with the Arab laborers. By the way, my Arab guide stood patiently during the entire time of the siren, "out of consideration for you."

Afterward, the Arab laborers sit down for a quick break-fast of pitas and humus and hasten to return to the rose hothouse. Their diligence is praiseworthy, just as our enthusiasm for breaks is shamefully apparent.

In an adjacent warehouse, before the end of my Hebrew work, I meet Yosi, a Jewish moshav member, who does not even bother to hire Jews.

"Why?" I ask him.

Yosi: "Do you know Jewish laborers who are willing to work inside a hothouse in which the temperature is 38 degrees [Celsius]?"

"Have you tried to employ Jews?"

"Certainly. On the Sunday after the detention, I got three youths from Ashqelon. Good, intelligent boys. We worked hard, and the output was relatively reasonable. I was glad. The next day, they did not show up.

"Two days later, I got four Russian immigrants. I explained what to do. I hurried to a hospital visit with my son and, when I returned, I saw that almost nothing had been done. These four did in a day's work what one Arab laborer does in two to three hours."

Kibbutz Membership Rates Reported

93AA0044C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
22 Apr 93 p 47

[Article by Shulamit Tana]

[Text] The economic state of the kibbutzim clearly influences the trend of their children to remain on the kibbutz in which they were born—or leave it. The average rate of abandonment among kibbutz natives, in the 30- to 45-year age group, reaches 56 percent. However, there are economically weak kibbutzim in which more than 66 percent of the natives in this age group have left. While a number of strong kibbutzim have succeeded in that more than 60 percent of their children remain.

This is indicated by a survey, which was conducted by business administration students at the Rupin Academy, under the guidance of Dr. Amir Helman.

The survey included 1,773 natives of 41 kibbutzim. A comparison to the findings of earlier surveys indicates a

trend of a gradual increase of a percentage in the extent of abandonment [as published].

Those who conducted the survey have determined that the economic crisis, the perpetual increase in the rate of abandonment, and the reduction in the birthrate on kibbutzim are frustrating the chance to depend on the third and fourth generations as on these [as published], that they will ensure the survival of the kibbutz.

Interest Rates on Kibbutz Loans Drop

93AA0044B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
22 Apr 93 p 47

[Article by Yisra'el Tomar]

[Text] The Knesset finance committee finalized by a repeat vote, the proposal of Finance Minister Avraham Bayga Shohat to change the government's conditions for granting loans to 55 kibbutzim in distress

In this framework, it was decided to reduce the interest rate of kibbutz loans from a rate of 6.45 percent to 4.5 percent. This change should contribute to the advancement of kibbutz debt settlements.

Thus, the opposition of member of Knesset (MK) Dan Tikhon, who, these days is lingering abroad, was dismissed. Other members of the opposition were also not present yesterday for the repeat vote in the committee. MK Tikhon claimed, at the time, that this decision is a sort of reverse discrimination to the benefit of kibbutzim, in contrast to other sectors of the economy, such as industry, tourism, and even mortgagors.

"Why not give the benefits to all sectors that, in the past paid usury-interest [as published], and not just to the kibbutz sector, which has close ties to the current government," Tikhon persisted. He announced that, with the renewal of the Knesset's summer session he would introduce a bill that would grant the other sectors the difference in interest.

Chairman of the Labor and coalition faction, MK Eli Dayan, is demanding that the finance minister lower the interest rate to 4.5 percent to mortgagors from the past [as published]. On this matter, the social lobby in the Knesset is about to begin a struggle.

Ministry of Labor Plan To Cut Arab Workers

93AA0041C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
13 Apr 93 p 2

[Article by Tzvi Zeheraya]

[Text] The government yesterday approved a plan offered by the Minister of Labor and Welfare, Ora Namir, for replacing workers from the territories in Israel, providing professional training for Israelis in the construction industry, tightening the criteria for unemployment benefits and stepping up review of employment of workers from the territories in Israel. At the

same time, the government approved employment of 7,000 agricultural workers from the territories despite the closure.

Namir's plan was unanimously accepted by the government with the exception of opposition from Finance Minister Avraham Shohat to a provision by which the government will pay laid-off workers who report to work up to 10 percent of the difference between the salary offered them at the new job and the unemployment benefits they were entitled to receive.

MERETZ Ministers Shulamit Aloni and Yosi Sarid asked Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin to take separate votes on Namir's proposal, which they supported, and on the question of extending the closure of the territories.

Namir's plan includes the following measures:

- Training 20,000 Israeli workers in place of laborers from the territories. The government accepted a recommendation from the building contractors' association to train 10,000 Israelis for the construction industry. Also approved was a proposal offered by Namir and Binyamin Ben-Eli'ezer, Minister of Construction and Housing, which calls for the government to contribute funds for professional training for as many as 10,000 unemployed up to the age of 35 for jobs in the construction industry. By the terms of the proposal, vocational training for these workers funded by the government will last only 6 months, after which they will be placed in jobs. They will receive minimum wage during their six months of training.

Training 10,000 unemployed workers for jobs in construction will cost the state budget 55 million NIS [new Israeli shekels]. Minister Shohat agreed with Namir that 25 million NIS of this sum will be transferred from budget reserves in the vocational training bureau of the Ministry of Labor and Welfare. Shohat is to inform the government next week where the rest of the money will come from.

It will be noted that the contractors had demanded on Saturday night that the Finance, Labor and Welfare Ministers join in their plans for vocational training, lasting 10 months and costing the government 157 million NIS, for up to 10,000 unemployed Israelis for the construction industry. The 3 ministers insisted on making changes in the contractors' plan and shortening the training period.

- A team of ministers headed by Prime Minister Rabin will track manpower problems in agriculture caused by the closure. The team will include Namir and Ministry of Agriculture Ya'akov Tzur. As previously stated, the government on Sunday approved employment of 7,000 workers from the territories for agriculture.

- Another ministerial team chaired by Prime Minister Rabin will discuss giving work permits to workers from the territories in other industries. This team will be made up of the Minister of Labor and Welfare, Minister of Construction and Housing Ben-Eli'ezer and Minister of Industry and Trade Mikha Harish. The two teams will get together from time to time to coordinate in making decisions on developments in the territories.
- Tightening the criteria for receiving unemployment benefits: the government adopted all the recommendations of the "Lefler Committee," chaired by David Lefler, director-general of the employment services bureau, for tightening the criteria for giving unemployment benefits. Lefler told the ministers that an unemployed person up to 35 years old will be required under the new proposals to accept every job offer even if the salary offered is lower than the unemployment benefits that he is entitled to receive.

If the difference between the salary offered and unemployment benefits is as much as 10 percent, the jobseeker must take the job and the national insurance system will pay him the difference up to 10 percent. If the difference is greater than 10 percent, he is not required to accept the job. As noted, Shohat opposed this provision, arguing that employers will lower the wages that they are offering workers because the government will pay the difference between the salary and unemployment benefits.

The Lefler Committee also recommended stiffening sanctions on jobseekers who refuse to take positions offered them. Under current provisions, unemployment benefits can be frozen up to 90 days for anyone who refuses a job offered through the employment service. The new proposal allows a reduction of 30 days in the entitlement period for any jobseeker who turns down a job. If he refuses again, another 30 days will be cut from the entitlement period.

A ministerial legislation team will meet tomorrow to approve proposed amendments for tightening the criteria for disbursing employment benefits and to put them in final form for approval by the Knesset.

- Stricter review of employing workers from the territories in Israel and more vigorous enforcement of labor laws. The decision calls for stricter criteria for issuing work permits to laborers from the territories within the Green Line. Work permits will be issued to workers from the territories as they request them and not, as has been done up till now, through "slave traders," building contractors and others like them.

The Ministry of Labor and Welfare will take measures to enforce employment of workers from the territories solely by means of work permits, apply the minimum wage law to all people working within the Green Line and enforce the law governing hours and work conditions. The ministry will treat unorganized workers from the territories as foreign laborers and impose fines on their employers accordingly.

Likewise, the government decided to shorten the period that a temporary worker from the territories may work in Israel. In recent years, many workers from the territories have worked under the status of "temporary laborer." This status granted them a work permit valid for three months, which could be extended periodically. According to the new proposal, it will be possible only twice to extend the period in which a worker from the territories can work as a "temporary laborer."

Under one proposal, Israeli employers would be required to deposit 500 NIS in a collateral account as a condition for employing workers from the territories. This collateral would be forfeited to the government if the employer fails to report termination of the worker's employment. Employers would be obliged to inform the employment service of the time when a worker from the territories ends his employment within the Green Line.

Fines on employers for hiring workers from the territories without a permit, which today amount to 2,000 NIS, would be increased. The government is studying the possibility of shutting down employers who violate the labor law requiring a permit for workers from the territories, the minimum wage law or the work hours and conditions law.

Work permits for workers from the territories will be valid for employment in specific zones. Workers will not be allowed to travel to work in other zones within Israel. In addition to a unit of the employment service that ferrets out foreign laborers, an inspection division of the Ministry of Labor and Welfare will monitor employment of workers from the territories. They will examine the criteria for granting work permits for laborers from the territories to assure that workers with security records are screened out.

Namir was pleased that her plan was adopted. "You have to start with small steps. What we have is a plan that sets forth all the action to be taken until the end of 1993. If 20,000 workers from the territories are replaced by the end of 1993 by unemployed Israelis, that will be an achievement," she said.

Minister Shohat stated during a cabinet session that he supports continuation of the closure while granting work permits and freeing people for sensitive spots in the Israeli economy, mostly in agriculture, industry and construction.

Industry and Trade Minister Harish stated that although the closure was imposed on the territories for security reasons, the new situation is creating conditions conducive to new economic arrangements during the autonomy period, both for Israel and for the territories. He believes that to prepare the economies of Israel and the territories for the time following establishment of autonomy, the fact that security reasons have created a separation must be exploited.

Recent Economic Growth, Future Potential

93AA0029D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
5 Apr 93 B6

[Article by L'iora Meridor: "The Recovery Process Is Naturally Gradual"]

[Text] An outside observer who examines the Israeli economy would be amazed at the economic developments in recent years, and the especially impressive picture in comparison with other economies in the world. In 1992, good achievements were recorded in Israel in a long line of economic indices: a high rate of growth of product (approximately 6 percent for the third year in a row, as against a rate of almost zero on average in the Western countries), an increase of 12 percent in exports, a significant decline in inflation, a reduction of the external debt of the economy, and more. The unemployment rate is, indeed, high, 11.2 percent, but it is similar to the rate in several developed Western countries, including Germany, Italy, and England.

And, indeed, a delegation of the IMF that visited here recently expressed its amazement at these developments. But we are not satisfied, because in Israel the absorption of immigration—and, therefore, employment—occupies a very high position on the national order of priorities.

The serious danger in unemployment here, beyond the painful problem of the unemployed themselves, is its social significance and its implications for the extent of expected immigration. The increase in the number of unemployed in the last three years (from 140,000 to 200,000 and more) and the widespread estimates that its reduction will be very slow and will continue for more than a few years, leave a strong feeling of lack of success and arouse the desire to improve the situation quickly.

Against the background of the high ranking of the employment issue in the national order of priorities, the question may be asked whether the functioning of the Israeli economy is satisfactory, and if not—whether the government can contribute to its improvement?

In order to try to answer these questions, attention must be paid to two long-term processes that are occurring in the Israeli economy—the process of the recovery of the economy, that began with the stabilization plan of 1985, and the process of absorbing the wave of immigration since the end of 1989. It is the nature of these two processes that they provide positive results mainly in the long term, while their beginning is strewn with difficulties.

The process of the recovery of the economy reflects the gradual transition from an economy that operates in difficult macro-economic conditions, that involved high-level government intervention and, as a result of that, low productivity, to an economy in which the conditions are easier. In this situation, the business sector can base its activity on considerations of profitability, while

relying on the situation in the market, and is not compelled to rely on the support of the government. This is a fundamental and important structural change, which even though it has not yet been completed, is already evident in the performance of the economy. The government contributed a great deal to this change—not only by reducing inflation, beginning in 1985, but also in the budgetary discipline that it imposed upon itself and in the beginning of the implementation of a move that includes reform measures, which are supposed to create gradually the proper economic conditions.

The budgetary significance included a reduction of government expenditure and the slice that it takes from the national pie (from 70 percent of the product before the stabilization plan to 51 today). As a result of this, the proportion that remained for the use of the private sector grew, especially for its investments, which increase the future national pie. Budgetary freedom was created, which allowed the increase of investments in physical infrastructure, the reduction of tax rates, and a contribution to increasing the profitability of the business sector.

The reforms have a dual role: directly, they bring about greater competition within the economy, and in that way contribute to the lowering of prices, they reduce costs, and in that way increase the profitability of the business sector and, with that, its desire to expand, to invest, and to grow. They expose to the economic units that operate within the economy the real cost that the economy pays for the various activities, and in that way bring about the implementation of only those activities that are worthwhile for the economy. Consequently, a situation is prevented in which a company carries out activities that appear to be worthwhile when, in fact, other companies are forced in the final analysis to pay for this (whether through a higher tax or through a higher price). Indirectly, the reforms contribute to improving the image of the Israeli economy in the world, an improvement that increases the chance of attracting investors and entrepreneurs from the outside to operate within the economy and contributes to the expansion of production and the potential for growth.

The implementation of the reforms is not easy, as it requires the removal of limitations and changes of arrangements that had led to preferences for certain sectors at the expense of others, and these, of course, oppose that, exerting pressures on the government. There were such phenomena also in other countries, and in many cases they impaired the processes of economic recovery.

The organizing of the economy for the new and changing conditions has already begun to bear fruit. The first stage is the hardest of all, as it brings about a change in the profitability of a portion of manufacturing: certain production lines stop being profitable, and others become profitable; workers must move between activities, and sometimes from a failing enterprise to another one. But despite the difficulties involved in this stage, it cannot be

skipped. Part of the increase in unemployment in the economy prior to the arrival of the wave of immigration (the unemployment rate rose from 6 percent in 1985 to 9 percent in 1989) may be ascribed to this development. The case of the Koor concern is a good example of this process: a crisis of profitability in the enterprises, which had relied to a great extent on direct and indirect government support, compelled them to become more efficient and to dismiss workers. The fruits of this were seen even recently—good performance and possibilities for expansion.

Another long-term process in the economy is involved with its getting prepared to receive the big wave of immigration from the former Soviet Union. This immigration has a potential contribution to the possibilities of growth of the Israeli economy, which is expressed both in the growth of the local population, which allows a reduction of the defense expenditures burden that weighs upon the individual, and in the quality of the immigrants' education. This human capital has great importance in the process of development and growth, especially of economies that compete in the world markets.

But these advantages can be expressed only in the longer run. In the first years, the process involves considerable difficulties, which stem first and foremost from the great increase in the number of job seekers. Some of them are, indeed, absorbed, with a decline in real wages in the economy as a whole—and, to a certain extent, because of it—but beyond this, an expansion of enterprises and the establishing of new enterprises is necessary to allow the massive absorption of additional workers, and this involves a tremendous increase in investment in the economy.

The developments in the economy in the last three years testify that this process is, indeed, occurring, but at a rate much slower than desirable. Exports began to lead growth only in 1992, but the level of investments is still too low, and while a cumulative increase was recorded over the last three years, in the past year there was a sharp deceleration (productive investment rose only 3 percent in 1992).

Government policy did not contribute sufficiently to the development of this process. Thus, for example, it delayed this process of adjustment when it encouraged in an exaggerated manner the construction sector in the first two years, and thus delayed the process of reorganization of other branches having a high potential for growth. Moreover, the extent and the dosage of the measures taken by the government were insufficient.

However, it should be emphasized that such a process is naturally gradual. Also, according to the forecasts that were made more than two years ago in the Research Department of the Bank of Israel, a reduction in the extent of unemployment was supposed to be spread over several years. In comparison to other countries, the rate of capital accumulation in Israel was most impressive

(an increase of 60 percent in productive investment in the economy in the last three years, in contrast to a standstill in the Western countries); but in comparison to the rate of growth in the number of job seekers, due to the immigration, this rate was too slow, and as a result the unemployment rate rose by approximately another 2 percent.

These problems do not have unequivocal solutions. The government must continue with its policy, while increasing considerably the measures that have already been taken—both the direct measures, such as the reduction of taxes and the construction of infrastructure, and the indirect measures, which are intended to contribute to the improved functioning of the economy and also to its image, including the acceleration of the reform move; the improvement of the image of the economy is important for attracting investors and entrepreneurs.

Another matter is the physical infrastructure—both for transportation and for communication—which has been talked about a lot while little has been done. In previous years, when we witnessed a lack of control over the budget, the economy functioned under a threat to its stability; the government did not invest in infrastructure, and severe lags occurred, reflected in crowding, both on the roads and in communications. Awareness of the implications of these lags for possibilities of growth of the economy increased only recently, and budgets earmarked for this began to be increased, but by a magnitude still far less than required, and a great deal of time will pass until the fruits are ready to be harvested. Meanwhile, in 1992, as well, a decline was recorded in the volume of public investments and there was an increase in crowding on the roads.

It should be emphasized that in order to help the economy to attain the desired achievements, there must be no retreat from the positive and important measures only because they have not yet yielded all the results. Preference for short-term magic solutions, which deal with unemployment and not with its roots, is liable to bring the economy to an inferior level of development, with a lower product and a higher level of unemployment.

One example of this is the issue of the exposure of the economy to trade throughout the world, which is now on the agenda. This is one of the main reforms that is required for the economy in order to enhance competitiveness in markets for goods, make production more efficient, and thus increase the volume and the quality of the products that reach the consumer. In a small economy like ours, it is impossible to maintain competition in markets only by relying on the domestic market, as the number of companies that will produce most of the products will be small. Therefore, competition is achieved by means of opening the economy to the world—that is, production of products that can compete successfully in the world (and there are many), instead of production of products relatively inefficiently in comparison to the world, that is, at prices that are too high.

Protection of domestically produced goods thus resulted not only in inefficient use of means of production here, but also to waste of expensive foreign currency. And, indeed, in the framework of the recovery policy the government took upon itself in 1991 the adoption of an exposure plan. The timing of this decision was influenced more than a little also by the wave of immigration, which was supposed to bring a large volume of investment. Therefore, it must be ensured that the investments will not be directed to products that are worthwhile for the investor only because of the umbrella of protection. The investments that are being carried out in these years, and that will aid in absorbing the newcomers to the labor force, will determine to a great extent the direction of the future development of the economy and its rate of growth. The more the investments in the sectors that are exposed to international competition, the more efficient the use of the factors of production, and the growth of the national pie will be accelerated.

However, it is clear that too rapid an exposure is liable to result in the temporary idling of means of production and layoffs of workers. Therefore, a plan for gradual exposure was adopted, which has a path of declining protection that is known in advance, which allows enterprises that will be exposed to make preparations, to increase efficiency, or to change their production lines. A retreat from this plan, as was recently proposed, would lead to the loss of the achievements that were intended for the long term, which are inherent in the development of the economy in the areas in which it will be able to compete in the world, and would set the economy back.

All that can be done in view of the volume of unemployment is to deal solely on a focused basis with enterprises whose main production lines will not be able to exist in another five years (the date for the completion of exposure).

Does that outside observer err, then, in his amazement at the Israeli economy? According to the analysis here, definitely not. In comparison to other countries, the development of the economy is worthy of commendation, even though there is still much room for improvements.

Sale of Homes in Qatzrin Detailed

93AA0034C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
8 Apr 93 p 23

[Article by Goga Qogan: "Storming the Golan"]

[Text] Yesterday at 0900 a small battle occurred on the Golan Heights. No, not to worry, no armored fighting developed and no artillery attack broke out, rather "just" an attack on apartments. It was a typical Israeli storming, that began with rumors about a wonderful deal and ended with bitter disputes ("Sir, I was here in line before you!").

The reason for all the ruckus was a sale of apartments in Qatzrin. The Ministry of Housing, through the Shikun

VePitu'ah Company, is releasing 250 apartments in the only city in the Golan. The Israelis, so it would appear, are not upset by the uncertainty that clouds the future of the Heights; the customers register, push their way, buy. The sought-after commodity: three-room apartments, 70 square meters, with land, with the possibility of expansion, at a price ranging from NIS [new Israeli shekels] 120,000 to 130,000.

Samy Bar-Lev, the chief of the Qatzrin Council, who came to see the sale with his own eyes, had not expected too many. He was surprised. The arguments and the pushing in line put him in a good mood. "It is a good sign," he gushed, "if they are fighting over apartments only in the registration stage."

Bar-Lev was encouraged especially by the onrush, following the comments of Assistant Foreign Minister Yossi Beylin, who said yesterday that, "there will be those who will have to get used to the idea of Syrian sovereignty." In the Golan, they take to heart such an expression. But the tens who milled around at the building site, knocked on the concrete blocks, walked among the scaffolding, examined the apartments, and besieged the clerks, did not get too upset by that.

After an hour, already 30 buyers had registered: one-third of them residents of Qatzrin, who want to improve their housing conditions a bit, one-third new immigrants, and one-third residents of the center of the country, who are interested in a second apartment.

Attractive terms are offered to the buyers: a special loan in the amount of NIS 49,500, a grant in the amount of NIS 60,000 to those who lack housing and NIS 25,000 for apartment owners. The immigrants consulted with Russian-speaking representatives of the banks, armed with brochures, who jumped on anyone who approached the scene.

Several long-time residents of Qatzrin, who want to leave the crowded projects, complained: "These new immigrants are getting everything, and we, who came here 13 years ago, have to wait in line."

A retiree from the center of the country, who came together with his wife, explained: "For whom is the apartment? Maybe for me, maybe for my son, I have not yet decided."

And what about the withdrawal, which everyone is talking about recently? Aren't you apprehensive?

"No problem. I am relying on As'ad, that nothing will come of it. For he will demand what we cannot give, and from the whole story we will remain here."

The attractive female clerk at the registration table reveals that most of the buyers from the center of the country are coming to buy a second apartment. They explained to her that the price tempted them, but she is not sure. Perhaps it is speculation, maybe they want to buy cheap and sell dear.

Not all of the individuals there devoted the first day of the week between Pesah and Sukkot to construction sites. Outside of Qatzrin, there was a spectacular kite event, and a ceremony of planting was held at the "Peace Forest." On the way there or back, the travellers jump over to Qatzrin and inquire seriously into the purchase of an apartment.

The secretary of the United Qibbutz Movement, Muki Tzur, who arrived at the planting ceremony, was not sure that all of the customers are pioneering settlers with flashing eyes. There are always speculators, who purchase whatever is available, he suspects.

Bar-Lev is not suspicious and does not inquire into the registrants' motives, the main thing is that they come to the Golan: "I do not care what they think secretly. The main thing is the facts, which speak for themselves. If this promotion, together with the campaign of filling the housing—which will begin after Pesah throughout the Heights, in moshavs, in community centers, and in kibbutzes—will bring 1,000 families, that is worth more than all of the talk. I have not yet encountered speculators here. The people that are coming are not doing this due to thoughts about withdrawal compensation."

Bar-Lev also storms the site and gives out orders: "Move the directions sign over there, so that they can see it from afar."

Next to him stops another family from the center of the country, which is touring in the region. The wife gets out of the vehicle and says to her husband with gleaming eyes: "Ya, what a beautiful place, maybe we will come here to leave in spite of everything, what do you think?" The husband says cynically: "First let them move the factory here, then we will look into the matter."

Effect of Closing on Contractors, Housing Viewed

93AA0034B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
15 Apr 93 p 21

[Article by Hagar Enosh: "Who Will Save Your House"]

[Text] Will apartment prices rise as a result of the closure, which entered its fifteenth day this morning? How can one know? In the exchange of the construction workers, especially the skilled workers, there is now a situation of "buyers only." Construction workers from East Jerusalem, who are exempt from the closure, demand and receive at this time NIS [new Israel shekels] 200 per day net, 50 percent more than a month ago. Especially those with the skills in demand—erectors of scaffolding, plasterers, and floor layers.

Such a rise in wages must, in the final analysis, be expressed in the price paid by the consumer. But this is only one side of the scaffolding. On the other side, there is the precedent of the Gulf war: the workers from the territories disappeared then from the scaffolding for two months—and nothing terrible actually happened. For the following three months there was indeed a massive

sell-off at astounding prices, but whoever refused to panic and waited a little was able to buy an apartment at a better price during all the months of the long slump that came after that big fuss.

The present closure, which is beginning its third week, serves meanwhile mainly as an excuse for advancing various interests. The Construction Workers Union demands that the wages of Israeli workers be raised; the contractors demand the return of the workers from Roumania, Turkey, Brazil, and China; the owners, who are selling second-hand apartments, are exploiting the confusion in order to demand higher prices.

A female apartment broker: "The owner of a four-room apartment that is worth, in our opinion, \$225,000, a few weeks ago wanted \$240,000. He decided yesterday that he would in no way sell for less than \$250,000. Why? Because he feels that many buyers are now afraid to sign with a contractor."

Great interest, but few actual deals, are reported by the "Levy Yitzhak" appraisal and survey company: the company's pollsters found that during the week between Pesah and Sukkot, many individuals abandoned the traditional visits to building sites and went to see old apartments.

A spokesman for the Contractors' Association, Tzvi Friedman, says that if no solution is found for renewing work by the end of the month, there will be irreversible damage. At its daily emergency meeting yesterday, the Contractors' Association listed its demands: 10,000 foreign workers for up to one year, together with a plan for mass training of Israelis and deferring the delivery dates of apartments and other structures. All this, of course, on one basic condition: a declaration by the government that the workers of the territories will not be allowed to return. "Here," says the spokesman for the Association, "is the whole solution in one blow."

The director general of Shikun VeBinuy (the parent concern of Shikun 'Ovdim and Solel Boneh), 'Uzi Vardizer, is inclined to agree with the diagnosis, but not with the treatment that is proposed by his colleagues: "I doubt the possibility of implementing such a separation, and without a separation there is no hope for any of the training plans. No one will learn a trade if he knows that in another half a year or a year his competitors will return to the market, offering the goods at a lower price."

Is it possible to implement a complete separation? The question is not only political, and is not even only economic-national. There are also the real laws of the market. Yesterday, for example, it became clear that fewer laborers than they were allowed to order came to some agriculturalists. Whence did these laborers from the territories disappear? To the construction sector, it is asserted, for tens of them "were grabbed up and smuggled in" by Israeli contractors to near-by building sites.

Is the demand for the declaration of a forgiveness of contractual milestones justified on account of the lack

of hands? Not at this time, it seems. Almost every purchase contract has a clause that allows the contractor to fall behind three months in delivering the apartment, without any penalty. "Even beyond that," says the economist Dr. David Cohen, one of the owners of the Cohen Development company, "it is possible to shorten the stages of construction. It is only a question of proper organization and of a certain increase in expenses."

Thus we arrive at the central question—money. Dr. Cohen estimates that the wages of construction workers will stabilize in the future at a level 15-17 percent higher than today, even if the government accepts the contractors' demands and will allow the entry of 20,000 construction workers from the territories, about a third of the number that were previously employed in the branch.

Such a wage increase, say the contractors, would compel them to raise, with great regret, the prices of apartments by 7 percent. The building branch in Israel continues to be labor-intensive and its wage component constitutes 44 percent of the construction inputs index. The Construction Workers Union maintains that even if the wages of the workers were raised by 50 percent (as they demand), there would be no justification to increase apartment prices by more than 1.5 percent.

"The contractors are able to absorb part of the costs," says Secretary Shlomo Dahan. An examination of the last year strengthens his assertion: in that period, the prices of owned apartments (from contractors and second hand) rose 18 percent, while the construction inputs index rose only 9.7 percent.

Dahan adds a decisive assertion: apartment prices are not directly related to calculations and costs. They depend on demand. And as he does not see on the horizon a great outburst of demand for apartments, he estimates that the lack of demand will not allow the contractors to raise apartment prices in the near future.

Both sides agree that no matter what happens, and whatever happens, there will be an increase in the wages of the construction workers and that it will bring about an increase in the construction inputs index.

Should this index interest apartment buyers? And how. The first victims of such a new situation will be those who have purchased an apartment and have not yet paid the entire price. The prices of apartments that are offered for sale change according to the laws of supply and demand, but the unpaid balances for an apartment that has already been sold are almost always linked to the construction inputs index.

If wages go up during April by 15 percent, the construction inputs index is liable to jump on a one-time basis by 6 percent due to this item. A debt of NIS 200,000, for example, will suddenly grow to NIS 212,000.

Minister of Construction and Housing Binyamin Ben-Eli'ezer promised yesterday at a press conference that Israel is preparing for the new reality "In the first stages, shocks are, indeed, expected," he said, "but I have no doubt that in the end homes of good quality and at lower prices will be built in Israel."

For he who pays more in the near future, there is little comfort in that.

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